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Al-Ahram Weekly 19 - 25 August 1999 Issue No. 443 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 19 - 25 August 1999 Issue No. 443
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Two states, one Holy Land
By John Whitbeck *As the Israeli-Palestinian peace process struggles to move forward again, what is most sadly missing is any compelling vision of how a Holy Land at peace could be structured in the new millennium so as to enhance not only the physical security of Israelis and the human dignity of Palestinians, but also the quality of day-to-day life for both peoples.
While Yitzhak Rabin never revealed his vision (if any) of what "permanent status" might actually look like (even, by her own admission, to his wife), Ehud Barak has given a glimpse of his own vision. It is based on the principle that "tall fences make good neighbours" and aspires to reduce the number of Palestinians working in Israel to zero. It features a 47km-long elevated highway between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank -- elevated so as to prevent any Israeli-Palestinian contact or "contamination". Its key word is "separation" (apartheid in Afrikaans). It is a profoundly depressing vision, far from the goal of an "historic reconciliation" proclaimed in the Declaration of Principles so optimistically signed on the White House lawn in September 1993.
Can Israelis and Palestinians really do no better than this? Is there really no middle ground between "Greater Israel" and apartheid? Or might it still be possible to blend the practical and psychological necessity of a two-state solution with some of the best aspects of a humane one-state solution, and so produce a vision of a possible future so bright that both Israelis and Palestinians would be inspired to act on their hopes and dreams rather than their memories and fears, to seize this future together and make it a reality?
Sharing the Holy Land is not a zero-sum game, in which any development advantageous to one side must be disadvantageous to the other. One can envisage a society in which, by separating political and voting rights from economic, social and residential rights in a negotiated settlement, both the legitimate national aspirations of Palestinians and the legitimate security interests of Israelis could be simultaneously satisfied.
The non-negotiable minimum for both Israelis and Palestinians is their own self-determination as peoples and nations, that they can have a state of their own in the land that both love, including at least some share of Jerusalem, and that never again will anyone else govern them. This is not impossible. The Holy Land could be a two-state "confederation", a single economic and social unit encompassing two sovereign states and one Holy City. Jerusalem could be an Israeli-Palestinian "condominium", forming an undivided part of both states, being the capital of both states and being administered by an umbrella municipal council and local district councils.
All current residents of the Holy Land could be given the choice of Israeli or Palestinian citizenship, thus determining which state's passport they would carry and in which state's national elections they would vote. All citizens of either state could vote in municipal elections where they actually live, a matter of particular relevance to Israeli Arabs opting for Palestinian citizenship and to Israeli settlers choosing to continue to live in Palestine. Each state could have its own "law of return" conferring citizenship and residential rights within that state on persons not currently resident in the Holy Land.
Borders would have to be drawn on maps but would not have to exist on the ground. The free, non-discriminatory movement of people and products within the Holy Land could be a fundamental principle subject only to one major exception: to ensure that each state would always maintain its national character, the right to residence in each Holy Land state could be limited to that state's citizens, to citizens of the other state residing there on an agreed future date and to their descendants. In this way, deeply felt principles could be maintained. Israelis could have the right to live in all of Eretz Israel -- but not all Israelis in all of Eretz Israel. Similarly, Palestinians could have the right to live in all of historic Palestine -- but not all Palestinians in all of historic Palestine. A common currency (perhaps printed in Hebrew on one side and Arabic on the other) could be issued by a common central bank.
To ease Israeli security concerns, the Palestinian state could be fully demilitarised, with only Palestinian police allowed to bear arms within its territory. As an essential counterpart to the absence of border controls within the Holy Land, Israel could conduct its own immigration controls, at the same time that Palestine conducts its immigration controls, at the frontiers of the Palestinian state with Egypt and Jordan, with any non-Palestinian visitors restricted to the Palestinian state by the Israeli authorities facing penalties if found in Israel. The settlement agreement could be guaranteed by the United Nations and relevant states, with international tribunals to arbitrate disputes regarding compliance with its terms.
The status of Jerusalem poses the toughest problem for any settlement plan, causing many to assume, for this reason alone, that no settlement acceptable to both sides can ever be reached. When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 in 1947, it addressed the problem by suggesting an international status for Jerusalem, with neither the Jewish state nor the Arab state to have sovereignty over the city. Yet joint undivided sovereignty, while rare, is not without precedent.
