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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 November 1999 Issue No. 454 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 November 1999 Issue No. 454
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Plundering democracy
By Gamal NkrumahNicknamed the "Soldier of Soldiers", Pakistan's new leader General Pervez Musharraf announced on Monday the formation of a National Accountability Bureau with "special speedy courts" to determine corrupt officials' fates. No doubt many heads will roll, some of them perhaps literally. "Just bear with us and we will do the job", the general assured his 140 million, mostly Muslim compatriots.
There are few more difficult public policy issues for Third World military governments to grapple with than stamping out corruption. Indeed, most coup leaders the world over justify their actions as necessary to weed out corrupt civilian officials. Yet sadly, the juntas they put in place often prove just as corrupt as the civilian administrations they oust. "Never before have so few plundered so many," Musharraf told his people last week. Let us hope he does not try to break that particular record himself.
Against the background of a 3-4 per cent contraction in GDP, Musharraf has stated that regenerating the economy is top of his agenda. New initiatives are needed. Corruption, extreme inequalities in income and wealth, and rampant poverty call for radical solutions and drastic measures. But these are also profound matters of conscience that should not be decided in haste. Already, one of Musharraf's fellow generals has been named head of the new anti-corruption squad.
The economy and corruption may be vital issues, but so is setting the timetable for a return to democracy. "The armed forces have no intention of staying in charge any longer than absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan," Musharraf announced soon after the coup. But who is to determine how long is "absolutely necessary" -- unless it is the general himself?
"Pakistan, in recent years, has experienced merely a label of democracy, and not the essence of it," Musharraf said in his first address to the nation. There is nothing unique in this. Most poor and underdeveloped nations are condemned to suffer the exact same fate. Ironically, one notable exception is India, Pakistan's neighbour and antagonist. Yet, despite the lack of viable democracies, relatively few political establishments in the South still seem vulnerable to hijack by direct military intervention. Not surprisingly, many prominent civilians have politely turned down offers of a job with the Musharraf regime. Seven civilians, however, did oblige the general, even including one woman. Four civilians were also appointed to the National Security Council (NSC) which is headed by Musharraf himself. Perhaps the most distinguished member of the NSC is Dr Mohamed Yaqub, an accomplished academic and former top official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yaqub headed IMF missions to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen and Lebanon. A graduate of Yale and Princeton, where he received his doctorate, he will no doubt prove an asset in the difficult negotiations to come with the country's Western creditors and the international financial institutions (IFIs).
Yet for all the technocratic skill with which he is surrounding himself, Musharraf still has to choose between a number of unpalatable options. His anti-corruption campaign would entail a complete overhaul of the country's cumbersome public sector, and might well dash any hopes of reinvigorating private entrepreneurship. Western creditors are meanwhile urging radical fiscal adjustments, and greater fiscal discipline will inevitably loom large on the agenda.
On Monday, a World Bank energy mission arrived in Pakistan to settle a dispute between Islamabad and independent power producers. The visit is widely regarded as a litmus test, for the IFIs have linked the next round of desperately-needed loan disbursements to a satisfactory resolution of the power dispute. The World Bank, of course, has long been part of the de facto political establishment of Pakistan. The Bank played a key role in ousted premier Nawaz Sharif's decision to ban Pakistan's largest trade union, a precondition for the across-the-board privatisations prescribed from Washington. The Bank also encouraged Sharif to initiate the anti-terrorism ordinance that described strikes as "terrorist acts".
Ironically, Pakistan is itself branded as a "state supporting terrorism" in many Western quarters. Internationally, the country is inching ever closer to the dreaded "pariah" status. It is common knowledge that the Pakistani military has close ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who are in turn the protectors of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born financier and Islamist militant leader who tops Washington's list of most wanted fugitives from justice. Indeed, the entire future of American-Pakistani relations may well hinge on this very issue, which also has a considerable impact on Islamabad's status in the eyes of its neighbours.
Bin Laden and the Taliban regime are known to have close contacts with Islamist separatists in neighbouring Xinjiang, the predominantly Muslim-Chinese province, and the Pakistani regime has on several occasions had to issue public reassurances to Chinese officials. In the aftermath of October's coup, it was hardly surprising then that Beijing strongly condemned the military takeover. Bin Laden himself has declared a jihad against India, and the Taliban regime is among the staunchest supporters of Islamist separatists in Kashmir. Russia, too, is concerned at the growing ties between the Taliban and Islamist separatists in the war-torn breakaway republic of Chechnya.
The nations of the West, for their part, have strongly condemned the 12 October coup. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook is leading a campaign to suspend Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group has already suspended Pakistan from participating in the Councils of the Commonwealth, following a fact-finding visit to the country last week. Musharraf did not allow the Commonwealth delegation to meet with the ousted Pakistani premier.
It is in this context that Musharraf's first state visit abroad was highly indicative of the new regimes future political focus overseas. The general's first foreign trip took him to two of Islamabad's most generous financial backers -- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Gulf states have together been asked to bail out the Pakistanis, since in the circumstances Western funds are unlikely to be forthcoming. This alliance-in-the-making is also of wider significance, for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only three states in the world that recognise the Islamist Emirate declared by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan -- where it controls over 90 per cent of the impoverished mountainous country, including its bullet-ridden capital Kabul.
The Pakistani army might be united in its support for Kashmiri liberation, but it is no monolithic body. Indeed, it is ridden with factions. Musharraf is therefore expected to consolidate his power base within the army, and potential troublemakers are destined for early retirement, or worse. Lt Gen Zia-ud-Din, Lt Gen Tariq Pervaiz (a relative of Sharif) and Brig Javed Malik (Sharif's military secretary) have all been taken into custody for aiding the deposed prime minister. Zia-ud-Din tried in vain to prevent Musharraf's plane from landing at Karachi after the general's return from celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the Sri Lankan army. Sharif had wanted to retire Gen Musharraf and appoint Lt Gen Zia-ud-Din in his place, but the Soldier of Soldiers outsmarted his foes once again.
The other central question that needs addressing is Pakistan's traditional rivalry with India. The ongoing feud between the two states has severely distorted the smaller country's political and economic development. Perhaps one of the blessings of this ambiguous coup will be that the political establishment -- both military and civilian -- will now be able to focus more on Pakistan's many intractable domestic problems, and less on its historic one-upmanship with New Delhi.
