 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 28 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1999 Issue No. 453 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 28 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1999 Issue No. 453
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Study Special Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Defusing an explosive peace
By Ahmed Abdel-Halim *Perhaps the US enjoys more stable and profitable relations with other Middle Eastern states, but from its perspective, no state in the region can replace Egypt. This fact has been known for some time, and is well accounted for by Pivotal States theory. We can thus understand the constancy of US-Egyptian relations despite the often stormy crises of the past 20 years.
The US is aware of the danger of allowing muted crises to flare up; Egypt, too, has every reason to practice maximum self-restraint, carefully preventing disagreements from escalating. This remains true even as Egypt actually pursues a policy largely at loggerheads with US orientations, at all levels.
Egypt recognises the vitality of the US role in the region, seeing no alternatives to it for the Middle East as a whole, at least for the time being. It also appreciates the importance of bilateral cooperation with the US. This has become absolutely clear in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world system.
There are no signs of a radical transformation in Egyptian-US relations at present or in the foreseeable future. This does not totally rule out the emergence of relatively more dangerous crises between the two states, in comparison to what we have hitherto experienced. It is more likely, however, that the overall evolution of relations will be in the direction of more strength and maturity.
Disagreements between Egypt and the US, and the seriousness of past crises between the two countries, should not be exaggerated. In the final analysis, Egyptian-US relations conform to the basic pattern of relations between great and lesser powers. At the same time, however, the dependence of lesser powers on great ones should not be exaggerated.
There is obviously no "balance of power" in such relations; a relative "balance of interests" is not lacking, however, in the broad and long-term sense of the expression. At the political level, the gap between the imbalance of power and the balance of interests seems to be the main determinant of relations. Egypt has remained eager to assert its independence from the US in policy and practice, resulting in the crystallisation of a distinct character after Mubarak's accession to power in 1981.
Besides relations with Egypt, the US has sought to realise specific aims. First, it has attempted to help formulate strategic security policy in the Middle East, primarily against Soviet threats and secondly against radical regional powers, now referred to as rogue states. This aim relates to securing oil supplies in the region, and consolidating the control of American firms over the oil industry and trade in the Middle East and beyond. There is a disagreement, however, between Egypt and the US as to the definition of rogue states and ways to deal with them.
Second, the US aspires to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that takes into account circumstances prevailing Israel and the US. This means the continuation of total US protection for Israel on the international diplomatic front, and Israel's absolute military preponderance over all its Arab neighbours. There is again a disagreement between Egypt and the US as to the nature of Egypt's role and the way in which it should exercise it. The US would like to put more pressure on the Arab side in the peace process, while Egypt disagrees with this view.
Finally, the US has sought to promote the market economy and liberal policies in the region. It expected Egypt to lead the region toward economic transformation, and a minimum of political reforms guaranteeing a façade of democracy. Egypt's insistence upon effecting this transformation very gradually in order to avoid the fate of the former Soviet Union did little to alleviate the feeling of disappointment that has marked Egyptian-US relations in this area.
Conversely, one of Egypt's main aims in relations with the US is to reach a status equivalent to that of Israel in the US's strategic global and regional vision, as a prerequisite for a just resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. Egypt also needs American support in order to achieve economic take-off under safe conditions.
In this respect, Egypt considers that one factor affecting the special relationship with the US has been the dynamic nature of that relationship, which has adapted to every development at international and regional levels. There is no written document confining relations to specific borders or a specific set of mutual commitments, or even outlining its basic principles. Discretion has been necessary in interpreting mutual interests in each individual case. Interestingly, however, the relationship has proved to be vital and special for both sides, especially at the strategic level.
In this perspective, Egypt's role has not been restricted to the region. Throughout much of the second half of the 20th century, this role has been international. Egypt's role has been shaped by its importance as a leader capable of influencing the dominant political mood in the region and beyond. It also relates to its effectiveness in setting a global agenda, the plurality of its regional zones of influence, and its active membership in international movements that still exert a measure of influence with respect to the enforcement of international law.
