 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 26 Aug. - 1 Sep. 1999 Issue No. 444 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 26 Aug. - 1 Sep. 1999 Issue No. 444
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Focus Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The problem is not the summit
By Hassan Nafaa *
The idea that an Arab summit is necessary at this point has received extensive media coverage. While advocates of a summit have plausible arguments and sound reasons to support their position, they appear nervous and emotional (implying, perhaps, that the summit is an escape from a grim future), rather than analysts coolly deliberating the problems besetting the Arab world. An excess of zeal and emotion followed by a sudden lapse in attention (until the next crisis arises) seems to characterise our approach to critical matters.
Our traditional approach to issues that matter to us as Arabs, has changed -- consciously or unconsciously. The change may imply that certain points need to be addressed. For example, we seem to believe in the existence of an organic and self-evident link between the failure of the peace process and the convening of an Arab summit. At every pitfall in the staggering peace process, we hear calls for a summit. But once the peace process is back on track, the voices fall silent, summits are dismissed as unnecessary. Positing such a link between the failure of the peace process and the convening of an Arab summit is dangerous. It implies that the Arab-Israeli conflict has become the only field for collective Arab action. In other words, once Syria and Lebanon make peace with Israel, Arab summits would be entirely unnecessary. Worse, summits would no longer be contingent on the extent of progress achieved on the path to a comprehensive settlement: they would be contingent on the state of the process itself and its viability as a mechanism, regardless of results. As long as the process is rolling along, there will be no need for Arab leaders to meet.
The fact that only one summit has been held in the past 10 years (the exception having taken place at a time when the imminent collapse of the peace process made it imperative) confirms the idea that the role of Arab summits has been reduced to a mere symbol, signifying that collective Arab action is still alive and well. Whenever the Arab states decide to hold a summit to discuss developments in the peace process, the US and Israel immediately leap to discourage such an initiative, which, they argue, could only harden the Arab position on the peace process. An invitation to an Arab summit is considered proof of Arab extremism, intolerance and exasperation. Summits have therefore become a much dreaded institution in the eyes of major international and regional powers; they are also a temporary institution, to be discarded once Syria and Lebanon sign their agreements with Israel.
The Arab countries alone are to blame for exposing this vital institution to the danger of extinction through their irresponsible behaviour. Had the Arabs met regularly, without fail, to discuss their differences and common projects, the world would have been forced to deal with these meetings as institutions affiliated to the Arab League and duly mandated to deal with issues of concern to the Arabs, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US and Israel would never have acted as though such summits lacked any substance or continuity, as though their sole aim was to reflect opposition to peace initiatives.
The claim that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent cooling of relations, particularly between the Arab monarchs and other heads of state, has rendered any summit attended by President Saddam difficult (if not outright inconceivable) is false. First, Kuwaiti officials have consistently repeated that Kuwait is not opposed to an Arab summit attended by all parties, including Iraq. Further, Iraq never insisted that it be represented at any summit by its president. It even confirmed that it was prepared to turn down an invitation to a summit attended by all Arab states if its absence was seen as likely to enhance the summit's possible success in passing resolutions beneficial to Arab interests. On the other hand, there are matters worthy of discussion at summits besides the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, and even the Arab-Israeli conflict. Scores of other problems which are of great relevance to all the Arabs can only be settled through meetings at the highest level. Saddam Hussein should not be viewed as an obstacle to an Arab summit, since his presence is not absolutely necessary. Issues that could prove explosive could also simply be postponed until simpler matters have been dealt with.
To leave such legitimate questions pending seems to suggest that there are obstacles to a summit that has nothing to do with Saddam Hussein or Iraq, the PLO, or the countries "opposed" to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The international scene is facing situations at least as critical as those the Arabs have to address, but the conviction prevails that every problem has a solution of some kind. Levels of awareness differ from country to country: not all nations are able to take stock of their own problems, then draw lessons from their own experiences and those of others. Yet certain countries are incapable of learning and, like mice, return time and again to gnaw at the piece of cheese in the same trap.
No problem must be left to calcify. Countries must remain on the alert and mobilise their political will to address problems and find creative solutions. Problems seem much larger with the passing of time. It is this determination, it would seem, that is the missing ingredient in Arab politics.
But why should political will be lacking today, as we seek a way out of the crisis? There are two possible answers. First, that the ruling elite in Arab countries is unaware of the dangers surrounding it, and believes that the current crisis is a summer cloud that will soon pass, like other crises in the past. But this is a tad far-fetched. The ruling elite cannot have acquired a degree of self confidence verging on stupidity and a reckless refusal to face facts. Speculation on oil prices, Israel's unlimited arrogance and attempts to impose its military and technological hegemony, the conceptual vacuum in Arab intellectual life, frustrated extremist factions, globalism and its challenges: all these are clear and present dangers. The lack of political will, truly, cannot be the result of any lack of awareness.
The second, more plausible possible answer is that the Arab rulers cannot find their way out of the current crisis. They perceive solutions only through the filter of local reality, in terms of the here and now, riddled as it is with innumerable everyday problems clamouring to be solved. Even when rulers are aware of the solutions required, they realise that collective action at the regional or international levels is necessary. Since their ability to forge policies at these levels is strictly limited, they fall back upon their limited authority at a domestic or bilateral level. Within such a pragmatic perspective, nationalism loses its urgency and its specificity. It cannot generate itself, but needs to be fuelled to maintain its momentum.
Today, no Arab state or group of states is ready or able to take on the task of igniting and maintaining pan-Arab national sentiment and its concrete manifestations. The Arab world today does not need a summit to coordinate its policy on the peace process. This time, Syria will be the one to scupper any gathering that limits its agenda to this item alone. It will perceive such a meeting as a conspiracy aimed at fettering its ability to manoeuvre in the coming stage, and as an attempt to tie it to parties that repeatedly refused to wait for Syria but preferred to embark alone on a settlement with Israel. No one possesses enough moral or political clout to dissuade Syria from taking action on its own in the Arab-Israeli settlement. In forging its position, Syria will ignore all considerations bar its own view of its interests.
We now need a comprehensive mechanism for the management of inter-Arab relations in the aftermath of the occupation of Kuwait. We must also think of ways to manage relations between Arabs and their geographical neighbours, including Israel, after bilateral settlements are concluded. Finally, we will have to think of our relations with the international community in the context of globalisation.
Can a comprehensive view which accommodates these different dimensions be forged? Can it be translated into a mechanism for effective Arab collective action? This vision is desperately needed. It has little to do with Egypt's role in the '50s and '60s; in fact, is not a role that one Arab country can assume alone. Can Egypt advocate it, encourage its development and take responsibility for bringing it about?
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
