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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 November 1999 Issue No. 455 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 November 1999 Issue No. 455
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Books Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The state as anti-climax
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
If last week's Oslo summit was meant only to commemorate the fourth anniversary of Rabin's assassination by an Israeli extremist, which is the official reason given for the meeting, then it should have included all the parties involved in the peace process with which the late Israeli prime minister was closely identified. The conspicuous absence of three key Arab rulers, namely, President Mubarak, King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohamed VI of Morocco, made it clear that the undeclared aim of the summit was to bring Clinton, Barak and Arafat together in order, in Clinton's words, "to find a way to reach final peace within ten months".
This ambitious enterprise entails circumventing a major stumbling block which stands in the way of the peace process. The mechanism established by the Oslo agreement signed in the White House on 13 September 1993 covers only an interim phase, but does not address itself to the final negotiations, which remain unchartered territory. One of the main objectives of the Oslo summit was to agree on a framework agreement that would establish rules an a system of reference for the final accords.
There is no compelling reason, at least, no objective, reason to meet the arbitrary ten-month deadline set for reaching the final accords. The urgency derives from a factor that is not intrinsically linked to the peace process itself but, rather, to its sponsor, the incumbent, soon to be the former, US President. Bill Clinton's second term ends in January 2001, and if a final agreement is not reached within the envisaged time-frame he will be unable to take credit for bringing an end to a relentless conflict that has ravaged the Middle East for much of the twentieth century. To include such a historical achievement in his record has become all the more imperative for the US president after his Monicagate debate and his failure to push the Non-Proliferation Treaty through Congress.
But even in the interim phase of the negotiations, target dates were never achieved. Despite the fact that discussions over the more intractable issues were deferred to the final talks, not one agreement was signed on schedule during the interim phase. It is hard to believe that things will be different with the most difficult negotiations still ahead.
Arafat went to Oslo with a long list of grievances about agreements that have not been implemented. A proposal now under consideration is to organise a tripartite summit between Clinton, Arafat and Barak in Camp David, where they will remain sequestered until they achieve results along the lines of the Camp David accords hammered out by Carter, Sadat and Begin at their Camp David summit over twenty years ago.
In previous articles, I wrote that a Camp David-like reunion is highly unlikely to resolve all the many outstanding issues between the two sides in less than one year, and that to expect otherwise is more wishful thinking than anything else. It seems the undeclared agenda of the second Camp David summit is to agree on the creation of a Palestinian state while postponing any agreement on the prerogatives to be vested in that state. In other words, declaring that a Palestinian state has come into being will be the cornerstone of the 'final agreement' Clinton will claim has been achieved before he steps down. The provisions of this agreement will have been laid down in closed-door meetings in which Clinton and Barak will be dealing with Arafat alone, in complete isolation from any other Arab leader. Thus we are not likely to see the restoration of all Palestinian land, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, or indeed, acceptable solutions to any of the thorny issues of contention between the two sides.
We must also be aware that declaring the creation of a Palestinian state is not to the advantage of the Palestinians only. If Barak agrees that such a state should exist (and on this matter, he is following in the footsteps of Peres), it is because he does not want to sin final agreements with a Palestinian authority whose legitimacy is not consecrated by international law. Neither the PLO, nor the Palestinian Authority (PA) have impeccable legal credentials. Their signature could be acceptable for interim agreements, not for final settlements. In the latter case, a full-fledged state, whatever its sovereign prerogatives and surface area, should assume the responsibility of its commitments.
In the matter of a Palestinian state, Israel wants to have its cake and eat it. On the one hand, it wants a Palestinian state with sufficient authority to guarantee Israel's security and thwart any Palestinian threat to that security, on the other, it wants one deprived of the elements that would enable it to honour its commitments effectively.
Whatever the final form of the Palestinian state, it will have to have a capital. The Palestinians consider East Jerusalem their capital. This is totally unacceptable to the Israeli side, for whom a united Jerusalem is and must remain their eternal capital. Yossi Beilin, member of the Israeli cabinet and well known for his inventive compromise proposals, has not been able to go any further in his search for a solution than to declare: "For the issue of Jerusalem to be solved, the city must not be divided but widened", thus including within its periphery wider chunks of the West Bank. A Palestinian capital will then be created out of a selected part of the enlarged city which, though ostensibly within the area of Jerusalem will actually be a part of the West Bank!
As to the return of the Palestinian refugees, Israel's stand on the issue is in open opposition to UN resolutions. No refugees will be authorised to return to any part of historical Palestine presently under Israeli sovereignty. The Palestinian state, with its area reduced as a result of the proliferation of Jewish settlement, whose construction is actively encouraged by the present Israeli government, will be capable of absorbing only a limited proportion of the 1967 refugees. All the other members of the Palestinian Diaspora, including all 1948 refugees, will be compensated and settled outside Palestine, whether in the Arab world or elsewhere.
If this is the master-plan for a final settlement of the Palestinian problem, can peace be achieved? Can Palestinian anger and frustration be overcome? Can Palestinian resistance movements be neutralised and eradicated? These are the difficult problems that the PA will have to resolve.
Both the US and Israel are betting on the assumption that wide constituencies in the Arab world want to see a speedy resolution of the Palestinian problem, even one that will come at a high price for the Palestinians themselves. In a repeat performance of the undignified rush to open up onto Israel at the time of the Peres initiative to build a Middle East market, many Arab states, notably those on the periphery of the Arab world, are once again trying to normalise relations with Israel, even before the Palestinian state is established. Mauritania has gone as far as to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, while Algeria seems to be toying with the idea. Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Tunisia and Morocco have taken steps in the same direction.
Following last week's Oslo summit, rumours began circulating, similar to those heard after the first Oslo summit in 1993, about a massive influx of economic assistance to the new Palestinian state as soon as it will be recognised, not only from the European Union and other western sources, but also from a wealthy Palestinian business community keen to ensure the prosperity of the state and eradicate sources of turmoil and discontent.
The money did not come the first time. There is no guarantee that it will this time. What is more likely is that the master plan now set for implementation will liquidate rather than resolve the Palestinian problem, with repercussions throughout the area, as history has repeatedly shown us, far beyond the Palestinian problem itself.
