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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 Jan. - 2 Feb. 2000 Issue No. 466 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 Jan. - 2 Feb. 2000 Issue No. 466
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Is peace on sale?
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
In a globalised world governed by the logic of the market, any value can be transformed into a commodity -- even peace. At least, that is what Israel is betting on. According to Ha'artz, Israel will ask the United States for between $65 and $70 billion to cover the withdrawals and the other expenses it will incur under the peace agreements. The amount includes important clauses related to the evacuation of Israeli settlements, stabilisation of the water system and the establishment of desalination plants and more. It does not contain clauses related to assistance in solving the refugee problem. On these issues, the Palestinians and the Jordanians are likely to submit separate aid requests.
However, in a market economy, a commodity is marketable only if the price is acceptable to both seller and buyer. If the buyer finds the price exorbitant, he will simply not conclude the transaction. Which brings us to the question of whether the sum of $70 billion that Israel is demanding as the price for peace is acceptable to the US. Of course, we are talking of a very unusual trade-off here, one that is worth a great deal to the buyer, an outgoing American president sorely in need of a foreign policy triumph in his few remaining months in office to offset the Lewinsky scandal and other more recent setbacks, notably, his failure to convince Congress to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the collapse of the World Trade Organisation meeting in Seattle.
True, Clinton can claim credit for a number of foreign policy achievements, such as his administration's important role in brokering a peace agreement in Northern Ireland and in ending the war in the Balkans. But the settlement in Northern Ireland is still fragile, while Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia remain potential flash-points. Moreover, his administration has been singularly unsuccessful in de-fusing tensions with Iraq and Iran. In short, as matters now stand, his name will not be associated in the history books with any glorious achievement. A breakthrough on the Middle East peace front could change all that, and he is willing to pay any price to ensure that the breakthrough comes about during his presidency. Israel is exploiting his ambitions in this regard to demand an outrageous price for finalising the deal.
But even if Clinton is willing to pay Israel's asking price, he needs the approval of Congress. And, although Congress is unlikely to turn down any Israeli request for financial aid related to its security requirements, this would place a heavy burden on the American taxpayer. To reduce the US commitment, Clinton will probably do what George Bush did at the time of the Gulf war and ask the European Union and Japan to help foot the bill. He will almost certainly also call on the Arab Gulf states to contribute towards the costs of meeting Israel's security requirements.
However, once peace is treated as a commodity that is sold at a price, bidding for a share of that price is open to all the parties involved, not only Israel. Syria too can refuse to continue negotiating, as can the Palestinians. And time is an important factor in raising the price of peace. If the stakes have been driven so high in the Middle East peace process, this is due less to considerations related to the process itself than to an arbitrary deadline imposed by extrinsic considerations. The parties know full well that their freedom of manoeuvre is subject to the constraints of a rigid time-frame, that they cannot continue to 'play chicken' indefinitely and that, once Clinton is out, the peace process will resume its slow and tortuous course.
Already the third round of Syrian-Israeli negotiations has been suspended indefinitely. The reason for the suspension is unclear. Some have attributed it to the publication of an American 'working document', first by Ha'artz then by the London-based Al-Hayat, which Clinton had presented to the negotiating parties before the end of the second round of talks. The document revealed that both sides had accepted concessions which their respective public opinions saw as unacceptable. The leak, which each side blamed on the other, was embarrassing for both. In Israel, a giant demonstration in Tel-Aviv's Rabin Square, which included two serving cabinet ministers, denounced any withdrawal from the Golan as a 'painful territorial price'. As to the Syrians, the document revealed that they had agreed to involve themselves in substantive negotiations before receiving a firm commitment from Israel that it would withdraw from the Golan up to the 4 June, 1967 borders.
From the start, the third round of negotiations was an unwieldy affair shrouded in ambivalence, a coming together of two ill-prepared, not to say reluctant, interlocutors cajoled into talking together by a third party. This found its caricatural expression in Farouk Al-Sharaa's refusal to shake hands with Barak in public after talking to him for hours behind closed doors in the presence of Clinton and two of his closest aides. This bizarre situation betrays a distorting factor in the peace process, namely, Clinton's personal interest in having a deal wrapped up before his departure from the White House. This distorting factor exposes the whole process to backlashes and developments that can spiral out of control. Instead of accelerating the advent of peace, such developments can bring about just the opposite results.
The main problem in the Syrian-Israeli track is that the first step in the negotiations is the most difficult, not, as is the case with the Palestinians, their final stage, to which the most intractable issues have been deferred (Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders, water). The first step, a written undertaking by Israel that it will withdraw from the Golan to the 4 June, 1967 borders, is a make-or-break condition for Syria. Once this condition is fulfilled, Syria is ready to be flexible on any other conditions put forward by Israel.
What makes things still more complicated is the recent announcement by the US Congress that it will not offer Syria economic assistance, either for military or civilian purposes, as it had offered Egypt in the wake of the Camp David agreements. This means that of all the parties involved in the Middle East peace process, only Syria will not be rewarded. It seems that though peace has become a marketable commodity, the buck stops with Syria. The decision of Congress can jeopardise Clinton's whole peace design, especially that he has only a few months left to finalise the deal.
