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Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 February 2000 Issue No. 467 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 February 2000 Issue No. 467
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Special Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Resuming the multilaterals
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
The Middle East Multilateral Negotiations (MEMN), which resumed in Moscow on Tuesday without the participation of Syria and Lebanon, need to be looked into very carefully at a time the peace process stands at a particularly critical stage. As outlined in the Madrid conference, the multilateral track deals with a number of issues which are of common interest to the peoples of the region. It was launched in January 1992 at the Moscow Multilateral Middle East conference. Following the opening presentations by the co-sponsors and the participants -- thirty-six parties in all, including Palestinian and Israeli (but not Syrian and Lebanese) representatives -- the delegations broke up into five specific working groups dealing with areas of common regional concern: environment, arms control and regional security, refugees, water and economic development.
The goal of the multilateral framework is twofold -- to find solutions for key regional problems, while serving as a confidence-building measure to promote the development of normalised relations among the nations of the Middle East. Shared infrastructure such as highways and water pipelines, shared development bringing about growth in tourism and trade, and cooperation in preserving the quality of natural resources and the environment are among the realities envisioned for the region.
From the start, the MEMN were considered an integral part of the Madrid process, a track that was meant to run parallel with and, hopefully, bolster, the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Arab parties. The principle adopted by all the parties in Madrid as the basis of the Middle East peace process was the exchange of land for peace, with the procedural aspects of the trade-off left to the bilateral talks in conformity with Security Council Resolution 242. It goes without saying that those aspects cannot be implemented if the bilateral track breaks down and no headway is made on the crucial issue of ending the occupation of Arab territories.
But the setback in the negotiations that occurred after Benyamin Netanyahu came to power encouraged a variety of parties to consider the MEMN as totally independent from the bilateral negotiations. And because the latter had ground to a complete standstill, those parties believed the MEMN should be used as an instrument to prevent the entire peace process from breaking down altogether. This approach was seen as consistent with the logic of globalisation. Indeed, you cannot genuinely relinquish bipolarity at the global level and keep on operating in terms of that logic at the regional level.
This was the core issue in the 1997 debate over whether the economic forum held that year in Doha should convene or not. The argument of those in favour of holding the forum was that the establishment of a Middle East market could help avert what then seemed to be the almost certain collapse of the peace process; the argument of those who opposed it was that it was impossible to engage in talks on any aspect of the peace process while crucial negotiations on the restoration of occupied territories remained suspended.
Among those who advocated that the Doha meeting should go ahead as scheduled despite Netanyahu's intransigence was British Prime Minister Tony Blair. On a one-day visit to Cairo, he met with a number of businessmen and intellectuals and stressed the importance of pushing ahead on the multilateral track as a means of putting pressure on Netanyahu to move forward with the bilateral talks. But it was hard to accept the idea of normalising relations with Israel at a time it was refusing to honour its commitments under the land-for-peace deal, and the opponents of the Doha meeting won the day.
But though Cairo and other Arab capitals boycotted the meeting, the suspension of the MEMN was always regarded as a temporary measure, because these negotiations are part and parcel of the Madrid process. Moreover, the MEMN did achieve results during the short time they operated before Netanyahu caused their suspension: an Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East was agreed upon in the aim of resolving the region's environmental problems; the parties agreed to set up a regional crisis resolution centre in Amman to facilitate rapid communication, exchange of critical information and de-escalation of acute conflicts; an agreement was also reached on incidents at sea and, while not part of the formal multilateral process, the November 1994 Casablanca Declaration outlined a framework for economic cooperation and development.
With the end of the Netanyahu era and the resumption of bilateral talks, not only with the Palestinians but also with the Syrians, the reasons for the suspension of the MEMN process no longer hold. However, the Syrians are still refusing to take part in these negotiations, and their reservations should not be lightly dismissed.
One should remember that Syria has always departed from an either or position; either Israel commits itself to a withdrawal from the Golan up to the 4 June 1967 borders in exchange for full peace, or no negotiations whatsoever, that is, no negotiations on all the issues that are to be resolved in the multilateral talks. Given Syria's basic premise, how can it take part in the MEMN as long as Israel refuses to commit itself to the withdrawal Damascus requires?
As Syria sees it, embarking on multilateral talks before ensuring the return of all the territory it lost in 1967 would seriously compromise its negotiating position and could infringe on its sovereignty. True, the now prevailing drive towards globalisation is not greatly concerned with considerations of national sovereignty, although no state, however powerful, would dare openly defy the principle of national sovereignty enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
The Arab parties have every interest in upholding this principle with all the means at their disposal, including standing by Syria in its legitimate bid to safeguard its sovereignty. In this connection, we must not lose sight of the fact that President Clinton will use all the means at his disposal to come up with a 'final solution' of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the end of his presidency, now less than a year away. The many critical issues still outstanding are unlikely to be resolved within this short time-frame, and a formula will have to be devised to prevent them from foiling Clinton's plans. The precedent used in Camp David between Egypt and Israel to put the unresolved differences on record through letters sent by both parties to the US president in his capacity as sponsor of the process, could be one way out. Another would be to transfer unresolved issued to the multilateral working groups: water issues to the water working group, refugee problems to the refugee working group, etc.
When the Middle East peace process was first launched, the bilateral talks based on the land-for-peace trade-off constituted the main thrust of the process, while the multilaterals were seen as a subsidiary track, a parallel process designed to help the original one achieve is objectives. With the drive towards globalisation, there is a very real danger that the multilaterals are becoming the core issue and the bilaterals a mere instrument by which to attain the objectives of the multilaterals.
