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Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Comment Focus Special Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Developing an Arab context
By Hassan Nafaa *
The Arab-Israeli conflict is at a critical juncture. As long as the Arab world remains less than thoroughly prepared for the plans in store for it, it will find itself up against conditions it will find very difficult to accept. Recent developments on the Israeli and Arab fronts are foreboding. On one side is a power that is gathering every ounce of force to deliver the lethal blow. On the other is its intended victim, cowering submissively as though its fate were already sealed.
In the few months following Netanyahu's fall from power, the Israeli government has seized the initiative once more in both its domestic and international drives. To most Israelis, Netanyahu was more forthright than his successor in his expression of the true aims and aspirations of the Zionist project. It was his headstrong and reckless management at the helm of Israeli domestic and international policy that turned the Israeli electorate against him, however -- not his refusal to negotiate on the peace process. Nor should we imagine that it was the Peace-Now movement in Israel that swept Barak to power. Netanyahu failed because the combination of all his policies brought the contradictions within Israeli society to a critical head, while alienating even Israel's closest allies abroad. Things got so bad everyone wished he would just disappear, and perhaps worked surreptitiously toward that end.
With the increasingly rapid flight of Netanyahu's coalition partners, starting with the resignation of Foreign Minister David Levy and ending with the resignation of Minister of Defence Mordechai, Israeli society needed to search for a new leader capable of repairing the ruins Netanyahu had left in his wake. Barak was only one of many options before the Israeli public. He alone, however, was ultimately able to resolve the electoral race in his favour, employing tactical strategies very reminiscent of the sting operations for which he became famous during his career in the army.
Israel under Barak is a very different country. Israeli society appears to be less at odds with itself than it was under Netanyahu, and therefore prepared to accept the compromises needed to generate a climate conducive to harmony between conflicting demographic, political and ideological trends.
Further, Israel's relations abroad appear as strong as ever, particularly following the signing of the memorandum of understanding in Sharm Al-Sheikh. In a single visit to the US, Barak not only dispelled the ill-feeling caused by Netanyahu but got the US to open its coffers and arsenal even more magnanimously than before. The US president needs Barak more than Barak needs Clinton. Knowing this, the Israeli prime minister is poised to exploit the current circumstances of the US administration to Israel's advantage, while Clinton is far less capable of using Barak to erase Monicagate. In other words, the American card is in Israeli hands more securely than ever before.
Barak also managed to reorganise his relations with Europe so as to grant Europe a relatively greater role in the peace process than previously. He has thus succeeded in acquiring another lever with which to obstruct any European impulse to support the creation of a Palestinian state.
Having mended many rifts at home and ironed out the wrinkles in Israel's relations abroad, Barak was in a position to play his negotiating cards with the greatest efficacy. He put his negotiating strategy into effect and, in Sharm Al-Sheikh, succeeded in accomplishing two objectives that Netanyahu never managed to bring off. The first was resuscitating the frozen peace process in a way permitting that pressure be applied on the Arabs to revive the Middle East project (as embodied in the mechanisms of the MENA conference). This package also entailed the resumption of multilateral negotiations and the revival of the bilateral normalisation processes begun under Rabin and Peres. His second accomplishment was obtaining approval for the immediate resumption of final status negotiations before Israel fulfills the obligations of the interim phase. This has given Barak the chance to exercise enormous psychological and material pressure on the Palestinian negotiators in the coming phase.
These successes have given him the confidence to move on to the next phase in his negotiating strategy: the effort to generate a climate conducive to the resumption of negotiations with Syria without appearing as though Israel has caved in to Syria's conditions.
Israel seems to have painted itself into a corner on the Syrian-Lebanese track, though. One of Barak's electoral promises was to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon within a year. If he is to keep his promise, this must take place before next June. Barak is aware that he can withdraw from Lebanon without reaching an agreement that provides him with the security guarantees he seeks. In the absence of an agreement with Syria, however, the withdrawal of Israeli forces would constitute a tacit acknowledgement of defeat at the hands of the Lebanese resistance, and represent the unconditional implementation of UN Resolution 425, which Israel has rejected for more than 20 years. On the other hand, if Israel resumes negotiations with Syria at the point where they left off, it will appear as though Israel had caved into Syria's demands. In fact, merely to resume negotiations will imply that Israel has accepted the principle of withdrawing to the 4 June 1967 lines and that subsequent negotiations with Syria will revolve solely around the understanding of peace and mutual security arrangements. Such a situation would place Israel at a negotiating disadvantage from the outset.
Nevertheless, both Israel and Syria clearly stand to gain from a resumption of negotiations. Syria is aware that regional and international circumstances offer it a unique opportunity to regain the Golan, an opportunity that may not present itself again. Israel knows that peace without Syria is impossible. Without a peace agreement, forces opposed to the current settlement process will constitute a formidable barrier to Israel's assimilation into the region.
