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Al-Ahram Weekly 12 - 18 August 1999 Issue No. 442 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 12 - 18 August 1999 Issue No. 442
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Books Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Washington takes a back-seat?
By Lamis AndoniWhile Bibi Netanyahu's aggressive style necessitated a hands-on US role to prevent the collapse of the peace process, Ehud Barak's "pragmatism" has ushered in a new stage in American-Israeli plans for a Middle East settlement that allows Israel far more flexibility in pursuing its security and political interests.
During his recent visit to Washington, Barak sought, and to a large extent succeeded, in convincing the American administration that Israel can now be relied upon as a partner that reconciles its goals with the American quest for containment of conflicts and "threats" in the area.
On the basis of this new understanding, the US and Israel would agree on the strategic parameters of the peace process, while Israel would maintain a free hand in playing the role of a tough negotiator with the Arab parties.
The US, on its side, would use its global leverage to ensure that Israel would not find itself under regional or international pressure to cede territory or give way to demands that contradict its security or regional interests.
An example of this new dynamic was evident in at least two official American statements. In responding to reporters' questions about Israeli intentions of modifying the Wye River Memorandum signed in October by Netanyahu and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the US would support whatever the parties agreed to. As representative of the sole sponsor of the Wye Memorandum, Albright was effectively signalling to the Palestinians that Israel is no longer obliged to carry out its part of the agreement.
At the same time, the US has been using its global leverage to prevent the international community from supporting Palestinian rights or pressuring Israel to respect international law. In a congressional testimony last month, under-secretary of state for international organisations, David Welch, vowed that the US will work to ensure that Israel is treated fairly at the United Nations. By "fair treatment", Welch, a veteran Middle East diplomat, meant to discourage attempts at obliging Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention banning the building of settlements in occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and to United Nations resolutions 181 and 194 dealing respectively with the right of Palestinians to establish a state in Palestine and the right of refugees to return to their land. Welch revealed that President Bill Clinton had personally asked French President Jacques Chirac and other world leaders not to pursue such efforts at the United Nations.
There is a discernible pattern here of America retracting its commitment given at Wye, while using its international prestige and power to guarantee Israel a negotiating edge over the Arab parties. Analysts believe the pattern is likely to continue. While there is no fundamental difference between "the old" and "the new" American role, this new pattern of US involvement in fact places the Arab parties in an even weaker position at the negotiating table. They will lose any margin of manoeuvre, however limited, they might have enjoyed as a result of differences between the US and Israel. Under Netanyahu the US was forced to intervene and demand Israeli territorial concessions in order to save the peace process. Such intervention, which occurred mostly during the negotiation of the Hebron Protocols and Wye, alarmed Israelis who feared that they could lose control of defining their territorial "concessions".
Ironically, both agreements gave unprecedented authority to Israel to determine the scope and timing of its troop withdrawal or redeployments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, some Israelis, including Barak, concluded that US eagerness to salvage the peace process had prompted territorial concessions that did not adequately correspond to Israeli security interests.
This Israeli view was endorsed and defended by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after meeting with Barak last month. "Israeli negotiators, however appreciative of American material help, instinctively resist American pressure for fear of establishing a pattern that would gradually push them beyond the limits regarding Israel's security, especially because the margin that determines the survival of a country whose maximum width is measured in tens of miles inevitably appears trivial to a continental power such as the United States," Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post on 19 July.
Kissinger went on to advocate "understanding" between Washington and Israel about the extent and limits of Israeli withdrawal (in the Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories) while leaving the Israeli negotiators a free hand at the negotiating table.
In return, Israel would have to guarantee the continuity of the peace process by reviving what is called "the Israeli-Palestinian security partnership", and pursue its overtures to Syria.
The US, meanwhile, would be expected to step up its "prodding", in Barak's words, of both Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and Arafat, to comply.
Such views appear to have made headway in Washington precisely because they pave the way for a regional security order headed by Israel. This cannot be achieved unless there is peace with Syria, and the implied consequent isolation of Iraq, Iran and even the Palestinians. The periodic meetings, agreed upon by Clinton and Barak, would serve to further formulate an Israeli-American plan for the region.
Barak has yet to prove to the US that Israeli power and diplomacy can prevent the peace process from reaching a dangerous impasse.
