Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 December 1999 Issue No. 459
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

The legacy of 20th-century Islamist thought is riddled with disagreement and inextricably associated with political action. In this year's first round of Al-Ahram Weekly's traditional Ramadan Debates, Islamic thinker Mohamed Selim El-Awwa* reflects on a complex heritage, and the difficulties facing its self-appointed heirs Mohamed Abduh A return to the centre

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Gamaleddin El-Afghani, who died in 1897, three years before the beginning of the 20th century, laid the foundations of the concept of Islam as political resistance, Islam as the struggle for freedom, Islam as defence of the land in the face of European colonial ambitions. To fully comprehend the diverse facets of the liberation enterprise as expressed in Islamic political thought in Egypt, however, we must also consider the major contributions of other symbols of this movement. We must consider, for instance, Mohamed Abduh, who advocated a renewal of political and religious thought capable of meeting the challenges of modern life; Hassan El-Banna, who propounded the notion of comprehensive Islam, and linked it to organised activism; renowned jurist Abdel-Razeq El-Sanhouri, who is noted, among other things, for his scholarly and practical response to the trauma of the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 at the hands of the Kemalists in Turkey. In a thorough and erudite investigation of the development of the Caliphate as an institution, he distinguished between the "perfect" caliphate as embodied in the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (the Prophet's four immediate successors), and the "incomplete" caliphates of later eras. He appealed for the general acceptance of the second notion to institutionalise a modified caliphate that would safeguard the essence and sovereignty of Shari'a.

Another key figure in the development of Islamist thought is Sayed Qutb, whose programme for the revival of the Islamic nation ultimately cost him his life. In spite of its excessive idealism, his attempt to furnish an ideological framework in which to redraw the battle lines so as to include the domestic front triggered a controversy that continues to rage today.

In one of the most significant attempts to bring Islamic political thought down to earth, Muslim Brotherhood leader Hassan El-Ashmawi expounded a bold distinction between the divine and human aspects of what he called "the problem of supremacy". Extrapolating from both El-Ashmawi's conceptual distinction and El-Sanhouri's notions on the caliphate, Tawfiq El-Shawi expounded a theory of government founded upon what he described as the need to separate between the religious, or juridical, imamate and the political imamate.

Less than four years after publishing his theory on the jurisprudence of government, El-Shawi's ideas, and those of El-Ashmawi before him, found practical expression in the establishment of the Wasat (Centre) Party. Founded by a group of young Islamists and Coptic activists, this party failed in its two successive attempts to obtain the approval of the Egyptian government and the Political Parties Court. Nonetheless, it has become the primary representative of the Islamist political and intellectual enterprise today; moreover, it has inspired other Islamist trends, which for decades had rejected democracy, the electoral process and the state itself, to consider establishing political parties founded upon Islamist platforms.

In the following paragraphs I will attempt to trace the trajectory of Islamic thought in the Egyptian political process from the generation that inaugurated this century with its liberationist theorising to the generation of Islamists that is moving into the next century with its quest for official political legitimacy.

In sowing the seeds of liberationist Islam, El-Afghani was not only fighting foreign occupation and government despotism, but also stagnation in Islamic jurisprudence. In a discussion of Ijtihad, the exercise of independent judgement in legal or theological questions, he wrote: "Who has announced that the door to Ijtihad is closed? Where is the scriptural basis for this statement? Which imam determined that no one after him should be authorised to exercise Ijtihad in religious jurisprudence, to apply the principles of deduction and analogy in the interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith [the Prophet's sayings] to the demands of modern sciences and the exigencies of the age?"

If the Islamic nation is to emerge from its state of dependency and subjugation to foreign powers, there is but one "successful remedy," he contends: "to return to the bases of religion, comply with its original strictures, seek guidance from its abundant spiritual counsel toward purity of heart and moral refinement... The true fundaments of religion, unadulterated by subsequent innovations, give nations the power of unity, inspire them to acquire virtue and expand the scope of knowledge, and lead them to highest ends of modernity."

