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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 27 October 1999 Issue No. 452 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 27 October 1999 Issue No. 452
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Back with a vengeance
By Diaa Rashwan *Egyptian security authorities recently announced the sudden and completely unexpected arrest of 20 leaders of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The arrested leaders were referred to the General Prosecutor's office, which ordered their imprisonment for 15 days, accusing them of "joining an illegal group, possessing publications endorsing the group's line of thought and action, and attempting to circumvent legality through the infiltration of professional associations with the aim of controlling them and diffusing the outlawed group's thought within them".
The names of those arrested, the context of the arrests, and possible results all suggest that we could well be witnessing an important turning point in the relationship between the Brotherhood and the state, as well as in the latter's policy toward the Islamist trend in general. In order to define the features of this new phase, it seems vital to tackle the three main dimensions of the recent arrests: namely, their motives, aims, and possible results.
The 20 individuals arrested include a former MP and treasurer of the Egyptian Bar Association, the assistant treasurer of the Bar and council member of the Suez Bar, the secretary-general of the Engineers' Syndicate, five members of regional engineers' syndicates, the secretaries-general of two regional medical syndicates in Cairo and Giza, three council members of the Doctors' Syndicate, the secretary-general of the Pharmacists' Syndicate and a council member of the same syndicate, in addition to council members of three other professional syndicates.
The arrests took place at the headquarters of the Federation of Islamist Engineering Organisations in Maadi, where 16 of the arrested were -- according to security reports -- discussing Brotherhood participation in the coming professional syndicate and parliamentary elections. The arrests also took place a week after a ruling by the Court of Cassation lifted the sequestration that had been imposed upon the Bar Association.
This conjuncture reveals the first aim of the arrests, which targeted the most prominent intermediary leaders within the Brotherhood at both the syndicate and political levels. These are the elements most capable of planning and directing electoral battles.
The place where the arrests were carried out is known to be the headquarters for meetings held to coordinate the activities of Brotherhood leaders in different professional syndicates, as reflected in the names of those arrested. The fact that the meeting took place there may well have given security officials the impression that the Brotherhood is preparing for the next syndicate elections.
The arrests also come at a time when the legalisation of Islamist political parties seems imminent. Rising expectations in this regard led former members of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya and Al-Jihad to present an official request for the establishment of Hizb Al-Shari'a. Other former members have also petitioned to establish another party, Hizb Al-Islah.
It is clear that the first aim of the arrests is to let the Muslim Brotherhood and other political forces know that the Egyptian state's policy on Islamists has not changed. The state is thus confirming its categorical refusal to grant the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, any legal existence on the political or syndicate scene. Through its new campaign against Brotherhood members who have never resorted to violence and who were elected to the posts they occupy in most Egyptian professional syndicates, the state is asserting that it will not tolerate any Islamist attempt to acquire formal legitimacy, no matter how moderate and willing to be integrated in legitimate political and syndicate life these elements prove to be.
The same premises reveal another aim of the government's anti-Brotherhood campaign. This aim relates directly to the professional syndicate elections scheduled to take place next year, especially at the Bar Association (following the lifting of sequestration in accordance) and the Engineers' Syndicate.
Since 1995 at least, the state has been trying to limit Brotherhood control over professional syndicate councils. For that purpose it issued a law requiring a voting quorum of at least half the registered members of professional syndicates in order for election results to be valid. The sequestration of the Engineers' Syndicate and the Bar Association was an additional measure taken to prevent the Brotherhood from administering syndicate councils in which they obtained a majority of seats, and to impede their success in any forthcoming elections.
The state has certainly been annoyed by the ruling that canceled the sequestration of the Bar Association. It fears that the elections due to take place six months hence could restore Brotherhood control of a large and influential syndicate. It is also probable that the government's fears multiplied in light of the results of the Journalists' Syndicate elections last May. Islamists acquired three seats, representing one quarter of council members; two of these went to the Brotherhood. Hitherto, Islamists occupied just one seat on the council.
It is thus clear that the second aim of the government's campaign against the Brotherhood is to prevent the organisation from effectively taking part in the next syndicate elections by depriving it of activists who enjoy credibility within syndicate circles.
The third motive relates to the political, rather than the syndicate, scene. It is part of the strategy the state has deployed in dealing with the Brotherhood since 1994. This "preemptive strategy" is based on directing successive strikes of varying intensity against the Brotherhood to disrupt its ranks and to ensure that the bulk of its energy is channeled into self-defence, not into planning for its regular participation in public life in general, and in parliamentary and local elections specifically.
Ultimately, this strategy aims at absolving the state from the embarrassment of having to interfere heavily and directly against the Brotherhood in elections, to preempt a possible success. Such a scenario is likely to make the state vulnerable to loud criticism within international political and media circles.
This strategy was formulated and implemented about a year prior to the November 1995 parliamentary elections. In order to prevent the Brotherhood from doing well, security forces arrested three groups of Brotherhood leaders expected to run in the elections. They were referred to military courts and most were sentenced from one to five years of imprisonment.
The recent measures therefore represent a continuation of the same strategy. The aim this time is to prevent the Brotherhood from running in the parliamentary elections of November 2000, for which preparations have already begun. The fact that leading Brotherhood elements arrested during the 1994 campaign -- including Essam El-Erian, secretary-general of the Doctors' Syndicate -- are due to be released shortly might have constituted an additional reason for the state to launch its campaign at that time.
On the other hand, the security forces' announcement regarding the recent arrests seems to suggest another reason for the choice of timing. The authorities noted that they had received valuable information "concerning the outlawed group's position on the domestic and international situation, including the Palestinian issue, and concerning attempts to exploit this situation in order to incite popular opposition to the regime".
This factor is backed up by developments in Arab-Israeli negotiations since the Labour Party and Ehud Barak came to power in Israel. The most active Palestinian and Arab opposition to the process is Islamist, nationalist and, in some cases, left-wing. This factor could be behind the measures the Jordanian government took against Hamas, the staunchest opponent of the settlement process on the Palestinian track.
The Egyptian state may have foreseen the possibility of escalating Brotherhood opposition to the process during the coming period, which could raise difficulties for parties involved in that process, including Egypt. In this perspective, the arrest of leading Brotherhood elements is one way of dealing with the disturbance -- by following the example set by Jordan.
As for the impact of the recent arrests on the Brotherhood and Egyptian political life in general, this will depend mainly on developments we could be witnessing in the near future. The state will probably try to detain the arrested Brotherhood leaders as long as possible, to reap the greatest possible benefit from their absence. The fact that the state security prosecution has played an essential role in perfecting the case from a legal viewpoint indicates that the military courts will not be involved, especially if the state security courts can achieve equivalent results.
The perpetuation of the state's strategy indicates that strikes of varying intensity and scale will be directed against the Brotherhood during the coming months. The aim, as always, will be to disrupt Brotherhood ranks and prevent the organisation from running in political or syndicate elections.
This general strategy of categorically denying the Islamists any legitimate political or syndicate representation, while subjecting other political forces to the same controls, is likely to create a situation of political congestion that could have grave implications for political and social stability in the short term.
*The writer is managing editor of the annual State of Religion in Egypt Report, issued by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
