 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 10 - 16 February 2000 Issue No. 468 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 10 - 16 February 2000 Issue No. 468
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Profile Travel Books Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Peace in whose time?
By Hassan Nafaa *
As US-sponsored Syrian-Israeli negotiations become the main focus of the Middle East peace process, the Arab-Israeli struggle appears to have entered a conclusive phase. Without minimising the difficulties or intricacies of these negotiations, they will most likely conclude in a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement.
If indeed this does transpire, Barak will be able to jubilate at having scored the most important breakthrough in his negotiating strategy. The Syrian-Israeli peace accord will enable him to fulfill his electoral promise of withdrawing Israeli forces from Lebanon within a year of coming to office. He will also be able to reap the rewards for having helped Clinton score a success that will overshadow the personal scandal that has marred his term of office, and that will rally support for the next democratic candidate to the White House. This payback will take the form of US support for Israel's negotiating positions on the Palestinian track, especially with regard to the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinian refugees. In addition, the Syrian-Israeli treaty will serve to take the wind out of the sails of those opposed to normalisation with Israel, drive a larger wedge between Syria and Iran, pave the way for the resumption of multilateral negotiations and give stimulus to MENA economic conferences.
These, in turn, will generate such pressures on the PA as to compel it to make concessions on fundamental issues, particularly if such concessions are deceptively wrapped. Two examples come to mind. One is that the PA accept Abu Dies, a suburb of Jerusalem, as the capital of a Palestinian state. The second is that it step up urban development in the areas under its control, using this as a cover to clamp down on radical Palestinian elements. In all events, whatever concessions or actions it takes, the PA will be able to assert that Arab pressures and the abandonment of the Palestinian people left it no other recourse. At this stage, a settlement conceived in accordance with Israel's terms will have neared completion.
No one can dispute Syria's right to sign a treaty that will permit it to regain its occupied territory, particularly after it had been left to fend for itself. However, the problem with such an agreement is that it will not so much mark the end of a process, but rather it will ultimately initiate a new period during which an entirely new map of the Middle East will emerge.
It is difficult to imagine that the Arab nations will be capable, in this phase, of meeting the challenges placed before them. Just as they were ill-equipped to formulate a united strategy towards securing a more balanced settlement on the Palestinian issue, they will find themselves incapable of dealing with the, if anything, more crucial phase that will follow legal and political settlements between Israel and its neighbours.
In this phase, all Arab governments, without exception, will be obliged to enter "normal" relations with Israel even before the full components of an independent Palestinian state are in place and before the regional arrangements around water, economic integration and disarmament have been finalised. Furthermore, just as Israel has succeeded in exploiting the distorted balance of power in the region and the current fragmentation in the Arab world in order to impose its conditions on the negotiated settlements, it will most likely succeed, if the state of the Arab world remains unchanged, in exploiting the same factors to impose its conditions on the final status accord with the Palestinians and the substance of the regional arrangements that will affect the future of the entire Middle East.
If Arab nations do not act quickly to formulate a united strategy to support the unity of the Palestinian people in their forthcoming negotiations and to set the conditions for Israel's assimilation into the region the gap between official and popular stances on the negotiations will only broaden. The growing potential for popular discord, in turn, will heighten the likelihood of instability in the forthcoming phase which, in turn, implies that the political settlements, contrary to the hopes pinned on them, may seed disruption instead of peace.
The Arab world does not appear to have grasped the nature of the changes in the international order and, consequently, it is not prepared, whether in terms of its internal institutional infrastructure or in terms of its external relations, to cope with these changes. Even at the economic level, Arab countries, without exception, are essentially raw material producers and consumers of manufactured products. If the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose members have virtually the same socio-economic profile, is still, 20 years after its founding, unable to unify its tariff structure preparatory to founding a single customs zone, imagine how long it will take, if ever, to establish a common Arab market comprising all the members of the Arab League.
In sum, the state of the Arab world at the present juncture is not at all encouraging. Its problem for the future resides not so much in its inability to reach a political settlement that will secure for it the minimal level of its usurped rights as much as it resides in its incapacity to capitalise on the concrete results of the settlement in order to uplift its domestic and regional circumstances and to revamp its tattered institutional structures. We can hardly expect the current institutions, which have been unable to manage the Middle East conflict effectively, to perform any better in the far more difficult period that will follow settlement. Indeed, if these institutions remain at their current levels of deterioration, the settlement will give Israel the inroad to penetrate so deeply into the Arab world as to effectively terminate it as a concrete entity. Conversely, if we want the settlement to serve as an interstice that gives us the opportunity to catch our breath and rally our strength so that we can more vigorously resume our pursuit of development and prosperity we must do all in our power to forestall the further deterioration of our institutions and gradually restore their dynamism.
Syria's signature on a peace agreement with Israel may be a positive development in its own right. However, it will signify the onset of a crucial phase in the region that will demand the greatest vigilance. There is still a long way to go before peace comes. However, has the Arab world given thought to the question of what the post-settlement period will bring? Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa posed this question to the Arab League not long ago. And it is not a purely academic question. Rather, it is a question that should be put to every Arab government, for ultimately they will have to come up with some very concrete answers.
* The writer is head of the Political Science Department at Cairo University.