To Mohamed Abduh, El-Afghani's methodology for reform was the only way to rejuvenate the Orient, and he went on to elaborate a comprehensive philosophical structure for its interpretation and implementation. There is little wonder in this, given that Abduh was El-Afghani's most gifted and dedicated disciple. That Abduh also worked with El-Afghani in Paris for two years on Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa (The Firm Bond), both a magazine and an underground organisation, enabled him to benefit more from his mentor than other disciples.

Gamaleddin El-Afghani Hassan El-Banna

Mohamed Abduh brought his immense erudition to an exhaustive programme of reform, earning himself praise as "one of the greatest minds of the East, the Arab world and Islam in the modern era". In the realm of political thought, his "reformist" theory contrasts with the "revolutionary" theory propounded by El-Afghani. Abduh believed that "gradual reform" was the optimum means of achieving the ultimate aim of political action: the resurrection and liberation of the East. Islam "is a religion and a code of law," Abduh wrote. "It imposes limits upon man's actions and ordains his rights. There can be no rationale behind the promulgation of law without the existence of an authority to impose restrictions, implement the judge's rulings and safeguard public order. If this authority is not to disintegrate into chaos, it cannot be vested in a large number of people; it must reside with a single individual. This individual is the sultan or the caliph, who, in turn, derives his power from the nation, which has the right to depose him in the event that such action best serves its welfare. As such, this individual is a civilian ruler in every respect."

Mohamed Abduh's secularist notions of government were incorporated into Article 5 of the platform of the Nationalist Party, which stated that the party "is a political, secular entity. Its membership is drawn from among all Islamic denominations, Christians and Jews, and all those who plow the soil of Egypt and speak its language. This stipulation is granted by the most eminent leaders of Al-Azhar, who support this party and who hold that the true Law of Mohamed prohibits intolerance and holds that all people must be treated equally."

Mohamed Abduh's life-long devotion to a comprehensive system of reform defined a new and authentic approach to religious reform, rooted in "the liberation of thought from the fetters of tradition, the attempt to comprehend religion in the manner of this nation's ancestors before disparity arose, and the quest to acquire knowledge from its original sources". But to this scholar, jurist and educational reformer, the quest required rigid discipline and erudition. As he put it: "Every Muslim should seek to enhance his awareness of God through the Book of God, and of the Prophet through his sayings, without recourse to the mediation of his predecessors or contemporaries. Before that, however, he must acquire the means that will allow him to understand." It is undoubtedly his spirit of enlightenment that earned this major pioneer of Islamic reform such lasting stature and enduring influence.

Hassan El-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, defined the Murshid, or spiritual guide, as a reformer and mentor above all. In this respect, we can discern the influence of Mohamed Abduh; but his revolutionary activism brought him closer in spirit to El-Afghani. El-Banna, however, went further, setting up the first organisational framework for Islamic political activism. In fact, it is in large measure due to these structural foundations that the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood continues to be felt strongly in Egypt, the rest of the Arab world and abroad.

El-Banna was adamant in his advocacy of Islam as an all-comprehensive doctrine, which governs every aspect of human activity. In answer to Taha Hussein's Mustaqbal Al-Thaqafa fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt) he wrote: "We take issue with Taha Hussein and those who subscribe to his claim that the distinction he postulates between religion and politics, religion and nationalism, and religion and science is beneficial and conforms with our religious precepts. His contention lacks both theoretical and historical corroboration. Moreover, it is inimical to our welfare and the requisites of our rebirth. Those who seek to divest Islam of its nationalist and its cultural ramifications are, in effect, appealing for the end of Islam as a faith and a creed for this nation."

El-Banna believed that the philosophy of political resistance had to be grounded solely in the Qur'an and the tenets of Islam. Of particular concern to him was the role of the intellect in this endeavor. In keeping with the Qur'anic injunction, the devout Muslim is exhorted to keep an open and actively engaged mind. As El-Banna put it, thinking is a form of worship unequaled by other forms, "because the Qur'an linked faith in the heart to the intellect", which, in turn, "is governed by the bounds of Islam and must inevitably submit to the Creator and Ruler of the universe." The pursuit of knowledge therefore reinforces spiritual strength and gives it the guidance of wisdom and the benefits of scientific discovery and technological advances. As El-Banna pointed out, the Qur'an renders the acquisition of knowledge, in both the spiritual and profane domains, a religious duty.

