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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 December 1999 Issue No. 460 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 December 1999 Issue No. 460
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Debate Focus Profile Living Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Making peace at home
By Hassan Nafaa *
Since Khomeini's death, Iran has being undergoing a gradual transition from revolutionary to constitutional legitimacy. While the Shura Council elections of 1996 marked a major turning point in this direction, Khatami's election to the presidency in 1997 was the event that convinced most observers of the depth of change taking place in Iran.
The 1996 elections cleared the way for a full transition from the revolutionary mind-set to rationalised government, although conservative elements still attempted to sway the electorate in favour of the right-wing candidates. Observers at the time, however, were particularly struck by the involvement of the younger generation, which had reached maturity under Rafsanjani's relatively moderate rule. They were also struck by the growing participation of Iranian women.
Although the conservatives came out ahead, gaining a majority of the seats in the Shura Council and with their foremost exponent, Nateq-Nouri, as speaker of parliament, the elections revealed a growing desire for change, which would prove irresistible in 1997.
Although there were several presidential candidates, the contest focused around two: Nateq-Nouri and Khatami. Nateq-Nouri's platform emphasised the need to protect the revolution. Firmly opposed to making any concessions to the West, he denied the opposition any participation in government, since, he claimed, this would give the West a foothold inside the country. He was wary of civil liberties and women's rights, warning against "Western cultural dependency" and "intellectual alienation". Although he favoured a measure of economic reform, he cautioned against fostering international hegemony over the Iranian economy.
Khatami, in contrast, advocated measures to bring Iran out of its isolation, including opening channels of dialogue with the West and normalising relations with the Gulf and Egypt. He appealed for a national consensus that would affirm the rule of law, human rights, civil liberties, and especially women's rights. He sought a climate of intellectual freedom and creativity. Khatami also favoured economic reform, but stressed the principle of equity.
The fact that the old religious establishment cast its weight firmly behind Nateq-Nouri made Khatami's 70 per cent victory all the more stunning. Iran had embarked on a new and vibrant post-Khomeini phase, and there was a flurry of conjectures over the implications for Iranian foreign policy.
As analysts gauged the prospects for détente in relations with the US, Egypt and the Gulf, the conservative-moderate rift surfaced more openly in the Iranian political arena. The conservatives' attempts to stem the liberal tide were clear in the elections of 23 October 1998 and again in the local elections of February 1999. Sometimes direct clashes erupted, as was the case when security agencies began an assassination campaign against intellectuals noted for their reformist ideas. On university campuses, violent confrontations between the police and students led to hundreds of deaths and detentions. The eventual resolution of the conflict will determine Iran's future relations with the world in general and the Arab world in particular.
For its part, the Arab world hopes developments in Iran will bring fundamental modifications to unresolved disputes. Arab-Iranian disagreement centres around three issues: Iran's policy of exporting its revolution; border conflicts with a number of Arab countries; and Iran's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In the heated years following 1979, extremist elements in Iran offered moral and material support to forces that were prepared to further the goals of the revolution. The Arab world found itself faced with a two-fold threat. On one hand, countries with sizeable Shi'ite populations, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq, feared that Iran would exploit these elements to undermine their national stability. On the other hand, Iran's bid to spearhead the Islamist movement raised apprehensions that it would provoke further turmoil in many Arab countries already troubled by violence. Saudi Arabia, as the seat of Sunni Islam and the destination of the annual pilgrimage, became the focus of Iranian attempts to export the revolution. One violent clash with Iranian pilgrims caused Iran to boycott the pilgrimage for several years.
The end of the war with Iraq, the rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council following the Gulf War and the growing moderate trend inside Iran have contributed to alleviating Arab apprehensions, however. Particularly encouraging are Iran's repeated affirmations to Saudi Arabia that its aggressive propaganda campaign has come to an end. Relations received a significant boost when Rafsanjani made a two-week visit to Saudi Arabia in 1998. Immediately following this visit, the Iranian ministers of foreign affairs and defence visited Saudi Arabia, and a five-year cooperation protocol was signed. Saudi Arabia also declared that it has exonerated Iran of involvement in the explosion that claimed the lives of 19 Americans in June 1996.
