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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 September 1999 Issue No. 446 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 September 1999 Issue No. 446
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Focus Culture Features Books Special Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters 'This is much better'
By Sherine Bahaa
What were the reasons behind the last-minute crisis that delayed the signing for two days?
Nabil Shaath
In those talks we were keen on ensuring that no misinterpretation would lead again to problems with the Israelis. And, of course, we were continuing efforts to get better terms for the prisoners. The prisoners remained an issue until the last minute. However, what we could not get directly from the Israelis, we were able to get through American and European guarantees. In fact, the American guarantee directly quoted Mr [Prime Minister Ehud] Barak; so, we had a double guarantee. The guarantees were about four issues. The first was the clear de-linking of the permanent settlement agreement and the schedule of implementation of withdrawal.But reports say there is some kind of linkage between the implementation of withdrawal and final status talks, at least with regards to the time frame.
This is not linkage. When you do two things parallel to each other, at the same time, that is not linking. You link them when you say that progress on one affects completion of the other. However, we insisted on a specific American guarantee. That is the one which says that "it is our understanding that the implementation of the outstanding commitments emanating from the memorandum will proceed as agreed upon and as scheduled regardless of developments in negotiations related to permanent status issues." That is de-linking. The American guarantee, directly quoting Mr Barak, also stated that "we have also been informed by Prime Minister Barak that Israel will implement the future redeployment called for in the memorandum, even if the parties have not concluded the framework agreement of the settlement called for by that time." This is a very clear double assurance on de-linking. Mr Barak himself informed the Israeli cabinet on Sunday that "as much as you have liked to combine and link the two, sorry to inform the cabinet that I had to agree on de-linking."In talks with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine last month, you rejected the idea of going to final status talks before the full implementation of Wye, saying that negotiating while you are on liberated land is different from negotiating while outside it.
It is true. I would have preferred to do that. Had we not wasted three years, I would have loved to do that. But having wasted three years, we did not want to lose more time.Back to the US assurances. You said there were four guarantees that you got from the American side but you mentioned only one. What are the other three?
The second assurance is very clear on the issue of changing status. It explains that what is meant here is unilateral action, which the US will stand against, and makes it clear that its most important concern is settlement activity, adding that the US knows how destructive settlement activity is to the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli peace. We also wanted -- and got -- a reassurance that the positions and policies communicated to us in connection with the conclusion of the Wye River memorandum, as well as those stated in President Clinton's letter of 26 April, 1999, will continue and will be re-confirmed. The reason we sought this guarantee is that the size of the third redeployment, which will be carried out in four months, has not yet been decided. Finally, we got a re-affirmation of the American position that they support the aspirations of the Palestinian people to determine their own future on their own free land. The American and European guarantees resolved the crisis that had delayed signing for two days.Were those guarantees in exchange for the 50 prisoners whose release you initially demanded but later dropped?
No, there is no exchange. We could not get those prisoners because the Israelis would not soften their position. Instead of delivering to us the 50 prisoners, they committed themselves to two things. First, they will free a significant number by Ramadan and another by the new year. Secondly, an ongoing committee will continue to explore names and criteria to allow the release of additional prisoners.How is Wye River II different from the original Wye River memorandum signed last October?
It is much better, and there is a good reason why it is much better. The original Wye was left with vague timing and dates because we could not get anything better from Mr Netanyahu. It turned out that he was not even willing to implement the points that were agreed upon. This time, with a new prime minister in office, specific dates are attached to every development. This agreement affirms that the objective of the permanent status negotiations is the implementation of [UN Security Council] resolutions 242 and 338. This restores a provision that was contained in the original Oslo agreement but was opposed by Israel, at least under Netanyahu. This is very important for us because resolution 242 means that there is no permanent settlement without full withdrawal to the 4 June [1967] borders. This means withdrawal from Jerusalem, ending settlement activity and a just solution to the refugee problem on the basis of the right to return and compensation.Wye II is a modification of the original Wye River memorandum which, in turn, is a modification of the Hebron accord. Hebron is also a modification of Oslo. How long will this process continue, especially since you are about to start the final talks next week?
We had decided to go through interim arrangements and then permanent settlement. An interim agreement goes by accumulation, that is, you get more land, you get freedom for people jailed, you get more rights and a greater exercise of sovereignty and you get institutional control of the country. That is already happening. Now, by the end of the implementation of the Wye River agreement, we would have control of over 42 per cent of the West Bank, half of it full control, that is Area A. There is also the six per cent that is in Gaza and Jericho, which makes it close to 50 per cent of the territory occupied in 1967. That is, by accumulation, five per cent here, six per cent there. This accumulation has brought us to a scope of control even before the opening of negotiations on permanent status issues. At the same time, 200,000 Palestinians have been allowed to return to the self-rule territories and 50,000 to Jerusalem during this period. All these are significant improvements before we start permanent status negotiations.Both the DFLP and PFLP have condemned the memorandum. Will this have an impact on the national consensus you are seeking to establish before going to the final status talks?
This is unfortunate. Those people have not read the agreement or read it and decided not to understand it. The agreement does not wrest any new concessions from the Palestinians. They are saying that instead of getting 13 per cent [of West Bank land], we could have gotten 40 per cent. This is logic I really do not understand. Why do they oppose [the agreement] unless, of course, they feel they have to oppose [it] as part of their anti-peace process policy. But I do not think that this will affect the dialogue.