Hassan El-Banna established political Islam as an all-encompassing endeavour -- the logical consequence of the idea that Islam governs all aspects of existence. Faith guides man's being in the universe. The Shari'a establishes his duties and rights with respect to society, and defines the principles of conduct and modes of interaction with others, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Islam, in Hassan El-Banna's political ideology, is a philosophy, a code of law, and a moral ideology that demands the believer's full mental and emotional commitment.

Between the assassination of Hassan El-Banna in 1949 and the appearance of the first edition of Sayed Qutb's Ma'alem ala-Tariq (Signposts Along the Way), Egypt underwent immense changes. For the Muslim Brotherhood, it was a period of intense crisis, as the government pressed forward in implementing its state socialist programme and reinstated the pre-Revolutionary ban on Muslim Brotherhood activity. Repression and violence gave rise to a new intellectual trend in political Islam that would have a profound impact on political and cultural life in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. This trend was defined by Sayed Qutb.

Qutb's arguments emanated from the premise that Western democracy was morally bankrupt and that Marxist socialism would eventually prove equally so, a prediction that seemed to bear itself out three decades later. The West's position as the leader of the world was on the verge of extinction, he said, because it no longer possessed the values that qualified it for leadership. Islam, on the other hand, possesses such values; but only a truly Islamic society, or "nation", could bring them to fruition. That condition had not been fulfilled. Qutb wrote: "The Muslim nation ceased to exist centuries ago. The Muslim nation is not the land on which Islam thrived, or a people whose ancestors lived in accordance with Islamic precepts at one time. The Islamic nation is a collection of human beings whose lives, perception, values, economies, laws and regulations, manners and morals are all derived from the Islamic system. This nation ceased to exist when humanity ceased to abide by the Law of God and its command over the entire earth."

Islam, according to Qutb, defines two types of society: Islam and Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance and, by extension, barbarity). The former observes the requirements of worship, law, government, morals and behaviour; the latter does not. That a society consists of people who call themselves "Muslims" does not mean that it is necessarily an Islamic society. As long as that society does not live by the Shari'a, it is in a state of Jahiliyya, even if its members believe in God and observe the rituals of worship.

The evolution of the concept of Jahiliyya from Mohamed Abduh to Sayed Qutb is fundamental to the development of Islamic political thought and the radical redirection it would take. To the reformist Mohamed Abduh, although the masses were ignorant/barbaric, they could be enlightened; governments, however iniquitous, could be guided to the right path through the application of Shari'a "in the manner that conforms with the customs of the people."

In keeping with his anti-colonialist activism, Hassan El-Banna charged that the governments of his time (when Egypt was still under de facto foreign occupation) were not founded on Islamic bases. Sayed Qutb, on the other hand, turned the concept inwards and directed it against society at large. The "nation of Islam" had ceased to exist once man submitted the governance of his affairs to men. Society was in a state of Jahiliyya because it failed to submit to the full dominion (Hakimiyya) of the Law of God, even if the members of that society "pray, fast and perform the pilgrimage".

Qutb's theory introduced a host of concepts to the lexicon of radical Islamist groups: Hijra (the Prophet's flight to Madina and, by extension, flight from infidel society); Takfir (the indictment of society as infidel) and Istihlal (whereby infidel aggressors against the Muslim nation could be killed legitimately). To this day, Islamic jurists and intellectuals condemn the violence and destruction that has taken place in the name of these concepts, which have distorted the image and spirit of Islam. However one may interpret Qutb's writings, they have had such far-reaching consequences as to prompt Hassan El-Hodeibi, the second Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, to publish Du'aa La Qudat (Advocates, Not Judges), in which he protested that the Muslim Brotherhood does not claim the right to "excommunicate" society and take up arms against it.

