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Al-Ahram Weekly 24 Feb. - 1 March 2000 Issue No. 470 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 24 Feb. - 1 March 2000 Issue No. 470
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Heritage Profile Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Searching for an escape hatch
By Bahman Baktiari and Augustus Richard *A poll of 509 Israelis done by the Dahaf Institute for Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper showed that 57 per cent want their troops out of Lebanon -- even without an agreement with Lebanon and Syria. Many Israeli soldiers fighting in Lebanon are about 18-years-old. They are not ideological, and some question whether they should pay the price of Israel's failed occupation and have publicly expressed their wish to end the madness and leave. One thing is clear: Israel's strategy of hitting infrastructure in an effort to turn the Lebanese government and public against Hizbullah has not worked before and is not working this time either. The public opinion in Lebanon and the Arab world blame Israel, and few speak out against Hizbullah.
For months now, the scent of defeat has been in the air, and there is no hiding it, even with state-of-the art air bombardment and diplomatic hyperbole. The Lebanese may be forced to suffer darkened homes, but it is Israel's policy that is benighted and there is no hiding from that fact. At long last, the end of the occupation is in sight, and it will come before the announced departure on 7 July 2000. "The warfare is entering its last stages," said Ehud Barak. "Within four-and-a-half months, I am determined to put an end to this tragedy in Lebanon that has already lasted 18 years, and to bring the boys home to the international border."
After losing seven more soldiers in recent weeks, as well as Aql Hashim, a key operational official in the South Lebanon Army, Israel has begun to execute its exit strategy by tearing up the rule book that long defined the war since 1993. Now it is flailing at the Lebanese, punishing them for Israel's defeat. It is as though a boxer, unable to defeat his more skilled opponent, jumps out of the ring, throws hand grenades at the audience and blows up the refreshment stand for good measure.
The most recent attacks are reminiscent of earlier applications of the "iron fist," which were supposed to coerce and intimidate the Lebanese. These efforts have persistently proved counter-productive, since they unite rather than divide the Lebanese. Israel's paradigm for understanding Lebanon has no room for the notion of Lebanese nationalism but persists in mistaking the persistence of confessionalism as a condition precluding collective sentiments.
Prime Minister Ehud Barak claims that Hizbullah's attacks constitute a "violation" of the rules but this is sophistry and even the dullest US official knows it. The simple fact is that these actions were within the rule book, as verified by on-the-ground observers from the United Nations. The rules -- hammered out by diplomats in 1993 and 1996, following massive Israeli attacks -- clearly entail the right of the Lebanese to resist occupation, provided the guerrillas do not attack Israel. Each side commits itself to avoid targeting civilians. Foreign Minister David Levy now threatens that Lebanon will burn if Hizbullah launches retaliatory Katyusha rockets into Israel, and an exasperated Barak calls for Syria to rein in Hizbullah.
Barak, of course, has committed himself to withdrawing from Lebanon by July, and the idea of withdrawal -- with or without an agreement with Syria and Lebanon -- is widely supported in Israel. "Mega-hawk" General Ariel Sharon, the mastermind behind the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, calls for a unilateral withdrawal.
Israel presumes that Syria possesses the means to rein in Hizbullah, especially while the fate of the Golan Heights remains to be discussed. Obviously, Syria is not without influence, but Israeli, and US officials for that matter, exaggerate Syria's freedom of manoeuvre. Even dictators have to be concerned with public opinion, and the fact is that the resistance to the Israeli occupiers enjoys wide popularity in Syria and in Lebanon where few people believe that the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) will withdraw without pressure.
Nonetheless, the situation is not at a dead end. Hizbullah and Iran, its patron, have pursued a measured strategy, not because of Syria's pressure, but because the basic goal is to see Israel end its occupation. Iran has called for restoring the 1996 ground rules, which, coincidentally, is also a goal of US and European diplomacy. The question of the hour is what will happen when Israel withdraws from the south, especially in the absence of a formal agreement with Syria?
Understandably, Israel wishes to formally negotiate its exit from Lebanon, but a unilateral withdrawal based on tacit understandings is more likely. Should this occur, the signals from Iran and from Hizbullah point to a stable situation in Lebanon. Iran's perspective on the peace process and its view of Hizbullah, which it brought to life in 1982, have changed fundamentally. These changes have been masked by the cacophony of political debate in Iran.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's project for exporting the "Islamic revolution" withered under the tutelage of his protégés, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and current President Muhammad Khatami. Hizbullah leaders argue that their military struggle against Israel would be transformed into a political one if Israel fulfills its pledge to withdraw by July 2000. The accumulating evidence shows that Iran does not aspire to pursue a permanent war with Israel in Lebanon. Tehran has actively encouraged Hizbullah's political transformation from stalking horse for Iran to a legitimate political party.
This transformation is also made necessary by the much-broadened political constituency that Hizbullah has built amongst Lebanese Shiites in the 1990s. It is no longer a secretive conspiratorial group but a party that needs to be alert to its supporters' interests and attitudes. Hizbullah has been planning for years for life after resistance, and it anticipates winning considerable political capital by emerging the victor in the south.
In October Iran signalled its commitment not to obstruct the peace process. The Supreme Leader Ali Khameinei says that he will not interfere in Iran's relationship with Lebanon, and he has been true to his word.
These factors point to the possibility of a relatively stable situation in Lebanon following an Israeli withdrawal. Equally important, Iran's incremental moves to become an active player in Middle East diplomacy reflect the steady marginalisation of Iran's advocates of permanent revolution. Inside Iran, Khatami and company have elevated the Lebanon debate so high that they now have a big stake in the stability of Lebanon and the transformation of Hizbullah. Officials in close contact with Khatami confirm that there is no change in Iran's policy, notwithstanding the Israeli bombing campaign.
Sceptics in Israel and in the United States assert that Hizbullah has no significant popular support in Lebanon, and therefore cannot put down its arms. The facts argue otherwise. Hizbullah has succeeded in re-crafting itself as a party, perhaps the only real party in Lebanon. It has done so to insure its political life. Its ranks will shrink, as its own leaders acknowledge, but it will be a viable political party with a constituency that wants Israel out of Lebanon and an end to living in a war zone.
These factors point the way to the escape hatch. Should Israel choose to use it, it will also find itself sitting across the table from Syria with a far stronger hand than its southern exposure now permits.
* Bahman Baktiari is an associate professor at the University of Maine, a visiting professor at the American University in Cairo, and the author of Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran.
* Augustus Richard Norton is a visiting scholar at Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadid in Amman and a professor at Boston University. He is also the author of a just-published monograph on Hizbullah for the Council on Foreign Relations.
