 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 23 - 29 September 1999 Issue No. 448
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Comment Focus Special Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters An impossible equation
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
The assertion that a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be wrapped up in the space of just one year rings somewhat hollow. Indeed, bringing the many loose ends together into an acceptable package for all the parties concerned within the envisaged time-frame is a proposition that calls for a similar suspension of disbelief as would the assertion that the equation of squaring the circle can be solved.
It is sufficient to remember that the intermediary agreements signed in Oslo six years ago have not yet been fully implemented, despite the fact that the issues they addressed are in no way comparable to the difficult and complex problems of the final status talks. The Wye River agreement, which entails an Israeli pullback from only 13 per cent of the occupied Palestinian territories, took nearly two years to finalise. The final status talks deal with the central issues of Jerusalem, refugees, the Palestinian state, water and security. The Wye II agreement, signed in Sharm Al-Sheikh a few weeks ago, proceeds from the assumption that all these issues can be resolved in as little as five months and agreements pertaining to them actually signed before September 2000, that is, just before the end of President Clinton's second term.
During the ceremonial opening of the final status talks in Eretz earlier this week, Barak reiterated his claim that the agreed upon timetable can be met, a claim that was later challenged by two prominent members of the Israeli establishment. In an interview to Ha'aretz, Israeli chief of staff Shaul Mofaz warned that "a fifty-year conflict cannot be resolved within a year or two", while Ariel Sharon, foreign minister under the previous Likud government, declared that "if the intermediary stage needed six years, the final stage will need no less than twenty!"
We all know, of course, that President Clinton is extremely keen to have some sort of deal wrapped up before his second and final term draws to a close. A declaration announcing an end to the century-long Arab-Israeli conflict would be a spectacular swan song for a president whose record has been badly tarnished by scandal.
We also know that Ehud Barak will take full advantage of Clinton's keenness to finalise a settlement before leaving office in order to impose his own terms on the Arab parties, who are likely to find themselves being pressured by the sponsor of the settlement to accept the Israeli terms on the grounds that they are the maximum 'concessions' Barak is ready to make and it is better to take what is on offer than to squander yet another opportunity for peace.
With the present disarray in Arab ranks, of which the most acute expression is the bitter feud between Syria and the Palestinian Authority, and with the potentially explosive Iraqi crisis still unresolved, it is hard to see how the Arab parties can stand up to American-Israeli pressure. It now appears that the driving force for an overall settlement is not so much the cause of peace as it is the furtherance of agendas having nothing to do with peace. For Clinton, it is an opportunity, perhaps the last he will have, to redeem himself after the Lewinsky scandal, while in Barak's case it is an opportunity to use Clinton's eagerness to achieve a breakthrough in the peace process to impose Israel's conditions on the American president and, through him, on the Arab parties.
Both Barak and Clinton are betting on a number of assumptions: one, that the Arab world is no longer as committed to the Palestinian cause as it was; two, that Arab regimes no longer consider defending that cause vital for their credibility with their own masses; and, three, that they want the issue solved as quickly as possible, even if this will entail major concessions, so that they can become part of the new globalised world order with all the advantages and benefits they assume this will bring.
However, the one-year deadline to which Barak has committed himself is seen not only as unrealistic by a number of prominent Israelis, but also as dangerous. One of these dangers, according to the Ha'aretz interview with Shaul Mofaz, mouthpiece for the military establishment, is that a speedy resolution will deprive Israel of the 'cry wolf' argument it uses so successfully to prevent Washington from providing extensive military equipment to Arab countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel. Asked what type of compensation or assistance should be given to a country that makes peace with Israel, he said it should be limited to the economic sphere only.
Thus the timetable of the agreement is all important, Foreign Minister David Levy, who led the Israeli negotiators in the opening session of the final talks, reiterated the famous four 'no's' Barak announced the moment his election as prime minister was confirmed: no to returning to the pre-1967 war borderlines; no retreat on Jerusalem's remaining Israel's united and eternal capital; no to the dismantling of Israeli West Bank settlements which would be regrouped in conglomerates under Israeli sovereignty; no foreign troops to be stationed on the West Bank of the Jordan River.
It is clear from the reconfirmation of Barak's no's at the opening session of the final status negotiations that they are not merely a reflection of Israel's negotiating position at the start of the talks, but the essence of the ultimatum Barak will try to impose on the Arabs over the coming year. Such modifications as may be introduced will be of a cosmetic nature, aimed at defusing Arab anger and resistance but not at changing the essence of the deal Israel plans to work out.
In response to the Israeli challenge, the top Palestinian negotiator, Abu Mazen, reaffirmed the well-known Palestinian 'constants': a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; an Israeli pullout to the pre '67 borders (East Jerusalem is to be considered no different than any other Arab land occupied in 1967; Jerusalem is a city equally sacred for all believers in a monotheistic religion); implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 on the refugee problem; and the dismantling of all Jewish settlements in territories occupied by Israel in 1967, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 465 which declares the settlements illegal. Abu Mazen reconfirmed the PA's commitment to combating violence and terrorism by all available means.
For the negotiations to succeed, they must not be used to further agendas which have nothing to do with achieving peace in the Middle East, and which can only end up in a mutually beneficial deal between Clinton and Barak at the expense of the Arab parties. But these parties cannot stand up to American-Israeli manoeuvres as long as they remain divided and unable to operate collectively, especially when it comes to the Arab front-line parties. This is particularly crucial in the case of Syria and the Palestinian Authority, given that issues such as water and refugees overlap for the two countries, and it would be absurd if agreements on such issues can be reached between the Arabs and Israel but not between the Arabs themselves.
