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Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 September 1999 Issue No. 445 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 September 1999 Issue No. 445
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Focus Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Notes towards an agenda
By Tahseen Bashir *
In the last half century the Arab agenda has swung between periods of stability and periods of change. At the beginning of the '50s, for instance, a general consensus prevailed among Arab states, united in their opposition to colonialism. Independence, and its contingent strategies, became the central pivot of the intra-Arab agenda. Differences appeared quickly, however, between those Arab states that considered the adoption of revolutionary positions as the only possible course and the more traditional Arab regimes that thought the best policy to deal with Western colonialism was to seek accommodation through co-operation between Arab governments and the traditional colonialists in London and Paris.
This period, that might be characterised as a conflict between those states that sought cooperation and neighbours seeking confrontation, has been termed the Arab Cold War. As a broad rule of thumb, countries that needed Western cooperation to develop their oil reserves tended towards conciliation, a direction lent greater impetus by the existence of a great many traditional monarchies.
The partition of Palestine in 1948 and the resulting Arab-Israeli military conflicts led to an intensification of this cold war. Those governments that sought to prevent the partition by military means were pitted against other regimes, most notably that of trans-Jordan, that sought to consolidate their own positions by cooperating, directly or indirectly, with Britain and the emerging state of Israel.
Following the rise of the US to a position of hegemony, attempts were made by Washington to contain the cold war via a policy centred on joining Turkey to the Arab regional system under the guise of containing the Soviet Union, and through treaties such as the Baghdad Pact.
The pivotal struggle then, had a three dimensional aspect: the Arab; the circle of regional powers such as Turkey, Iran and Israel and external powers -- the US, UK and France. But while external and regional factors were dominant, Arab domestic agendas were also changing, dictated largely by an emerging middle class. In Egypt this group was spear-headed by the young revolutionary officers who led the 1952 coup d'état, and who quickly developed a revolutionary new agenda under the leadership of late President Nasser.
This new agenda demanded radical reform as it sought to restructure the domestic balance of power through land reform and nationalisations. Central planning became paramount in the attempt to build a new Arab society, one capable of more equity and justice at home and yet strong enough to redress a regional balance of power that was increasingly tilting in the favour of Israel and its Western supporters. During this period, the Arab agenda became a composite creature, conditioned by national and regional concerns, but also tempered by domestic considerations.
Among the members of the Arab League a schism developed between states whose regimes were in essence revolutionary and those that believed it could only be by following tradition that the Arab world would save itself from becoming stranded in uncharted waters. They were utterly opposed to the revolutionaries' arguments that a manifold change in the Arab system -- including a redistribution of income and the building of strong military forces -- was the only way by which the Arabs would succeed in facing the dual challenges of modernity and external domination.
What both the traditionalists and the revolutionaries agreed upon was that their avowed aims could be achieved through patriarchal systems in which an authoritarian elite dictated their agenda, allowing little room for diversity of opinion or judicial safeguards for individual rights. Authoritarianism thus became the common denominator of both the supporters of the status quo and those who advocated radical change. Nascent liberal legal systems were consequently stifled as national interests were exclusively decided by the ruling elites.
Democracy came to be confused with foreign domination, while the only freedom on the agenda was freeing the nation from its colonial yoke. The rights of the people to shape foreign and domestic policy were submerged by a developing consensus the vehicles for which were the nationalised media and the one-party systems, or the advocacy of certain interpretations of Islam.
Arab independence, Arab co-operation and its strategies suffered from many ironies. In 1956 President Nasser recognised the independence of Sudan, effectively ending Egyptian ambitions to unify the Nile Valley, while at the same time advocating Arab unification and integration with ever greater vigour.
As the numbers of eligible members of the Arab League grew, it was not unity that developed between them but increasing diversity and division. The agenda shifted away from pan-Arabism to the identification of goals around which Arab states could mobilise. Divisions became glaring with the emergence of a revolutionary movement in Yemen, as Egypt supported the revolutionaries and Saudi Arabia the Imamate.
This period ended with the 1967 defeat and Israeli occupation of Sinai, what remained of Palestine, including Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Neither traditionalists nor revolutionaries had proved capable of containing the Israeli threat. A new Arab agenda then emerged, the flagship of which was the Khartoum Agreement, that sought a compromise between the revolutionaries and the traditionalists.
