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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 January 2000 Issue No. 464 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 January 2000 Issue No. 464
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Heritage Special Books Profile Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The progress of peace
By Ibrahim Nafie
"Nothing will be agreed before everything is agreed," said one US official, putting in a nutshell the complex negotiating formula arrived at during Syrian-Israeli peace talks in Shepherdstown. If the first round of negotiations that began in mid December ended the long-standing deadlock over whether or not to resume negotiations at the point they left off in 1996, the second round brought a significant breakthrough in the stand-off over "negotiating priorities."
When the second round opened both sides were intent on securing commitments before entering into substantive negotiations. While Syria wanted Israel to pledge itself to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights before agreeing to talk about security arrangements, water and normalisation, Israel was insistent on Syrian commitments on these issues before pledging itself to withdrawal. At some point, however, the two sides, with considerable American prodding, arrived at a general understanding governing the general framework for negotiations.
The framework, while offering a guarantee that the fundamental demands of both sides would be addressed, side-stepped the priority issue by providing that talks over subsidiary issues would proceed in tandem. The aim? To arrive at a "complete accord" resolving all the issues simultaneously. Towards this end, Syria and Israel, with the full backing of the US, agreed to create four subcommittees to address -- without stipulating priority -- borders, water, security arrangements and normalisation.
Earlier, Syria had emphasised that it had no desire to negotiate over a "working agenda" that could be subject to reinterpretation or renegotiation. It wanted to work towards a clearly formulated final settlement, complete with annexes and maps, that would resolve all outstanding disputes. The "negotiating pact" meets this demand. However, it is important to note, firstly, that by agreeing to the creation of the four subcommittees, Syria has tacitly agreed to discuss security arrangements, water and normalisation. Simultaneously, the existence of a border, as opposed to a withdrawal committee, implies that Israel admits the possibility of full withdrawal, even with the coda that the definition of these boundaries remain subject to negotiation.
Areas of difference, though, mean that the work of the committees will not be easy.
Syria insists that Israel withdraw to 4 June 1967 lines, arguing that the Labour government of Rabin had given a verbal promise to do so. Israel, however, maintains that the international boundaries to which it will withdraw are those defined by the 1923 British mandate. While the difference between the two borders averages no more than 700 metres, the 4 June borders allow Syria access to the shores of Lake Tiberius, a major water reserve.
The question of borders, therefore, is clearly linked to the thorny water issue. In this regard, Syria is prepared to reach an agreement over the "partition of water" in accordance with international law. Israel, on the other hand, wants to secure a guarantee that its withdrawal from Golan will not affect its water supply, more than a third of which comes from tributaries of the Jordan river originating in the Golan. If statements issued by both sides indicate a certain level of flexibility over this issue, much depends on the substance of the agreements reached by the other committees.
Security arrangements, on the other hand, appear to hold the greatest prospect for stumbling blocks. While Syria adheres to the principle of balanced and equitable arrangements on both sides of the international boundary, Israel demands the establishment of a demilitarised zone in the Golan extending dozens of kilometres into Syria, in addition to access to early warning facilities in the Golan. With some 60 kilometers separating the Golan from Damascus, Syria is understandably very sensitive to arrangements surrounding the strategic heights. Technological advances in early warning systems, a variety of alternative proposals, not to mention the US offer to foot Israel's "costs for reestablishing security arrangements" should facilitate an agreement on this issue.
Normalisation, too, is a sensitive issue. Yet although important differences remain over the extent of normalisation these are unlikely to pose a major obstacle to an overall settlement.
If the prospects for an overall settlement appear positive, the intricacies and interconnectedness of the questions before the subcommittees mitigate against a rapid agreement. While American officials revised their initial estimate of 90 days for reaching a comprehensive agreement, the second round remained much more promising than expected.
Several factors, though, point to eventual success. In addition to a demonstrable level of commitment by both sides -- witness the large number of experts included in the negotiating teams -- there is evidence of a willingness to entertain new ideas.
Full and persistent US backing has been of inestimable value to the progress of these negotiations. President Clinton held no less than five meetings with the Syrian and Israeli delegations and a large American team, comprising several legal experts, has participated in the activities of all the committees. President Clinton also presented the Israelis and Syrians with a "working paper" outlining their areas of agreement to date, which both sides have declared to be a constructive basis for continuing negotiations.
All indications are that Syrian-Israeli talks will yield a landmark agreement that will pave the way to a settlement on the Israeli-Lebanese track and that will not adversely affect the Palestinian-Israeli track. It remains to be said, however, that certain Israeli demands are not conducive to a truly stable peace. Israel has demanded from the US between $17 and $25 billion to cover the costs of its withdrawal from the Golan, resettling some 17,000 Jewish settlers and dismantling and relocating its military facilities. That a significant proportion of this enormous sum will inevitably be channeled into the Israeli military machine could easily jeopardise the nature of the peace the rest of the region envisions. Contributing to the spectre of an "armed peace" are Israel's demands for advanced weaponry and missile defence systems, which would pose an even greater security risk to the region and complicate the very issues the negotiating process is seeking to overcome.
