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Al-Ahram Weekly 7 - 13 October 1999 Issue No. 450 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 7 - 13 October 1999 Issue No. 450
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Interview Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters No start in sight
By Graham UsherWhatever doubts were expressed about his attitude to the Palestinians, most analysts were convinced that the election of Ehud Barak as Israel's prime minister would bring forth at least one fruit -- a resumption of negotiations with Syria based on Israel's complete withdrawal from occupied Golan Heights.
The hope was fed by Barak's pre-election vow to withdraw from occupied south Lebanon "within a year of my government being formed" in the context of renewed talks with Damascus. It was bolstered by the release of his government guidelines which pledged to "conclude a peace treaty" with Syria "grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". And it positively bloomed when Barak praised Syrian President Hafez Assad for having fashioned "a strong, independent, self-confident Syria" and publicly accepted that the "only way to build a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East is by means of a peace agreement with Syria". From Israeli army generals to Jordan's King Abdullah, all were sure that the Israeli-Syrian track of the Middle East peace process would be reactivated "within weeks".
That was nearly three months ago, and the thaw is starting to freeze. Last week, President Bill Clinton held a surprise meeting in Washington with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa, in another attempt to break the ice. But the 45-minute talks produced nothing except the usual White House-speak that "there's still work to do" before negotiations can resume. Coincidentally or otherwise (and no Israeli analyst sees it as a coincidence), last week also saw the worst fighting in south Lebanon since June, when Israeli warplanes took out a Beirut power station and killed nine Lebanese civilians in "retaliation" for Katyusha rockets launched by Hezbollah into northern Israel.
Even the diplomatic niceties are beginning to wane. Asked, on 27 September, whether he had heard that Assad was "bitterly disappointed" with Barak, Israel's President Ezer Weizman snapped, "I am very disappointed in the stand of President Assad". He continued gloomily, "Assad hasn't changed. How long is it possible to court someone who doesn't move? If Mr Assad is interested, fine, he will come. If not, he won't". The next day the Syrian press rolled out its big guns. Barak's government is "an enemy of peace," editorialised Syria's Tishrin newspaper, "following in the footsteps of the Netanyahu government and not the Rabin government".
The root cause of this deterioration is the two sides' failure to agree on a formula for resuming negotiations "from the point they left off" in February 1996. Barak's preferred "map" is to reach a series of "understandings" on issues of security, water, Lebanon and diplomatic relations prior to any agreement on the "depth" of withdrawal "on" the Golan Israel is prepared to make. Syria's position is the complete antithesis. It wants Barak to reconfirm in advance of negotiations a commitment Syria says it received from Prime Minister Rabin in 1994 that a "full peace" meant Israel's full withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967.
Most Israeli commentators say Rabin never made such a pledge or, if he did, it was "hypothetical". Other Israelis are less categorical. In his book "The Process", Israel's last chief negotiator with Syria, Uri Savir, writes that "after talking with Rabin in May 1994, [then US Secretary of State Warren] Christopher conveyed to the Syrians the US's understanding that, conditional on all [Israel's] needs being met, Israel would be prepared to make a 'full withdrawal', which implied pulling back to the 4 June 1967 line". This understanding is still held, reportedly, by the present secretary of state, Madeleine Albright.
Can this divide be bridged? Moshe Maoz is professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Israel's Hebrew University and is viewed internationally as an expert on Syria. He says he simply "doesn't know" what Rabin did or did not commit to the Syrians in May 1994 since the pledge was contained in a "secret document". He also understands why Assad would want a withdrawal to the 1967 lines rather than to the 1923 international border drawn up by France and Britain. "Assad is a strategist," he says. "And a withdrawal to the 1967 line would grant Syria a position on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee as well as the claim that he -- unlike Egypt with Camp David -- had recovered all the territory he lost in the 1967 war".
But Maoz is also convinced that no Israeli government of whatever stripe would ever agree to withdraw to the 1967 lines, especially as any deal with Syria will be subject to a national referendum. "First, a withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines would mean granting Syria sovereignty over regions not only west of the 1923 international border, but also west of the partition line laid down by the UN on 29 November 1947. Second, there is no Israeli precedent for such a concession. In the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, Israel withdrew to the international borders, not to the 1967 lines".
Given these positions, Maoz believes the only "formula" lies in the alchemy concocted by American diplomacy. "One possible solution could be in the form of a 'peace line'", he suggests. "This would run between the 1967 line and 1923 border, but be so modified as to return Al-Hama [the strategic site where Israeli, Jordanian and Syrian borders meet] to Syria but keep Syria off the east shore of the Galilee". Maoz is also confident that such vagaries could bring about a resumption of talks, if only because all sides, including President Clinton, want a deal.
"There are two views about Assad in Israel", he says. "One believes Assad wants peace; the other believes Assad wants only the process. I think Assad wants peace. He may not be happy about it, he may prefer for Israel to disappear, but he's been reconciled to the fact of Israel ever since he accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338 in 1973. He also wants the Golan Heights back -- it has enormous strategic value, would ensure stability for the succession of his son, Bashar, and remove Syria from the US's blacklist of states that support terrorism. He also wants Syria to develop economically."
But Assad also wants the whole of the Golan Heights returned to Syrian sovereignty. On 29 September, Barak again pledged that "by July 2000 we will deploy the IDF on [Israel's northern] border and we will put an end to the tragedy in Lebanon". Maoz believes the Israeli leader is serious about meeting this deadline, mainly as a "gambit" aimed at drawing Syria back to the negotiating table. But he also believes it is a "dangerous" gamble. For should Syria not be drawn - and Israel withdraw unilaterally from its "Vietnam" -- then last week's upsurge in fighting in south Lebanon may not be the last battle before the peace. It may rather be the first shots in the next round of what is already Israel's longest and bloodiest Arab war.