The essential understanding characterising Egyptian-US relations stems from a wide spectrum of common strategic interests, especially in the protection of regional stability (hence the recent Bright Star manoeuvres), and achieving peace between the Arabs and Israel. The relationship between a great power and a middle regional power, however, cannot be one-sided. There is room for conflicting orientations and policies as well as sometimes open disagreements.
Inherent within the possible space of disagreement is a certain -- possibly positive -- vagueness, especially in the strategic domain. The bases of the settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, for instance, are not very clear. The US is putting all its weight behind Israel, despite the great importance Egypt accords to the international concept of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace. Despite important disagreements in this respect, the vagueness surrounding the American stand may have helped avert open conflicts and postpone disagreements. A process of learning is underway, however, regarding the handling of disagreements between the two states.
Egypt is serious about its drive to achieve a comprehensive regional balance of power, one guaranteeing self-defence capabilities on all sides and preventing the accumulation of a surplus of power that might lead to the exercise of strategic blackmail. The latter can stem from a clear superiority that could disseminate fear even in the absence of actual acts of aggression. Such fear can enforce the tendency toward a new arms race in the region in such a way as to disrupt the bases of stability. Egypt therefore demands parity with Israel in terms of US military support. It cannot accept any increase in the regional imbalance of power.
Ultimately, stability and peace in the Middle East can only be preserved through an acceptable strategic and military equilibrium among the regional powers. Egypt certainly understands that this equilibrium must be approximate, and that the American pledge to defend Israel is absolute and unconditional. The essence of the Egyptian demands pertaining to parity with Israel, then, relates to the extent of Egypt's confidence with respect to the strength of relations with the US, the independence of these relations from American-Israeli cooperation, and the reliability of Egyptian-US ties in all circumstances.
For Egypt, the gap between US military aid to Israel and to Egypt can only encourage extremism in Israel. In the course of its strategic dialogue with Egypt, however, the US has argued that Israel's military needs will continue to increase as it faces ever-greater military challenges. There is, of course, no evidence to support this position. It is more likely that Israel's needs will decrease if its leaders and citizens really want peace.
Egypt has clashed with the US over the political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with respect to both the content of peace and some procedural points. In terms of content, Egypt insists on a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. As for the US, it is clear that it accepts the Israeli viewpoint, or is willing to go along with Israel's insistence to make Jerusalem, for instance, the "eternal and undivided capital of Israel". The US may also be willing to support Israel's policy of swallowing the greater part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is a position that Egypt categorically rejects, insisting on total withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the creation of a Palestinian state.
As for procedure, severe public disagreements have erupted between Egypt and the US on economic cooperation. For the US, economic normalisation will encourage Israel to show flexibility. Egypt, however, perceives such normalisation as part of the process of negotiations, and as intimately connected to progress in the political settlement. Other disagreements at this procedural level have been less severe, because Egypt has attempted to show flexibility at this level, in contrast to its strong commitment to the principles pertaining to peace.
Within the broad framework of military issues, the issue that comes closest to the two states' "red lines" remains nuclear disarmament. Egypt objects to the commitment of successive US administrations to Israeli military superiority. For Egypt, the disequilibrium this entails necessarily leads to instability and the perpetuation of the arms race. Israel's large nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction are bound to be perceived as threatening to the region as a whole.
The US resorts to absolute silence on that issue, while actually backing Israel from the wings. There are probably a number of reasons preventing the US from pressuring Israel to conform to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it has never signed. The same reasons are behind the American silence regarding continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the negative US attitude toward the continuation of the political settlement on the different remaining tracks.
At any rate, the nuclear issue is still a time bomb likely to explode at any moment. Is this the Middle East peace desired by the US?
*The writer is the deputy director of the National Centre for Middle East Studies.
