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Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Comment Focus Special Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Building on stable ground
By Osama El-Ghazali Harb *When President Mubarak assumed the reigns of power in 1981, the Egyptian political scene was more turbulent than it had been for a decade -- certainly since Sadat's victory in his struggle against Nasser's supporters in 1971. This turbulence was reflected in the sweeping detentions of political and intellectual figures in September 1981, as an increasingly beleaguered Sadat sought to neutralise the opposition. Even the Coptic Pope was put under house arrest in a monastery.
The political regime inherited by Mubarak following Sadat's dramatic death was in fact relatively new. It had yet to take definite shape. It was, moreover, a regime suffering major problems.
Having consolidated his grip on power in May 1971, Sadat had sought to create a new political system, breaking with Nasserite authoritarianism. At the time, Sadat raised two slogans: "A state of institutions" and "the sovereignty of law". Practically, however, Sadat was unable to introduce any concrete political changes until his military victory against Israel in October 1973 allowed him to construct a new legitimacy for himself.
In the aftermath of the October War Sadat used this new legitimacy to initiate a transformation from a one-party to a multi-party system, a transformation that was to progress hand in hand with the opening up of the economy. A multi-party system was first announced in November 1976, followed by the issuing of the political parties' law in July 1977.
These new arrangements, however, were soon to face major problems, and the five years before Sadat's death were punctuated by sporadic upheavals. In January 1977 the bread riots shook Egypt. Branded "the thieves' riots" by Sadat, who blamed leftist elements, both Communist and Nasserist, for their occurrence, they were followed in November of the same year by Sadat's sudden visit to Israel, a visit that stunned the political elite and led to fierce opposition to the late president not just from within the ranks of the left but also from other forces hitherto encouraged by Sadat, the Islamist fundamentalists.
As these forces coalesced, opposition against Sadat escalated, a confrontation that reached its zenith with the detentions of September 1981. Sadat's assassination at the military parade on the morning of 6 October was the climax of the tragedy.
It was, then, left to Mubarak to create a suitably stable climate for a political system the cornerstone of which had been laid by his predecessor. And among the first actions by the new president was an attempt to ease tensions by freeing the political detainees -- many of whom were transferred directly from prison to meet the president at the presidential palace. By propagating a more relaxed and tolerant atmosphere the multi-party system was for the first time allowed to work and prosper.
In contrast to both Nasser and Sadat, President Mubarak saw no need to formulate the characteristics and aims of his regime in a document comparable to Nasser's National Charter or Sadat's October Paper, a reflection, perhaps, of the fact that Mubarak did not wish to introduce any radical changes to the regime he had inherited from his predecessor.
The main principle governing Mubarak's attitude towards the political system has been "stability". This, in fact, reflects a deep conviction on the part of the president that priority should be given to economic reform and prosperity, and that any radical political change, such as amending the constitution or reforming political legislation, remains inappropriate until stability and economic reforms have been thoroughly consolidated.
Within this general framework, founded on an emphasis on stability combined with caution regarding any radical change, a number of successes have been scored during Mubarak's terms of office, the most important being in the realms of freedom of expression.
Press freedom, especially, has progressed in a way unseen since the mid-century. In contrast to the 1950s, '60s and '70s the Egyptian press is now able to tackle almost every issue, and few public figures and state officials have been exempt from criticism. Indeed the president himself has shown a degree of tolerance of criticism exceeding that of any other official.
Despite the difficult conditions inherited from the Sadat years, the number of parties operating in Egypt has now reached 14. The independence enjoyed by the Egyptian judiciary has undoubtedly helped in establishing these parties: indeed, it is possible to convincingly argue that during Mubarak's terms of office the judiciary has enjoyed exceptional powers and has, if anything, expanded its actual functions within Egypt's political system.
At the same time, civil society has itself developed an increasing depth despite inherent opposition from the bureaucracy. Various human rights organisations have emerged and succeeded in consolidating themselves, conducting their daily activities, and announcing their opinions and evaluations on practically everything in Egypt.
With the start of Mubarak's fourth term, however, the Egyptian elite is aspiring not only to the consolidation of freedoms already realised, and has begun to anticipate more political reforms. Presidential tolerance, in this context, is not a sufficient guarantee for the actual exercise of such freedoms and consequently the need remains for a clearer and more decisive codification. At the same time, progress on the road of economic reform requires associated political reforms which, now that the dangers of terrorism have faded, are more possible.
The most urgent questions, then, concern amending the constitution in accordance with the requirements of economic and political liberalism, ending the state of emergency, providing more freedom to establish and activate political parties, and granting total freedom to issue newspapers.
It would be a grave mistake, however, to put the burden of such changes solely on President Mubarak's shoulders. The responsibilities incurred by such reforms fall on all political forces, and perhaps most heavily on those opposition forces advocating change. And unless these forces exhibit the capacity to develop themselves to a position where they can cope with the responsibility that goes with such reforms, it will remain a futile exercise for them to issue petitions calling for reform.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Al-Siassa Al-Dawlia (International Politics) issued by Al-Ahram.