Chandigarh is the joint undivided capital of two Indian states. For half a century, Sudan was a condominium of Britain and Egypt, officially named "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan". For more than 70 years, the Pacific Islands state of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides Condominium) was under the joint undivided sovereignty of Britain and France. For more than 700 years, until a 1993 constitutional revision, the Principality of Andorra was under the joint undivided sovereignty of French and Spanish "co-princes". In March 1999, the arbitrator appointed by the International Court of Justice ruled that the contested Bosnian municipality of Brcko should be a condominium shared by Bosnia's Serb Republic and its Muslim-Croat Federation.
As a joint capital, Jerusalem could have Israeli government offices principally in its western sector, Palestinian government offices principally in its eastern sector and municipal offices in both. A system of districts or French-style arrondissements could bring municipal government closer to the different communities in the city. To the extent that either state wished to control persons or goods passing into it from the other state, this could be done at the points of exit from, rather than the points of entry to, Jerusalem. In a context of peace, particularly one coupled with economic union, the need for such controls would be minimal.
In a sense, Jerusalem can be viewed as a cake which could be sliced either vertically or horizontally. Either way, the Palestinians would get a share of the cake, but, while most Israelis could never voluntarily swallow a vertical slice, they might just be able to swallow a horizontal slice. (Indeed, by doing so, Israel would finally achieve international recognition of Jerusalem as its capital.) Jerusalem is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in hearts and minds. Undivided but shared in this way, Jerusalem could be a symbol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims, Christians and the world as a whole.
Such a framework would address in ways advantageous to both sides the three principal practical problems on the road to peace -- Jerusalem (through joint sovereignty over an undivided city), settlers (through a separation of citizenship rights from residential rights in a regime of free access to the entire Holy Land for all citizens of both states, under which no one would be compelled to move) and borders (through a structure of relations between the two states so open and non-threatening that the precise placement of borders would no longer be such a contentious issue and the pre-1967 borders -- subject only to the expanded borders of Jerusalem, under joint sovereignty -- might well be acceptable to most Israelis, as they would certainly be to most Palestinians).
For Jewish Israelis, the threat of one day living in a state with a majority of Arab voters or an inescapable resemblance to pre-1990 South Africa would be replaced by the assurance of living in a democratic state with fewer Arab voters than today. The Israelis' security would be enhanced by assuaging, rather than continuing to aggravate, the Palestinians' grievances. By escaping from the role (so tragic in light of Jewish history) of oppressors and enforcers of injustice, Israel would save its soul and its dreams.
For all Palestinians, human dignity would be restored. They would cease to be a people treated (and not only by Israelis) as pariahs uniquely unworthy of basic human rights. For those in exile, an internationally accepted Palestinian citizenship, a Palestinian passport and a right to return, if only to visit, would have enormous significance. And if the Palestinians themselves accepted a settlement, few, if any, Arab states would continue to reject Israel. If a Palestinian flag were peacefully raised over Palestinian government offices in Jerusalem, few Arab eyes would still see Israel through a veil of hatred. The immovable obstacle to a lasting region-wide peace would be removed.
While the implementation of such a framework for peace would be relatively simple, its acceptance would require a moral, spiritual and psychological transformation from both Israelis and Palestinians. Yet, given the decades of hatred, bitterness and distrust, any settlement would require such a transformation. Precisely because such a transformation would be so difficult, it is far more likely to be achieved if both peoples can be inspired by a truly compelling vision of a new society of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and human dignity, in which both peoples are winners, than if they are left to contemplate painful programmes for a new partition and an angry separation in which both peoples must regard themselves, to a considerable degree, as admitting defeat.
Israelis, Palestinians and the true friends of both must now raise their sights beyond the minutiae of the Wye Memorandum and pursue a compelling vision of a society so much better than the status quo that both Israelis and Palestinians are inspired to accept in their hearts and minds that peace is both desirable and attainable, that the Holy Land can be shared, that a winner-take-all approach produces only losers, that both Israelis and Palestinians must be winners or both will continue to be losers and that there is a common destination at which both peoples would be satisfied to arrive and to live together.
Peace is unimaginable on any other basis.
* The writer is an international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