Polarisation of the Arab world gave way to a new regional and international agenda that revolved around the enigmatic Security Council Resolution 242. Though there were different interpretations of this resolution, a resolution that never mentioned the word Palestine or Palestinians but referred only to refugees without specifying their identity, it was perceived as outlining an orientation towards peace acceptable to both the US and the Soviet Union, as well as the world at large. The delineation of borders and the return of all occupied territories were broached only in the vaguest terms. Nonetheless the resolution became, as indeed it remains, the cornerstone of peaceful political settlements, whether they be UN initiatives or separately brokered agreements. Resolution 242 quickly became established as the benchmark of consensus among all the regional powers, the battle cry of the effort to achieve what is called, probably for the lack of a better term, the peace process.
Concretising formulas acceptable to all parties under the rubric of 242 became a pivotal concern of those whose avowed aim was to usher in a new Middle East, one capable of mutual recognition and cooperation. The Arab agenda, as a consequence, had once more to mutate, so as to accommodate both those who resisted such a scenario, and other states supporting the idea of cooperation. A new regional balance emerged, as some countries -- Egypt and Jordan -- concluded political settlements with Israel, while others, such as Syria and Lebanon, were left struggling to end Israeli occupation of parts of their territories. Yet other countries -- most notably Iraq -- attempted to use this transition in Arab politics to foreground their own new agendas.
The region's oil reserves have also informed an increasingly complex picture, as new wealth was creating in oil-producing countries, but also new imbalances at a regional level. Oil producing countries became ever more willing to accept US support -- happened during the Gulf War when Iraq's attempt to swallow Kuwait exposed the weakness of regional security systems based on perceptions of a common Arab cause. With the direct military intervention of American forces the hinterland of the Arab world lost much of its integrity, while Iraq itself remains exposed to foreign -- i.e. American, British and Turkish -- intervention.
With Iraq divided and paralysed, the Arab world's agenda has become split between those who seek to preserve Iraq's territorial unity, and those who tacitly accept the division of Iraq. And after nine years since the end of the Gulf War there is still no light at the end of this particular tunnel.
In today's world, the Arab agenda faces many new challenges. It must accommodate the increases in population that are a feature of both former revolutionary and traditional countries, and meet the challenge this poses in terms of enhancing economic performance. Unemployment has become, and is likely to remain, high on the domestic agenda of all Arab states. Tackling unemployment is a priority in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, as well as other countries, and one that cannot be solved by propaganda blitzes or the positing of some golden future that never arrives. What is required is an ending of entrenched bureaucracies and all forces that restrict the exercise of the creativity necessary to create economic and social relationships that fit our developing world.
Following the deaths of King Hussein of Jordan, King Hassan of Morocco and the Emir of Bahrain, the composition of the Arab leadership is changing. And this leads to the inevitable question: is what is needed a younger generation of leaders, or is the real challenge the rejuvenation of the economic, political and social systems? Certainly the continued mummification of political and economic systems is inimical to achieving genuine stability and real growth.
The Arab world must redefine its policy towards Iran and Turkey, and must seek a legitimate solution to the problem of the Kurds. Nor can we afford to forget that since independence Sudan has been plagued by intermittent civil wars. Sudan must, therefore, face up to the problems of the south as Egypt did in 1956 when it recognised the independence of Sudan. Any agreement that fails to fulfil the hopes and interests of the Sudanese people in both north and south through some form of mutual recognition or else a federation that allows for unity and permits the different manifestations of specificity that reflect genuine Sudanese concerns cannot, after all, be thought of as a solution.
These concerns apart, it is the Arab-Israeli problem that is likely to remain the number one concern of all Arabs. Unlike the superpowers and regional governments, though, I believe that the key challenge is not a political settlement between Israel and Lebanon or the conclusion of a settlement with Syria, or even the creation of a Palestinian state. For while all of these are positive steps, the most significant challenge is to effect an historical reconciliation between the Arab states and Israel, a reconciliation between the Arab and the Jewish peoples.
The long term Arab agenda remains unclear. To identify that agenda democratically, gradually and effectively, with populations and governments playing their appropriate parts, this is the great test of the future.
*The writer is a veteran Egyptian diplomat.
