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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 December 1999 Issue No. 460 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 December 1999 Issue No. 460
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Debate Focus Profile Living Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Relief and disrepute
By Salah HemeidThe Security Council postponed its vote on a resolution that would return United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq, but offer the country some relief from economic sanctions in force since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Following debates lasting for months, the Security Council delayed voting on the resolution which provides for the establishment of a new weapons inspection agency called the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). This agency will be entrusted with the task of overseeing the destruction of what remains of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons while the International Atomic Energy Agency will remain in charge of monitoring Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
UNMOVIC would replace the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) which supervised the destruction of Iraq's banned weapons from 1991 until it halted its operations after last year's military confrontation prompted by Iraq's decision to stop cooperation with the inspectors.
The new resolution also stipulates that 60 days after resuming work in Iraq, the two agencies should draw up a plan to strengthen the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programmes and determine specific steps Iraq must take to implement the remaining disarmament requirements.
In return, if Iraq cooperates fully, the council would be required to vote on suspending sanctions for an initial, but renewable, period of 120 days.
The new resolution also provides for financial controls on Iraq's imports, the details of which are to be worked out later.
To deter Iraq from noncompliance and a repetition of the standoffs with UNSCOM, the suspension of sanctions would be automatically revoked if either of the agencies reported that Iraq is not cooperating fully with the new inspectors.
In many aspects the resolution seems vague, most notably in the parts where it outlines the cooperation necessary for sanctions to be suspended. This ambiguity is the cause for the year-long debate among the five permanent members of the Security Council which has seen the United States insisting on "full cooperation", while Russia and China, seek a less strict interpretation.
During the consultations over the resolution, Iraq launched an intensive but seemingly futile diplomatic and media campaign to try to convince its allies in the council, namely France, Russia and China, to veto the resolution which it described as "a political mockery, vicious and venomous".
Iraqi officials have even threatened explicitly to cancel lucrative oil contracts with France, which is also Baghdad's fourth largest trade partner in the "oil-for-food" deal, if it supports the new resolution.
Baghdad's rejection of the resolution apparently stems from the fact that it does not include a date for lifting the sanctions. The setting of a date for the termination of sanctions is a demand Iraq has set for any cooperation with the inspectors.
Iraq also objected to the stipulation in the resolution permitting inspection visits to its installations and the questioning of Iraqi citizens -- the very same causes of its friction with UNSCOM in the past.
More importantly, many of the conditions imposed under the resolution are humiliating for Iraq, particularly the restrictions on its financial transactions which give the impression that the Baghdad government is under UN mandate.
Many observers believe that the new resolution was designed to maintain Washington's policy of containment against Iraq by further weakening the regime through portraying it as being unable to rule the country independently. Indeed, the new resolution seemed to be an attempt to make Iraq's containment an internationally sanctioned policy.
Despite Baghdad's reservations regarding the resolution, some of its measures might be useful for Iraq.
For example, the resolution allows for immediate improvements in the humanitarian situation in Iraq by lifting the $5.2billion ceiling on the amount of oil Baghdad can currently sell during the six month period under the UN oil-for-food programme.
It also authorises the UN Sanction Committee to draw up a list of items to be approved for import on an ongoing basis, thus speeding up their delivery. Also, Iraq would be permitted to use foreign exchange to buy spare parts for its ailing oil industry. Foreign investment in the oil sector is another issue for which the resolution permits consideration.
At a more fundamental level, the resolution provides for a mechanism to review the possibilities for suspending the economic sanctions which could be a first step towards lifting the crippling embargo.
Could these meagre incentives along with the ambiguity of the resolution persuade Baghdad to change its mind and accept the resolution in the hope that it will later open the door for a complete lifting of the sanctions? Or, will it continue its defiance and trigger another confrontation with the United States?
In the absence of clear indications, it should be recalled that Baghdad, in the past, backed down and accepted what it had previously rejected.
