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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 27 October 1999 Issue No. 452 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 27 October 1999 Issue No. 452
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The many faces of Barak
By Ibrahim Nafie
Political commentators in Israel have already dubbed their new prime minister Barakyahu, though in Egypt we were, if anything, aware of the similarities between the new Israeli prime minister and his predecessor even earlier. We were, though, prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt.
In the hope that some progress might be made towards a just and lasting peace Egypt indulged Barak when he appealed to the Arabs for a short respite in order that he might form his government before resuming negotiations on the various tracks of the frozen peace process. But even then, Cairo has had to remind Barak on more than one occasion to refrain from issuing statements detrimental to the peace process.
Barak made it clear he was committed to implementing the Wye River Memorandum, that he intended to withdraw from the south of Lebanon within a year and resume negotiations with Syria. Yet since his election we have seen little to distinguish him from Netanyahu.
During his recent visit to Washington, Barak was slickness itself as he sought to convince the US Administration that he intended to follow through negotiations on all tracks. But needless to say, this thinly disguised ruse was intended to persuade Washington to keep quiet as Barak manoeuvred to avoid meeting the terms of agreements signed with the Palestinians.
In the same visit, Barak presented Washington with a long shopping list of high-tech military products. Of course, Washington gave him everything he asked for and more, extending the bounds of military relations to such an extent as to necessitate the coining of a new phrase. Perhaps "strategic adoption" best describes a relationship in which the US is prepared to favour Tel Aviv with ever greater military assistance, committed perpetually to ensuring Israel's quantitative and qualitative superiority over all Arab countries combined. The US also appears committed to ensuring Israel remains the only exception in the on-going drive for nuclear disarmament.
Barak's other face has been clearly revealed in the vicious campaign he and several Israeli writers have conducted against Egypt. Appeals have been made to Washington not to furnish arms or modern military technology to Egypt on the grounds that this poses a threat to Israel.
The Israeli onslaught against Egypt can best be understood in light of Israel's intention to ensure comprehensive military superiority over the Arabs preparatory to the rivalry for regional leadership that it imagines will take place following a peace settlement. That Barak continues to perceive military might as the sole guarantee of Israeli security was confirmed in his Knesset opening address, when he insisted that "Israel will maintain its strategic deterrent power even after reaching peace," adding that Israel would never relinquish its nuclear capacities. Sound familiar? It should. Netanyahu had conveyed the same message umpteen times.
Ather golden-oldie that has resurfaced from the Netanyahu era is the charge that Egypt is pressuring the Palestinians to take a firmer line in negotiations. But this fabrication was nothing compared to the boldfaced lie that was "leaked" to the Israeli media to the effect that President Mubarak's political advisor, Osama El-Baz had told Israeli officials that Syria was wavering in its intent to resume negotiations with Israel. Dr El-Baz refuted the allegation, a blatant attempt to drive a wedge between Egypt and Syria.
Israel's media onslaught against Egypt is part of a wider campaign to pressure Egypt into relinquishing its support for the Palestinians and abandoning its drive to unify the Arab stand vis-à-vis the peace process. Vilifying Egypt, it seems, has become a cornerstone of Israeli "diplomacy".
Barak, it appears, has understudied Netanyahu in many ways, not least in his abrogation of agreements and insensitivity to the negotiating climate. The parallels are all too obvious. Having assumed power in 1996, Netanyahu did nothing to further the peace process with the exception of the Hebron agreement of 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum of 1998, both of which were watered down versions of articles of the Oslo agreements. And even then he managed to wriggle his way out of implementing the first of the three phases of the Wye River agreement, while simultaneously encouraging the expansion of Israeli settlements and seeking to renegotiate points of the agreement he had signed. Only when it became impossible to continue with such evasions did he pull his final gambit, dismissing his government and calling for new elections.
Barak, since coming to power, has proved just as slippery. During his visit to Cairo he declared he would abide by the Wye River Memorandum. Then he told the Palestinians that he would like to introduce some changes but assured the Palestinians that if they rejected his proposals he would still implement the agreement to the letter. When negotiations got under way, it transpired that he wanted to scrap entire phases of the interim agreement by linking them to final status negotiations and a framework agreement delineating the basis of the final settlement.
It is time Barak and Israel's ruling elite realised that their customary ruses have become tedious: to flaunt Israel's military capability will not further designs to deprive Arabs of their legitimate rights; it will not furnish Israeli citizens with the security they crave. The Arab nations have chosen peace and shown themselves willing to make painful concessions. Israel, too, must show enough courage to resolve to meet the Arabs half way.
Israel must implement the accords signed with the Palestinians and enter final status negotiations in a spirit that will ensure the Palestinian people obtain their legitimate right to an independent state encompassing the whole of the West Bank and Gaza, with its capital in East Jerusalem. The Israelis should also realise that if they do not withdraw from Lebanon and from the Golan Heights to pre-June 1967 borders there can never be peace and stability in the region. If history teaches us anything, it is that peace and security cannot be purchased through the massing of arms. And it certainly cannot be bought by the continued occupation of the territory of another people.
