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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 January 2000 Issue No. 464 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 January 2000 Issue No. 464
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Heritage Special Books Profile Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Counting the cost
By Graham UsherEhud Barak returned from his first real joust with Farouk Al-Sharaa, if not garlanded in victory, then at least not bloodied in defeat. "There are visible cracks in the Syrian obstinacy," he told Israeli TV triumphantly on Tuesday. Whatever these cracks are, they are clearly wide enough for Barak and his delegation to depart for another round of talks "in or near" Washington on 19 January.
Other than the guarded optimism exuded by the Israeli leader, and even more so by President Clinton, the only tangible outcome of the seven days of talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, was an American "working document" summarising "the issues to be decided and the differences between the parties", as described by White House spokesman Joe Lockhart.
The document has been kept under wraps, though a version of it did apparently find its way to the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper on Sunday. This caused a minor stir in Israel -- and swift charges of "inaccuracy" from Barak -- because it contained the first ever written commitment by Israel to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights "to the international border as drawn by the French and British mandatory powers [in 1923]".
Barak's denials may be read as for domestic rather than international consumption. The wiser among Israeli commentators long ago internalised the idea that a withdrawal to the 1923 border is less an Israeli retreat than a best-case scenario. Writing in Israel's Yediot Aharonot newspaper on Tuesday, Orly Azulai-Katz opined that two components of an eventual agreement could already be discerned from the talks in Shepherdstown.
The first is that there would be an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, but with the border "at times running [along] the 4 June 1967 line and at times [along] the 1923 'international border'." The second is that Syria had agreed to an early warning station on the Heights "supervised by the Americans" but "operated by Israelis as well -- for instance, by Israelis with American passports, so that the Syrians will be able to say that it is actually Americans who are running the station". The only thing now left to be done -- concluded Azulai-Katz -- is to "count the money".
It is likely to need a large calculus. According to reports in Israel's Haaretz newspaper, the "initial assessment" of the kind of cash Israel would want simply for a military withdrawal from the Golan is about $17.4 billion. The sum is so vast because, for Barak, an agreement with Syria "that enhances Israel's security" would include not only outlays to cover Israel's withdrawal from the Heights, but also expenditures to upgrade Israel's position as the uncontested military power in the region. Thus, according to Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff, $2 billion of the above figure is for Israel's acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, a weapon that the US has so far sold only to staunch ally and fellow NATO member Britain. Presumably, a Britain-like role is what Barak foresees for Israel, if not globally, then at least in the Middle East.
The other consideration driving Israel's "request" for such a massive down payment -- and one that Barak has reportedly aired with Clinton -- is domestic. Only a "security package" of such generosity -- so the argument goes -- can sway a sceptical Israeli electorate to vote in favour of withdrawal in any national referendum on peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon. If Barak needed grounds to support this thesis, they have been provided by what appears to be a burgeoning opposition in Israel to the "painful territorial price" involved in giving up the Golan.
On Monday, some 150,000 Israelis gathered at Rabin Square in Tel Aviv to oppose any withdrawal from the Golan Heights. If the number was less than the organisers had hoped for, it was still an impressive show of strength, with large turn-outs not only from settlers on the Golan Heights and West Bank, but also from Orthodox Jews and immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Perhaps even more troubling for the Israeli government has been the publication of polls that show opposition from constituencies it needs to win over if Barak is to achieve the "sweeping majority" he has predicted for peace with Syria and a withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
Thus a poll released on Sunday showed that 58 per cent of supporters of the Orthodox Sephardi Shas movement would oppose any evacuation of settlements on the Golan even if their spiritual mentor, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, issued a ruling in favour of one. Other surveys indicate that as much as 25 per cent of Labour and Meretz voters are presently opposed to a deal with Syria that involves a "full withdrawal" from the Golan. And a poll commissioned by Yediot last Friday showed that, after one round of talks with Syria, the percentage of Israelis in favour of a full withdrawal for a "full peace agreement" with Syria and Lebanon had slipped from 45 to 41 per cent.
Until an agreement is reached, such findings are unlikely to overly trouble Barak. On the contrary, he will invoke them to extract ever greater "peace" dividends from the American, European and Japanese taxpayer. But they should trouble the Arab and other states in the region. For the more cash that is lavished to salve Israel's "painful territorial price" on the Golan, the less money will be available to compensate the Lebanese for the 22 years of occupation Israel has wreaked on their country or the 3.5 million Palestinians made refugees by Israel's birth -- and the more likely will be the prospect and consolidation of Israel's role as an American-aligned Sparta in the Middle East.