A major symbol of the contemporary Islamist movement, Hassan El-Ashmawi was a prominent Brotherhood member. Before the 1952 Revolution and until 1954, he was the Brotherhood's major link to the Free Officers. Following the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in 1954, triggered by an assassination attempt against then President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Alexandria, El-Ashmawi went into hiding in Upper Egypt. Three years later, he left Egypt and remained abroad until his death in Kuwait on 2 February 1972.

El-Ashmawi's contribution to contemporary Islamic thought lies primarily in The Arab Individual and the Problem of Government. In this work, he expounded his theory that "the problem of government resides upon two primary, complementary tenets: the belief in Divine existence and faith in individual freedom. Individual freedom must assert itself before the challenges of both the metaphysical and tangible worlds."

It is not the objective of the Islamic movement, according to El-Ashmawi, to establish a "religious government" ; the expressions "Islamic government" and "Islam is a religion and a state" should not be interpreted to support the notion of a "religious government". Religious governments, in the form of divinely invested monarchs and priestly casts, have wrought too many tragedies throughout history.

El-Ashmawi developed his idea further in a discussion of Hakimiyya (dominion). In what was clearly a rebuttal of Qutb's notion of the concept, he wrote: "[Theologians and jurists] speak of bringing about God's dominion on earth, but have they explained what this means? Does God want to rule the earth in a specific way? Did He draw up a plan for government? With total confidence, I say no, and I challenge anyone to furnish me with proof of the contrary." To El-Ashmawi, Hakimiyya meant the dominion of God and His Laws on earth, regardless of the form of government. But as a rallying cry, he rejected the concept outright. "It can only produce one of two situations. The first is an authoritarian religious government in which justice depends upon its rulers' whims; they will brook no opposition because they embody the rule of God on earth. The second is total chaos as every faction seeks to assert itself as the representative of God's rule on earth, leading to dissent and fratricide."

In contrast to a "religious government", an Islamic government, to El-Ashmawi's mind, is "a Muslim government that believes in God and the day of judgment, applies the laws of the Muslims, which emanate from the Shari'a, and evolves to meet the demands of changing times." But, El-Ashmawi insisted, this notion does not impose a specific form of government: "Nations should choose the solution that best suits their circumstances." He added: "The Islamist movement is not a theory that imposes a certain determinism. It is a movement that strives to apply the essence of Islam as it was understood by its founders. Fundamentalism does not imply imitating the actions of the founders, but embracing the conceptual motives that inspired them to their actions."

El-Ashmawi's definition of divine dominion, in conjunction with his assertion of individual freedom and people's right to choose their form of government, opened a vast realm of possibilities within the framework of Islamic tenets. This contribution would inspire important practical developments in subsequent Islamic political thought and action.

The tide of Islamic revival that began in the mid-'70s brought to the fore a new generation of fresh and innovative thinkers throughout the Arab and Muslim world. For the most part unaffiliated with radical groups and unwilling to submit to the rigid thinking of these groups, their numbers came to include an increasing number of academics and scholars, who established magazines and other platforms for the expression of new trends in Islamic thought. From this milieu there emerged the proponents of the Wasat Party.

The attempt to found the Wasat Party precipitated a sharp rift between its founders and the Muslim Brotherhood, from which it drew many of its members. Perhaps the Islamist scholar Youssef El-Qardawi struck the crux of this problem when he wrote: "I welcome the idea of the Wasat Party, which may offer the Islamist movement an opportunity to break out of the isolation imposed on it. I fear, however, that the movement will seek to constrain its younger, freer thinkers, close the door to renovation and independent thought and insist on one mode of thinking that refuses to entertain an opposing view."

It is, of course, public record that the Wasat founders' application to constitute a party was denied; they were equally disappointed in their appeal to the Political Parties Court. They have not abandoned their quest for legal authorisation, however. As they have stated repeatedly, they are committed to open political action in accordance with the law, regardless of the restrictions it may impose on Islamist action and political activity. This is a wise choice, certain to send ripples through the stagnant waters of Egyptian political life. If, through its efforts, this embryonic party encourages radical political groupings to renounce violence and engage in peaceful party activity, it will already have achieved a laudable success.

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* The writer is a lawyer and the author of numerous books on Islamic thought and practice.

 

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