 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 19 - 25 August 1999 Issue No. 443 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 19 - 25 August 1999 Issue No. 443
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The Syrian-Palestinian rift
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
As they prepare to embark on what promises to be a decisive round in the peace negotiations, the Arab parties can adopt one of two possible approaches: either to set an ultimate goal and then decide how to go about reaching it; or not commit themselves in advance to any specific goal, but move forward with the negotiations anyhow, on the assumption that the dynamics of the peace process will eventually generate conditions favourable to the restoration of rights, even if these rights are not clearly formulated beforehand. The first approach is that of the Syrian leadership, the second that of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Actually, the existence of these two approaches is due less to personal animosities between Assad and Arafat than to objective reasons. For Syria, the only acceptable outcome of negotiations with Israel is the restoration of the Golan Heights in their entirety, that is, the pullback by Israeli forces to the pre-June 1967 borders. Short of that, Syria has no incentive to end its present total boycott of Israel. For the Israelis, however, as well as for all the other parties involved, there is every incentive to involve Syria in the peace process, because without its participation there cannot be an overall peace.
Fully aware of Syria's central role in any final settlement, Assad has consistently resisted all attempts to draw him into a step-by-step process and insisted on maintaining his all-or-nothing posture on the issue. This explains his absence from the funeral of King Hassan of Morocco. With both Clinton and an important Israeli delegation present in Rabat, Assad did not want to find himself in the embarrassing position of being coerced by the US president into shaking hands with Israel's leaders.
Though Assad's line can appear to be similar to that of the rejectionists who oppose all forms of normalisation with Israel, the similarity is tactical rather than strategic. Rejectionists proceed from the premise that there can be no alternative to eliminating the Zionist entity from the Middle East, and that even if the balance of power does not make that option possible today, they will just have to wait until it shifts in their favour. In the meantime, there is no question of establishing any kind of contact, let alone relations, with Israel, as this would provide it with some form of legitimacy. Contrary to the rejectionist approach, Assad does not exclude the possibility of dealing directly with Israel once it will have restored the Golan Heights to Syria along the pre-'67 lines. If Israel agrees to that, Syria will be ready to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.
Such a strong bargaining chip is not available to the Palestinian Authority. Its ultimate objective, an independent Arab Palestinian state, has never existed before. The Palestinian territories on which the PA intends to build that state were previously either under Jordanian rule or Egyptian custody. Recovering Palestinian land from Israel does not automatically mean placing it under Palestinian sovereignty. Thus the Palestinian Authority is forced to pursue a cautious step-by-step approach. If it is true that the PA is gambling on Israel's need to 'freeze' the Palestinian problem by accepting the creation of a Palestinian state capable of absorbing Palestinian discontent and preventing it from affecting Israel's security and stability, it is also true that Israel will never wholeheartedly espouse Palestinian aspirations, but placate them only to the extent necessary to eliminate them as a threat to its own security. Indeed, some Israelis (the Likud) are altogether against the creation of a Palestinian state, while even those who do not necessarily refuse the idea insist that it should remain demilitarised and with limited sovereignty.
It is thus clear that objective, and not only subjective, reasons stand behind the opposing approaches adopted by Assad and Arafat to the conflict. What is particularly disturbing is that the divergence of views between the two parties will probably become more pronounced over the coming critical period. How can there be talk of an all-encompassing Arab summit when the Syrian-Palestinian rift stands in the way of convening a restricted Arab summit limited only to the front-line states? As matters now stand, we are more likely to see Assad meet with Barak before he meets with Arafat!
Of course, the growing rift between Syria and the PA is not the only sign of discord throughout the region. There are deep quarrels between the Arab parties, between the various Israeli parties and even between Israel and the US, indeed, between Barak and Clinton themselves. The American president is keen to crown his second term with a statement announcing that peace has been achieved and an end brought to the century-old conflict between Arabs and Jews over Palestine. It will not matter to what extent this statement corresponds to the realities on the ground. As recent events in the Balkans illustrated, a characteristic of our present world order is that discrepancies can be wide between statements issued at the summit of the world community and what actually happens on the ground. What Clinton is concerned with is not the trickle-down effect of the peace arrangements at the grassroots level, but the ability to declare that peace has been achieved thanks to his sponsoring of the process. This can do much to enhance his status and exonerate him from the Lewinsky scandal.
As for Barak, it is clear from his attitude towards the Wye River agreement that he is in no hurry to reach a settlement. Though it was duly signed, if only partially implemented, by his predecessor, Barak is now demanding the re-negotiation of substantial parts of the agreement, which will mean delaying its implementation up to at least January of next year. With Barak stonewalling and Clinton keen to have a deal wrapped up before the end of his presidency in January 2001, the Arabs could well end up bearing the main brunt of the concessions that will have to be made for the Final Declaration to be issued on time.
As far as the Arab parties are concerned, whatever differences exist between Barak and Clinton are more apparent than real. Actually, Barak is taking advantage of Clinton's eagerness to come up with a Final Declaration to induce him into pressing the Arab side to make ever greater concessions. Moreover, Barak has committed himself to deal with the three parties -- the Palestinian, the Syrian and the Lebanese -- simultaneously. This gives him the opportunity to select which of the three he will choose to concentrate on at any given moment, thus playing the Arab parties off one against the other and bringing about further disarray in the already fractured Arab ranks.
To ensure that his negotiation opportunities are not undermined by any undesirable act on the part of the Palestinian rejectionist organisations that have taken refuge in Syria, Assad has limited their freedom of action to the issuance of benign 'political' statements. This has driven George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to engage in talks with its erstwhile nemesis, Arafat's Fateh. To justify the move, the PFLP admitted that the Oslo and Wye agreements, though totally unacceptable, have become facts of life and that getting an opportunity to have a say on the final settlement is a lesser evil than remaining totally outside the process. There is little doubt that the PFLP's opening on Arafat will encourage other Palestinian organisations based in Syria to follow suit. But the bond between the PFLP and similar splinter groups in Damascus on the one hand and Fateh on the other, which is a common history of resistance under the umbrella of the PLO, does not apply to Hamas, which has never been a part of the PLO. With no shared legacy pleading for reconciliation and the deep animosity between Assad and Arafat, Hamas's implacable opposition to the PA is unlikely to soften any time soon, even if Syria now stands against Arafat on tactical rather than strategic grounds.
As the game gets tighter in the run-up to the Final Declaration, all the parties are manoeuvring to improve their bargaining positions and optimise their share of whatever deal is worked out. The dynamics this rationale will set into motion are bound to add even more complicated dimensions to the Palestinian-Syrian rift. This places an extra burden on Egypt, probably the only party whose mediation between the Syrians and the Palestinians can be constructive and salutary.
