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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A rotten state of affairs
By Gamil Mattar
When Barak beat Netanyahu, I cautioned against premature jubilation over the future of peace in the Middle East. At the time, the chairman of a major Arab institution -- one with a long record of defying Israeli expansionism -- had just issued a statement that, in essence, urged Arab governments to welcome the new Israeli leader, elected on the strength of his promise to resume the peace process. Clearly, the statement, made so impulsively that it preceded the announcement of the final results of the elections, suggested that those who had formulated it had, in the first flush of optimism, thrown caution to the wind and asked the Arab governments to do likewise.
Indeed, the Arab leaders responded enthusiastically. They congratulated themselves and their peoples on the new arrival at the Arab-Israeli negotiating table. The US administration, which had not bothered to conceal its support for Barak and his party during the Israeli electoral campaign, invited everyone aboard the train of elated well-wishers. It hinted that the Arab governments should prepare for a time in the near future when they would sit cheek by jowl with Israel at Middle East conferences, rub elbows on multi-national committees and implement economic projects together -- as though these were gifts to be bestowed upon the Israeli people for having elected Barak, the proponent of peace.
Because of, or under the pressure of, all this "encouragement", an Arab government with nothing whatsoever to gain or lose in the Arab-Israeli conflict but which, as a member of the Arab League, can be viewed as expressing Arab opinion, established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Other Arab leaders made statements and gestures of warm welcome. In Indonesia, an Islamic figure who had just been "democratically" elected to power bowed to pressure and announced that his first foreign policy decision was to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
Indeed, it seemed that the Arab and Islamic world were on a new threshold, embracing a new Israeli leader who was favoured by circumstances unavailable to his predecessors since the peace process began quarter of a century ago. With Europe and the US patting him on the back and wishing him good luck, red carpets unfurled before him in the Middle East, including Turkey, where cheering crowds waited for him to grace us with peace and tranquility. One recalls only too vividly the photographs of some Palestinian politicians whose beaming faces seemed to tell the other Arabs, "Our dream has come true. Netanyahu has fallen and Barak, Rabin's successor, is victorious. Clear off, we don't need you anymore."
Amidst such exultation, all appeals for restraint fell on deaf ears. Some attempted to caution that Barak could turn out to be little different from Netanyahu, fearing that the disappointment would be too staggering for the enthusiasts to bear -- but to no avail. And indeed, within a matter of days, the Palestinians were swept up in the US-backed drive to modify the Wye River accord. Everyone -- Americans, Israelis and Arabs -- played along, minimising the significance of the modifications. What was important was to preserve Barak's glowing image before international and Arab public opinion. In the wings of many decision-making centres, it was also known that negotiations on the Syrian track would resume soon, and that Syria could not very well enter negotiations with a man whose intentions of reaching a just peace were suspect.
The modifications to the Wye memorandum were incorporated under the Sharm Al-Sheikh agreement and the matter passed, as had other modifications before it, with as little commotion as possible. Similarly, the Palestine National Assembly, as well as international and Arab media and governments, played down news of growing rates of Jewish settlement construction. Most of those who criticised Israel's stance on the refugee issue did so in the most subdued tones. In addition, Western and some Arab governments had to act quickly to allay the storm the Israeli government triggered, quite deliberately, when it proposed that Palestinians should be naturalised in the countries where they resided.
When the negotiations began to flounder, however, even the enormous US media apparatus could no longer ignore the fact that Barak was more talented than Netanyahu in putting paid to peace efforts. Worse yet, Barak had achieved this record when he had advantages -- international support and a favourable profile in the Arab press -- of which Netanyahu had never dreamed, and which he may never have wanted.
Once again, the Palestinian and Syrian tracks have ground to a halt. Once again, the Arab media is accusing Israeli of obstructing peace and the PNA is complaining bitterly. Some people believe that the Syrians were negotiating at the expense of the Palestinians whereas in fact the two tracks were never in competition. Many had imagined that a settlement was just around the corner, and held Syria responsible for the breakdown on both the Syrian and the Palestinian tracks. Their accusation is unjust.
