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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Harmony in the tower of Babel
By Asef Bayat *The upcoming elections to Iran's Majlis will unfold against a background of fierce power struggle between pro-Khatami reformists, who strive for change, and conservatives, who intend to maintain the status quo.
Campaigning began last July, at the time of the student uprisings in Tehran. These resulted from a deliberate attack by right-wing thugs escorted by security forces. The instigators hoped to create a national crisis that would discredit President Khatami's reforms, suppress the dissenting press and win them the upcoming elections. This, of course, did not happen. The conservatives had been badly beaten in the municipality elections, demoralised by the discovery of right-wing death squads in the Ministry of Intelligence, and damaged by the decline of the conservative clergy's credibility. A recent official survey showed that the clergy is at its lowest popularity point amongst young Iranians.
Despite -- indeed, because of -- the numerous obstacles the conservative circles have erected against reforms (impeaching ministers, jailing pro-reform clergy, closing down newspapers, denying the electoral eligibility of pro-reform candidates, or attacking pro-reform rallies), they have now entered an election campaign which they have little hope of winning. The question is just how badly they will perform. A recent opinion poll, conducted by the pro-Khatami Mosharekat Party, gave a 80 per cent lead to pro-reform candidates in the next parliamentary elections. Although such tactics are illegal, the conservative coalition may resort to a negative campaign of slander and character assassination. Their sloppy campaign slogan of "solving people's problems" points only to their ideological bankruptcy and inability to offer appealing programmes to the Iranians, who are more than ready for change. Their decision to ally themselves with ex-president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, their former rival, shows how desperate they are.
But what do the elections, and the likely victory of the reformists, mean for Iran's future? To what extent could a triumph push the movement ahead? How can it contribute to political reform, to a transition from the system of Vilayet-i Faqih (the Rule of the Supreme Jurist) to a parliamentary democracy?
Conservatives still control major state institutions -- including the army, security forces, the Expediency Council, the Assembly of Experts (which among other things appoints the Faqih, or Supreme Jurist), and the Council of Guardians (a 12-man body that verifies Majlis legislation according to "Islamic principles") -- all of which serve to maintain clerical rule. These institutions are set up in such a way that they tend to reproduce themselves and, thus, the system of the Vilayet-i Faqih. The Constitution grants more power to the Faqih (currently Ayatollah Khamenei) than to the president of the republic. The Faqih appoints the Council of Guardians, the head of the judiciary, commanders of the military and the Revolutionary Guard. He is also empowered to dismiss the president.
Yet he is not chosen directly by the people; rather, he is elected for an unlimited period of time by the Assembly of Experts (which also supervises and, if necessary, suspends the Faqih). The members of this assembly are, in turn, screened by the Council of Guardians, whose members are appointed by the Faqih himself. In other words, the Assembly of Experts, which elects and is supposed to supervise the Faqih, is effectively sanctioned by him. The way the system is constructed means the reformists will have a hard time modifying it. It is not an impossible task, however.
The significance of a Majlis controlled by pro-reform deputies with a strong popular mandate lies precisely here. In contrast to the current parliament, the new Majlis will help the government pursue its policies. Yet this same parliament is likely to find itself in constant conflict with the conservative Council of Guardians, which can veto any bills deemed "anti-Islamic". A major task of the new parliament may be to restrain the power of such a council. Contention, therefore, is inevitable.
But how long can the council keep blocking legislation issued by a parliament based on popular mandate? The thinking in Tehran is that, in the medium term, the council members will be compelled to come to terms with the reality of change, if they wish to maintain their legitimacy and relevance. They will find themselves facing a public opinion radically agitated by a free press prepared to disclose any conservative misdeeds. Khatami's strategy is to cultivate new ideas, behaviour and institutions -- without, however, directly antagonising the conservative camp.
If he can convince the more radical reformists to pursue the same tactic, he hopes that the spread of such measures and ideas will in the long run circumvent conservative-controlled state institutions. These will have to adapt to the new realities on the ground. Social peace, then, is indispensable for reforms to materialise.
Some indications already suggest that this is taking place. For instance, the Council of Guardians has been more conciliatory this time around, rejecting just over seven per cent of the 6,858 candidates, compared to 35 per cent in the last elections (and 80 per cent in the elections to the Assembly of Experts in 1998). Many prominent reformist candidates, such as Mehdi Karroubi and Behzad Nabawi, have been allowed to run for the Majlis elections. The hard-line head of the judiciary, Mohamed Yazdi, who controlled most judges in Iran, has been replaced by the more conciliatory Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, who has spoken of reform. The Intelligence Ministry may also be subject to some major changes following a revelation that top officials were involved in the death squads that murdered hundreds of dissidents.
Fear of losing the elections has overwhelmed many conservative circles. Indeed, the protest demonstrations of hundreds of seminary students in Qom and Tehran two weeks ago against press freedoms and the government's cultural policies could have led to a national crisis. Luckily for the reformists, however, the crisis was overshadowed by the Mujahidin-i Khalq's bombing campaign in Tehran.
Despite such provocation, the mainstream conservative camp has accepted the rules of electoral game. Its adherents seem to have internalised the idea that only people's votes determine who will go to the assembly. In the context of a Middle East infused with authoritarian rule, this is truly good news.
Pushing for meaningful change in Iran, however, would necessitate a concerted strategy on the part of the reformist groups. The Dovvom-Khordad movement, however, is a broad coalition of some 18 groupings with diverse ideological-religious tendencies. Its election campaign has focused on three major citizens' concerns: freedom, individual security and social justice. On the other hand, the Kargozaran party, an early reformist group, has now fallen into a centrist position, largely because the reform movement has become more radical. The inclusion of Rafsanjani as a front-runner for the Kargozaran has only intensified the gap between the latter and the left of the reform coalition. Left-wing representatives, articulate journalists and social critics, are highly critical of Rafsanjani's past policies, authoritarian character, and reformist "pretensions". The centrists, however, view him as a possible link with the conservatives in future conflicts.
In sum, differentiation and debate within the reformist camp is intense. Many in Iran are concerned about the danger of a possible break-up in the reform coalition. Yet there is also a sense that the existing differences are the natural result of a free and unreserved exchange of ideas. For the advocates, these frank but sometimes bitter exchanges represent a novel practice of democratic dialogue in a political landscape that cherishes deference and double meaning.
The irony is that democratic conditions and movements often breed internal discord and dissent. In contrast, ambiguity in objectives -- and, thus, unity -- is the feature of autocratic movements and conditions. This leaves one with few choices. Do we want a democratic and open movement that is divided, or an autocratic movement that is united? In Iran today, some elements in the reform movement seems to have chosen the first option. Yet while acknowledging diversity, there are also attempts to frame a broad consensus. This is still far short of a civil, rational, and critical debate encompassing all aspects of social, political and cultural life, but it is a hopeful beginning. The future parliament can serve itself as well as the reform movement by encouraging such pluralistic discourse.
* The writer is associate professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo.
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