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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 January 2000 Issue No. 465 |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Putting faith in friendship
By Mohamed Hakki *
Before the end of 1999 -- in the last century, if you will -- something happened quietly in US-Egyptian relations. For years, no one on either side could define the relationship between the two countries. Each was sensitive to press coverage (which was negative, more often than not) about the other. This was surprising, since the US-Egyptian friendship was built on very solid foundations: the Camp David accords, peace between Egypt and Israel, and the billions of dollars in US aid to Egypt. Yet it almost always seemed that something was missing. It was only in the past year that we began to hear expressions like "strategic dialogue", then "strategic alliance", to describe the bonds between the two.
When the EgyptAir flight 990 incident happened, however, a subterranean hostility surfaced suddenly: the press rushed to judge in one case, and displayed an irrational, often absurd, acrimony in the other. How can anyone explain the fragility of the US-Egyptian relationship despite the evident strength of ties between the two governments? It is true that both were terribly embarrassed by the wild outburst of speculation, and both moved to contain it. But the question of fragility remains unanswered.
An undercurrent of dissatisfaction and disappointment has been left to fester for far too long. A year ago, two former assistant secretaries of state for the Near East visited Egypt and returned with alarming reports. Each of them was on a separate, personal trip. Both had previously served as ambassadors to Cairo, and consequently both met with everybody who is anybody. Naturally, the visitors were able to have more open, candid conversations than if they had still been diplomats. When they exchanged impressions at the end of their visit, they were stunned and dismayed at the depth of anti-American sentiment they had experienced, but never before guessed at. They decided to report all this back to the State Department. It was their first visit there in nearly 12 years. They spent more time than they expected with Under-Secretary Thomas Pickering and later with Martin Indyk, assistant secretary for the Near East -- the same post both had held previously.
At that time, Israel's then prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, appeared to be doing everything he could to undermine the peace process between Israel and the Arabs. The Egyptians were frustrated but felt constrained in expressing the extent of their anger at Washington's seeming impotence towards Netanyahu, although he seemed to insult everyone he could in Washington, including the president. Still, the American media seemed to save its negative comments for Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa.
Now, most Americans who are unfamiliar with the Middle East would wonder why Israel's intransigent treatment of the Palestinians should affect US-Egyptian relations. Unfortunately, it does. In this region, when one link in a chain is poisoned, it tends to poison all the others.
Due to the difference in its relations with Israel and the Arabs, the US used incomprehensible language in explaining its role in the peace process. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger tried to explain this to the Israel Policy Forum on 20 October 1999. He called the debate on how to characterise the US's current role in the peace process a false debate and an artificial question. He described the role of US officials as that of facilitators or mediators, or perhaps brokers, partners, catalysts or middlemen. At any rate, he viewed the whole discussion as academic. Unfortunately, no one in Egypt, or the Arab world for that matter, considers the question academic.
The question is a fundamental one, the one upon which relations with all the Arabs are based. Of course, everyone considers the use of labels insulting to both the mediator and the parties to the conflict, especially if the mediator is not only the world's sole superpower, but the one that eliminated all other possible mediators (the Russians, the Europeans and the United Nations, as the representative of international collective will). In fact, when late Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat, whose credentials as a peace-maker cannot be questioned, became aware of how the US role had shrunk, from honest broker to mailman to catalyst, he remarked: "That's impertinent. It shows no respect." That was back in 1971, before this role diminished even further to "facilitator" (which in Arabic means laxative).
That is why the current peace talks between Israel and Syria are such a welcome sign of the US's determination to play an active role in the peace process. The talks are also one element in what can be considered a confluence of circumstances cementing the US-Egyptian friendship. These talks were not the result of Israeli Prime Ministers Barak's magnanimity, as the press was leading us to believe. It was thanks to the personal involvement of President Hafez Al-Assad that the talks got off the ground. The US persuaded Barak to accept Syria's contention that Yitzhak Rabin had promised to withdraw from the Golan Heights. President Clinton's visible determination to play an active role cannot simply be equated with a bowl of prunes, as beneficial to the digestion as these may be.
The other development is the obvious change in US policy on Sudan. For some time now, the US and Egyptian views of what is happening there have been at odds. An influential group in the US administration was pursuing a short-sighted and self-defeating policy that resulted in the idiotic bombardment of a pharmaceuticals factory in Khartoum, the decision to foment trouble in the South and opposition to the Egyptian-Libyan search for a rational solution to the decades-old civil war. The recent change in US policy indicates that this school has lost. Washington now realises that Egypt does have a legitimate regional role to play. It would seem, furthermore, that US policy-makers are beginning to recognise that this role should not necessarily clash with the US's national interests
Egypt has also been more assertive in airing its differences with the US about a number of regional affairs, without fearing that this will affect relations. For a long time, US relations with Egypt seemed to be based on how Egypt conducted its relations with Israel. While this factor will not become inoperative, there is a growing realisation that Egypt has proved itself as a reliable ally, and that differences of opinion should not undermine friendly ties.
There is also a growing realisation, especially among the military establishment, that Egypt is the US's most important military ally in the Middle East. Although no one would be prepared to declare this publicly, for domestic reasons, Egypt's military importance far exceeds that of Israel. It is a major regional stabiliser and the US's most trusted companion in the long and arduous peace process.
Much must be done, however, to give both countries greater confidence in their friendship. The consolidation of ties requires a concerted effort and a long educational process. Courses on Egyptian society could be introduced in American universities, and vice versa. The prevailing outlook on Arabic and Arab studies in the US needs to change. Arabists are sorely needed in the State and Defence Departments and on the National Security Council. As Phoebe Marr concludes in Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role, a small but useful new book: "What is needed is a new strategic vision to fit the changing regional environment and a practical programme to put it into effect. Above all, the United States and Egypt need better mechanisms to identify and forecast issues of importance to both and to bridge the communications gap."
* The writer is a political analyst resident in Washington.