More probably, the Israelis stopped to do some number-crunching and decided that the settlement was far too costly a prize; they would have to put it up for tender again. How much would the US pay for a settlement with Syria and Lebanon? What commitments could be extracted from the Arabs and their oil reserves? What price would Egypt pay in terms of a reduction in its regional political influence? What guarantees could Israel obtain that it would be able to realise its ideal image of the Middle East, and specifically the Levant? Could it take Iraq's place in a newly reconstructed Fertile Crescent? Which regional player would be the US's partner in making decisions on the Gulf? And the most important question: does Clinton really deserve a settlement in the Middle East, or should Israel wait for a new administration that will prove more magnanimous?
These Israeli questions -- or demands -- have dampened the Arabs' enthusiasm for Barak. At the same time, some in Europe, the US and even Israel are cautioning the Israeli government to back off European governments, banks and companies, which it has been harassing in the hope of compensation for the sufferings of Jews in World War II. Israel, they charge, is going too far, both in the number of cases it is pursuing and in the amounts it is demanding. Moreover, it is bent on reproaching an entire generation for atrocities committed by governments that have long been consigned to the history books, while it simultaneously shows little feeling for other Europeans and non-Europeans who were subjected to similar persecution during the same period. These excesses, they warn, may erode European popular sympathy for the Israelis, if not all Jews. Regardless of the claims that the banks and firms will pay gladly, or that Israel has no direct connection to the agencies that are dogging them for compensation, the issue, according to prominent Jewish commentators, is engendering deep resentment among Europeans. Certainly, this must affect Barak's image in Europe, for he is well placed to curb the persistence of those organisations that are creating such resentment in Europe.
That there is an element of intentionality behind these excesses is evident in a recent incident involving Austria's chief rabbi, who vehemently criticised the secretary-general of the Jewish Agency for having invited Austrian Jews to migrate to Israel after the Freedom Party, led by Jörg Haider, entered the ruling coalition. The rabbi protested that the Jewish Agency's invitation was "out of place" and that it had not consulted the Jewish community in Austria. As a religious Jew and a Zionist, he said, he had no problem with the call for Jews to settle in Israel, whether out of love for that country or because they feared persecution in their homeland. He insisted, however, that the situation in Austria posed no danger, and Austrian Jews certainly did not need a Samson operation (a reference to Israel's airlifting of Falasha Jews to Israel). The chief rabbi subsequently complained that the Jewish Agency's appeal would stir up sentiments of divided loyalty, and that it had only succeeded in distressing the 7,000 Jews living contentedly in Austria. In addition, an Austrian Jewish group broadcast a statement expressing its astonishment at the Jewish Agency's appeal, and condemning it as motivated by political considerations rather than real concern for the welfare of Austrian Jews.
The consequences of this endemic Israeli hysteria can be grave, and are bound to harm Barak's popularity abroad. With regard to the peace process, it is certainly counterproductive that Madeleine Albright, Martin Indyk and other US officials should fuel Israeli hysteria by suggesting that the Lebanese resistance was responsible for the crimes Israel has committed against Lebanese civilians. US officials claim that such statements are only an expression of consideration for Israeli sensitivities. But precisely what sensitivities are they referring to, if they encourage such sentiments as those expressed in David Levy's recent threat? The US, if only to keep the peace process alive, should not have permitted itself to indulge Israeli excesses so shamefully.
Israeli hysteria has its causes. One of the most important is the increasing corruption of the Israeli political system in recent years. This corruption, as epitomised by the Weizmann-Barak scandal, has eroded any trust the Israeli public or Arab and Western officials had placed in the Israeli ruling elite. Corruption and the consequent loss of confidence will inevitably have an impact on the negotiating process -- that is, if they were not one of the direct causes of the recent halt on the Syrian and Palestinian tracks.
Political corruption is therefore a principal obstacle to a settlement that restores the Arabs' legitimate rights. At one point, during the period of confrontation, it infected the Arab side. Now, it is preventing Israel from reaching an agreement that fulfils its ambitions.
