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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Life after El-Zawahri
By Diaa Rashwan *The recent news that Egyptian Jihad leader Ayman El-Zawahri had resigned raised many questions about the future of this radical Islamist organisation. From the moment it was announced, El-Zawahri's resignation, if indeed he has resigned, was clouded in mystery. Until now, he has issued no statement that could shed light on what took place. The fact that other Jihad leaders waited about two weeks after the announcement was made before commenting only intensified the atmosphere of rumour and speculation. So far, the only conclusion one can draw for certain is that "something" major, far more complex than a change at the top, has happened inside Jihad and will have repercussions on this organisation, both inside Egypt and abroad.
So far, all press reports and statements attributed to Jihad leaders abroad have stressed that the primary cause of El-Zawahri's resignation was his relationship with Saudi Islamist leader Osama Bin Laden. These leaders mentioned that, in mid-February 1998, El-Zawahri had taken the decision to sign, in Jihad's name but independently of the rest of the leadership, the communiqué declaring the establishment of an International Islamic Front to Combat Jews and Crusaders. This front is an umbrella organisation comprising Bin Laden's Qa'ida (The Base) and three other Islamist groups from Pakistan and Bangladesh. According to a common version of events, El-Zawahri also failed to consult the rest of the Jihad leadership with regard to the organisation's participation, under that umbrella, in the August 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.
Because of the part it played in that operation, Jihad became the focus of a worldwide US-led police hunt that succeeded in routing many of its leaders. Most were turned over to Egypt for trial, while the remainder were detained in US and British prisons. The comments on El-Zawahri's resignation emphasise that this debacle triggered disputes with most of the other Jihad leaders, who asked him to resign before the situation deteriorated further.
Despite the apparent consistency of the arguments cited for El-Zawahri's resignation, the timing of the decision raises a number of questions. It is hard to imagine that El-Zawahri affixed his signature to the IIF declaration without having made some prior arrangements within Jihad to furnish the organisational structures and materiel that would support the front's declared objective: to attack US and Israeli subjects and interests all over the world. The evidence surrounding the IIF's bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania points strongly to the existence of a powerful, tight-knit underground network in which Jihad occupied a pivotal role.
Given Jihad's relatively high profile in this operation, it is difficult to believe that El-Zawahri had not made plans with other Jihad leaders before deciding to join the IIF and to take part in the embassy bombings. It is equally difficult to believe, in light of the consequences his decision had for the Jihad, that, had he indeed acted autonomously, the other leaders would have waited for two years before denouncing his actions.
There is no reason, however, to doubt that El-Zawahri's association with Bin Laden and the embassy bombings was behind his resignation, but for reasons different from those cited. The Jihad leadership abroad probably believes that El-Zawahri has involved himself so inextricably with the IIF that his continued leadership would only jeopardise Jihad further. Logically, this conclusion would prompt the decision to split the organisation, a development enabling one faction, under El-Zawahri, openly to join the IIF, and for the other, led by members of Jihad's Shura Council, to disassociate itself entirely from El-Zawahri.
If El-Zawahri's faction does join the IIF, it is reasonable to assume that it will do so under conditions that entail a fundamental restructuring of that organisation. El-Zawahri's faction will undoubtedly move into key positions and El-Zawahri himself could well become the front's primary ideologue and helmsman. Certainly, he would be well suited to the role. His practical experience in the radical Islamist movement dates back to 1966, while Bin Laden's goes no further back than the early 1980s. In addition, El-Zawahri enjoys a reputation within the radical Islamist milieu as a prominent spokesman of Islamist ideology and activism, a status to which Bin Laden cannot even aspire.
It seems quite likely, in other words, that the IIF will cast off its identity as an umbrella association of separate radical Islamist groups to become a single, coherent organisation, led by El-Zawahri -- who will be able to draw on his 35 years of experience in the radical Islamist movement and, above all, of his 15-year leadership of Jihad. In this context, one can also predict that the IIF will maintain its staunch aggressive stance towards the US and, perhaps, Israel, which is consistent with its initial ideological foundations and has become irrevocable now that war has been declared on the US.
Although little is known of Jihad's internal structure, El-Zawahri's departure is certain to leave Jihad floundering. Conflicting recent statements from its leaders in Europe already point to confusion in the organisation's ranks. Osama Sadeq Ayoub, a Jihad leader under political asylum in Germany, had announced that Jihad will cease all violence against targets inside Egypt and Egyptian targets abroad and "focus all our energies on the realisation of our greatest cause, which is the liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque". Two days later, another Jihad leader, Hani El-Siba'i, currently residing in the UK, issued a statement implying that El-Zawahri had been ousted because he had deviated from Jihad's main strategic objective, which was to mount "a military coup" preparatory to founding an Islamic state in Egypt.
One strongly suspects that further shocks and perhaps rifts are in store for Jihad as it seeks to reconsolidate organisationally and ideologically in the post El-Zawahri phase. In addition, as the organisation moves away from its advocacy of violence, those who continue to espouse violence, whether directed abroad towards Israel or towards targets inside Egypt, will be alienated gradually. Whatever the case, the Jihad currently stands at a crossroads and its future will depend on the choices it is forced to make today.
* The writer is the managing editor of The State of Religion in Egypt Report issued by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
