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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 February 2000 Issue No. 469
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Shadowy Rafsanjani
By Azadeh Moaveni
When the godfather of Iranian politics, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, announced he would join the race for parliament, he unleashed a new set of political uncertainties about the outcome of the election, the fate of the reformist coalition, as well as his own political legacy.
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
Suddenly, it was not just the former president himself up for scrutiny, but the history of the Iran he presided over. Whether Rafsanjani's return was his own inclination, or as many say Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei pushed him to run, the former president is taking the biggest risk of his political career, opening himself up to attack and facing the possibility of an electoral flop. Were he to perform poorly in the polls, his carefully nurtured status might take a dramatic beating. Were he to rise to the occasion and guide Iran's fractured polity into a new era, he could ensure his political relevance for years to come.
As speaker, Rafsanjani could, ostensibly, head off a potentially disruptive row between the parliament and the Expediency Council, a clerical body he heads that reviews legislation passed by the deputies. As a political personality, though, he has a reputation for being egotistical and somewhat abrasive. Similarly, he is not considered to be one of those credited with the recent humanisation of some dimensions of the state.
Rafsanjani has long been faulted for putting on his most friendly face for the international scene and his nastiest at home. "[The image of] Rafsanjani as moderate has always [been reserved] for the foreign stage," says Massoud Behnood, a long-time liberal journalist. "Until Khatami became his minister of culture, journalists were working under the worst censorship conditions possible."
Despite a mixture of purposeful pragmatism and what liberals call reckless authoritarianism, Rafsanjani is easy to figure out -- particularly on issues of political and social reform. He is enthusiastic about structural adjustment, and acknowledges that an over bloated rentier state is unsustainable. But his critics among the left point to Rafsanjani's reputation for corruption as a sign that without parallel political liberalisation, economic reforms have no future. "Once politics are unlocked, then economic development can move forward," says Akbar Ganji, an independent journalist who has led the reformists' attack on Rafsanjani.
The former president belongs to the extreme right portion of the reformist coalition. In support of Rafsanjani, the moderate-right trend in the coalition claims his vision could be liberating, but it's not clear whose hands guide it. His many years of behind-the-scenes deal-making would likely help him survive in the new job, should it be his. Despite his somewhat murky past, it is difficult to imagine the institutions of the right-wing producing or backing a candidate much more progressive than Rafsanjani.
The political values that he seems to put ahead of others -- stability and economic growth -- can appear dated when juxtaposed with the discourses of transparency and civil society touted by reformists, especially when it is recalled that Rafsanjani and the reformists are from the same generation. It is possible, however, to view Rafsanjani as being in step with a well-established regional trend often labelled as "Islamic modernism" which entails pushing the most radical proponents of political Islam outside of the mainstream center.
Although the left of the reform camp likely envisions Rafsanjani's utility as being a buffer against the right-wing, that they are wary about his ties with this trend is demonstrated by the fact that he is not on the candidate list of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, the faction close to President Khatami. For them, political reform is the only priority, and they are unwilling to wait years for such a program to take precedence. "Of course political reform is what counts," says Abbas Abdi, a prominent personality in the reformist camp who was involved in the 1979 taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran. "If social, cultural, and economic reform were the only things at stake, there would have been no need for a revolution, the Shah could have moved forward with those."
Ganji, who has led the attack against Rafsanjani, says there is nothing new to the reformists' complaints about the former president. "This new atmosphere allows us to challenge the powerful," he says. "But if we are sympathetic to him, this makes us accept [what he represents]." The liberals are the most adamant about making the point that reformist politics are about transparency, an approach Rafsanjani has never taken nor looks inclined towards taking in the future. He has refused to respond to questions about the murder of dissidents under his administration, or his allegedly unnecessary prolongation of the war with Iraq.
This resistance to the open politics of the moment -- which forgives former excesses when they are renounced in favor of accountability -- reinforces suspicions that Rafsanjani will continue to practice politics the same way as in the past. Students tend to be vehement in their opposition to Rafsanjani. One young female university student said she prefers the more right-wing Nateq-Nouri, because at least he "is straight-forward politically, and we know what we're dealing with."
"There can be no political development with Rafsanjani!" proclaims a popular slogan chanted by students at reformist campaign rallies.
Rafsanjani has been remarkably dismissive of the young -- he seems as deaf to their demands and presence as they are to the supposed benefits of his deal-making. "Rafsanjani speaks the language of the technocrats," says Sayed Laylaz, a liberal commentator. In contrast, "Khatami's personal talent is that can speak the language of the young, and this creates a place for him in the hearts of all the families in Iran," Laylaz explained.
Rafsanjani leads a party, the Executives of Construction, that tends to be pro-business. His popular support comes from similarly-inclined Iranians. Such an orientation according to Ali Manefi, a 27-year-old construction worker "helped him [Rafsanjani] deal with things like inflation."
Jamileh Kadviar, a candidate whose popularity rests mainly on her familial connection to the jailed liberal cleric Mohsen Kadviar and her husband, Minister of Culture Ataollah Mohajerani, says that an ideal parliament would not be dominated by Rafsanjani, but reformists must deal with reality. "But now we need to concentrate on pulling him to the left," she says. "We can recruit him to help move reforms forward more quickly."
Political analysts are divided as to whether Rafsanjani's past provides any clues to his role in the future. While many do not welcome the possibility that he will play a prominent role in the next parliament, there are as many others who have resigned themselves to there being no other alternative. Iran's sixth parliament will be as much a litmus test for the future of one of the revolution's most prominent politicians, as it will be for the fate of the reformist movement he divides.
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