I predict that Syria and Israel, with help from the US (and perhaps Egypt and Jordan), will come up with a formula enabling them to resume negotiations where they left off. Perhaps that will involve redefining that "point", as a face-saving measure for Israel. At any rate, when Israel does resume negotiations with Syria it will come armed with a well-defined strategy and specific objectives. In exchange for relinquishing the Golan, Barak will demand the dissolution of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, the elimination of the armed resistance in southern Lebanon, especially Hizbullah, and the elimination of the Palestinian factions opposed to the Oslo Accords, particularly Jihad and Hamas, or at least the guarantee that these factions will modify their stance on the peace process.
Israel's ultimate goals include the annexation of East Jerusalem, the preservation of direct control over Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the relocation of Palestinian refugees to other Arab countries. It believes that its ability to secure these goals is dependent upon its ability to reach an agreement with Syria first. Thus, what Israel really wants from Syria in exchange for handing back the Golan is for it to back off -- to stop championing the Palestinian cause. Israeli negotiators believe that this is possible, and the inconsistencies generated by long-standing disputes between the Syrian and Palestinian leaderships may well have contributed to enhancing such a scenario's likelihood.
The repercussions of the Gulf crisis also continue to cast a dark shadow over the prospects for our future. The profound psychological rifts, enormous squandering of Arab potentials and unprecedented foreign involvement in Arab domestic affairs continue to paralyse us. Every real attempt to promote an Arab reconciliation capable of vaguely unifying the ranks has met with the same fate. The inter-Arab climate is still clouded with mistrust and, without a minimum level of mutual trust, any Arab summit aimed at exploring future options and elaborating a common strategy is doomed to failure.
Syria may well fear that an Arab summit could restrict its ability to manoeuvre by forcing it to link progress in negotiations with Israel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. Sadly, no single Arab party possesses the moral or practical influence to persuade Syria to wait until progress is made on the Palestinian track. No one, after all, stopped to wait for Syria. Syria was left to weave its own alliances in the hope of attaining a relatively advantageous negotiating position. It has largely succeeded in this task, and it is now determined to get what it wants. It has no need for anyone's advice.
Syria's policy may indeed be entirely justified in moral and emotional terms. Still, it has very difficult choices to make and, in my opinion, it needs to coordinate its positions with the rest of the Arab world just as much as the Palestinians do.
As Syria negotiates for the return of the Golan and the fate of occupied southern Lebanon, it will have to consider the fate of the entire peace process should Israel insist that Jerusalem is its undivided and eternal capital, refuse to dismantle the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and demand that Palestinian refugees be moved to other Arab countries. These issues are not the concern of Syria alone. They are the concern of the Arab world as a whole. Israel is counting on Syria to wash its hands of the Palestinian cause in exchange for withdrawal from the Golan. Moreover, Israel is perfectly capable of linking the schedule of its withdrawal to the final status negotiations with the Palestinians, thus keeping Syria's hands tied with respect to the conditions Israel intends to impose upon the Palestinians in those negotiations. Israel also expects Syria to play an active role in the fight against "terrorism", which, from the Israeli perspective, means that Syria will be expected to twist the arms of the Palestinian factions that reject the current settlement process. Even if Syria considers only its national security interests, this option has severe drawbacks.
This is why Syria requires an Arab context in which to work. Such a context must serve, not to mask our flaws, but rather to protect us, as Arabs, from the harshest vagaries of the international climate. Let Syria conduct its negotiations as it sees fit, with unconditional Arab support. Let the same apply to the Palestinian Authority, as long as it refuses to compromise on Jerusalem, the return of Palestinian refugees, the pre-June 1967 borders and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. But the Arabs must take a united stance in the multilateral negotiations. There are many issues, such as water rights, refugees and Israel's nuclear arsenal, that affect the security of every individual Arab nation, and Arab national security in general.
While Israel may appear to have the upper hand at present, I do not wish to be pessimistic or defeatist. The Arabs have many latent strengths enabling them to devise a systematic strategy to offset Israeli attempts to dictate biased terms. I believe the Arabs can so improve their negotiating position as to turn the negotiations toward a just and lasting peace that will achieve basic Arab demands and guarantee that Syria and Palestine regain every inch of occupied territory.
The recent meeting of the Arab League Council, attended by representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council members, and the recent outpour of popular support for Bouteflika in a unanimous gesture of determination to bring an end to a crisis affecting the whole Arab world, look quite like lights signalling the end of the tunnel. Perhaps the time has come at last; perhaps we can now begin the deliberate and methodological search for a better future.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