There are still many unresolved border disputes between Iran and neighbouring Arab countries. The most serious at this stage centres around Iran's continued occupation of the UAE islands Tanb Major, Tanb Minor and Abu Moussa. The UAE's position on this issue, which has received unanimous Arab backing, is much more flexible than Iran's. Whereas the UAE is willing to submit the dispute to international arbitration, Iran insists on negotiations, although it has yet to show its willingness to offer satisfactory concessions. As long as Iran continues to adhere to its hard-line stance on this issue, it will be difficult for it to normalise relations fully with the Arab world. In fact, Saudi-Iranian relations may suffer if Saudi Arabia proves unable to use these relations as leverage to coax Iran into adopting a more flexible stance. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran has already provoked bitter wrangling within the GCC as a result of the UAE's insistence that normalisation be linked with a tangible change in Iran's stance on the islands. Iran has only to alter its position on this issue, therefore, to show its sincere desire to improve its relations with the Arab world and confirm the reorientation of its foreign policy.
Of course, any settlement of this dispute that is to be satisfactory to Iran will have to address the Western military presence in the Gulf. Iran's tenacious claim to these islands is as much the product of strategic military considerations as it is of historical entitlement. To eliminate one of Iran's major pretexts for its continued occupation of these islands, the Arabs will have to take Iranian security interests into account and, perhaps, include Iran in future cooperative arrangements over Gulf security.
Inter-Arab tension over the conflict with Israel is also mirrored in relations with Iran. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian revolutionary regime's policy on Israel was diametrically opposed to the Shah's. For some time, Iran sided with the front formed after Egypt had removed itself from the military equation. However, this front collapsed when Iraq declared war on Iran. Syria was the only Arab nation to improve relations with Iran simply because it perceives Israel as the greatest threat in the region.
Syria played the Iranian card with consummate skill. The Syrian-Iranian alliance was instrumental in increasing the impact of the Lebanese resistance. The alliance also helped Syria's position following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and enabled it to establish an organic link with the Lebanese track.
Iran, for political and religious reasons, continues to view Israel as one of the major regional threats to its security. Its steadfast opposition to the peace process and support of armed struggle as the only way to liberate the Occupied Territories, especially Jerusalem, have shaped its relations with Syria. Iran sharply criticised Syria for participating in the Madrid conference and the subsequent bilateral negotiations with Israel. On numerous occasions it has expressed its concern for Hizbullah's fate in Lebanon should Syria reach a peace accord with Israel.
If the current stagnation in the peace process has helped bring Syria and Iran closer, many in Iran are worried about Syrian intentions. During Al-Assad's visit to Iran last year, the Iranian press commentaries reflected the general scepticism. Editorials expressed the hope that Syria's return to a "correct understanding" of the situation was not merely a temporary pragmatic manoeuvre, and that the negotiations with Israel were an error that could be forgiven.
However, any rapprochement in Iranian-US relations will entail a shift in the Iranian attitude towards Israel, which, in turn, will weaken Syria's stance in the forthcoming phase of the peace process. If Syria has unvoiced concerns over such an eventuality, the moderate Arab camp (primarily of Egypt, Jordan and the PLO, which have signed peace agreements with Israel), will welcome a shift in the Iranian attitude.
Whatever the future of relations between Iran and the US, however, the Arabs should reach a clear strategy for collective management of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In sum, Arab-Iranian relations have taken considerable strides towards normalisation. Both sides are coming to realise that Gulf security can only be achieved through solid relations between the Arab world (especially the GCC) and Iran. Certain impediments must be overcome before full confidence can be restored, the most formidable being Iran's continued occupation of the three islands in the Gulf. However, it would appear that all other circumstances are conducive to surmounting differences over most other issues.
*The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
