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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 September 1999 Issue No. 446 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 September 1999 Issue No. 446
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Focus Culture Features Books Special Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Changing the frames of reference
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
As the new millennium approaches, concerted efforts are being made to swiftly settle all the conflicts left over from the twentieth century so that the new era can begin with a clean slate. One of the most stubborn of those conflicts is, of course, the Arab-Israeli dispute, now the focus of a determined drive to reach some kind of settlement as quickly as possible. The question is what form a settlement can be expected to take in the context of the present disarray in Arab ranks. It is important at this critical juncture to try and envisage the future scenario of the Middle East as it crosses into the new century.
A few days before Madeleine Albright's visit to the region this week, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised that as a 'farewell present' to mark President Clinton's departure from the White House in January 2001 he would do his best to bring the Middle East peace process to a successful conclusion before that date, thereby allowing Clinton to announce that the century-long Arab-Israeli conflict was resolved during his presidency and thanks to his personal mediation. Such a spectacular achievement would earn him a place in history and go far towards rehabilitating him after the Lewinsky affair.
Obviously Clinton will have to repay Barak somehow, and the only gift he can offer in return is to pressure the Arabs into making still more drastic concessions to the Israelis in the negotiations. And, as long as the Arabs remain divided among themselves, they cannot put any counter-pressure on Clinton to offset the pressure of the Israelis.
Moreover, an announcement on peace does not necessarily mean that peace has been achieved. We have become used in recent years to announcements hailing international peace agreements signed at the pinnacle of the global community and proclaiming that peace has been achieved in this or that regional conflict, while strife and infighting continue unabated at the grassroots level. The Balkan situation stands as a glaring illustration of the discrepancy that can exist between official statements and the reality on the ground. This is not a coincidence but a characteristic of the age of globalisation. Under the New World Order, what is important is to agree on universal frames of reference without regard to the realities on the battlefield or the specificity of individual cases.
This mechanism is particularly disturbing if applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where the race to come up with an announcement before the arbitrary deadline will require that the conflict's traditional frames of reference be abandoned and replaced by new frames of reference more in keeping with a balance of power tilted in Israel's favour and reflecting Barak's success in rallying Israeli public opinion around him.
Although Resolutions 242 and 338 were mentioned in the Wye II agreement at Arafat's insistence, there is a clear tendency to move away from these and other Security Council and General Assembly resolutions which have so far served as the basic frames of reference for the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Actually, this would not be the first time the Security Council is absent from crisis-resolution situations. Clinton can invoke the precedent of Kosovo, where NATO's military intervention against Serbia was not sanctioned by the Security Council. The argument used to justify the replacement of the Security Council by NATO was that the latter is better equipped to deal with crises in the post-bipolar world order, an argument that can be used just as well in the Middle East if the need arises.
Resolution 242 stands as an obstacle in the way of Israel's continued occupation of territories it occupied in 1967, of making Jerusalem Israel's eternal and undivided capital and of limiting evacuation to the areas in the West Bank and Gaza where the Palestinian population is highly concentrated and where it is in Israel's interest to clearly separate the Palestinian Arab population from the Israeli Jewish population. Israel further refuses to consider the right of return of Palestinian refugees, particularly those of 1948, or even their right to receive fair compensation pursuant to UN resolutions. If Barak is not opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state, it is only because he hopes such a state would assume the responsibility of guaranteeing Israel's security and stability, not because he upholds the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.
The most likely scenario that will unfold if the traditional frames of reference are abandoned is a polarisation of the Palestinians, eventually of the entire Arab world, into two opposite camps: one comprising those who will bow to pressure from the international community led by the US to accept a settlement, even with modified frames of reference, to allow for a declaration announcing that the conflict has been resolved and no longer represents a threat to international peace and security, even if there is no evidence to support such a claim; the other comprising those who will refuse to be bound by any such declaration on the grounds that there can be no settlement in the context of the new frames of reference that will be imposed.
We are now seeing a number of the more pragmatic and secular of the Palestinian opposition organisations setting aside their differences with Arafat in the hope that their participation in the negotiation process can be more effective in averting a worst-case scenario than their continued boycott of the Palestinian president. This course is unlikely to be adopted by the religious opposition groups, which will continue to express their opposition by all available means. The recent clampdown on Hamas's organisational setup in Jordan foreshadows the growing polarisation in the Arab world.
The split in Arab ranks is thus expected to deepen still further between a mainly secular trend that will go along with the negotiation process, whatever the perils, and a mainly Islamic trend that will vigorously oppose a negotiated settlement on the grounds that it cannot, at this juncture, meet minimal Arab/Islamic demands. This scenario seems to confirm the validity of Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory, a clash that will not necessarily confirm only the American/Israeli vision of the region, but also that of radical trends within the Arab and/or Islamic worlds. The religious/secular confrontation, which first moved to centre stage with Iran's Islamic Revolution, is now extending to the entire Middle East, including Israel.
It is a scenario that carries untold dangers. Preventing it from unfolding will not be easy, especially if Barak's gift to Clinton materialises and a declaration claiming that peace has been achieved is made in one year's time. What is still more critical is that nothing in the Sharm Al-Sheikh agreement signed this week belies the assumptions on which we have built this scenario.
Presenting this scenario as the most likely to occur does not necessarily mean that it is unavoidable. But any attempt to prevent it from unfolding must proceed from a clear understanding of its negative aspects. Only then would action to avoid it become a credible option.
