 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 March 2000 Issue No. 471 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 March 2000 Issue No. 471
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Interview Features Focus Heritage Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Creating fictions of rivalry
By Abdel-Azim Hammad
One of the wildest interpretations I have heard of the first visit by an Egyptian president to Lebanon in 41 years held that it was intended to offset Syrian influence in that country; this was supposed to explain why President Mubarak was so warmly received by officials and the people alike.
Although those who hold this point of view admit that Mubarak's visit was intended to show solidarity with Lebanon, and to protest the Israeli attacks, they assert that Egypt timed its visit to coincide with the breakdown on the Syrian-Israeli negotiating track in a bid to counter attempts to marginalise Egypt's influence in the Levant. They also believe that Syria created an additional incentive for this move when it brought in Jordan to mediate between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Following the accession of King Abdallah, specifically, Syria began to see Jordan as a direct link to Washington, enabling it to bypass Egypt and to dispense with Egyptian support.
More curious yet, those who insist on seeing Syrian-Egyptian rivalry where there is none do not feel that President Mubarak's successful personal intervention just over a year ago to defuse the crisis between Syria and Turkey belies their assertions. Nor do they give credence to the statements issued in Lebanon by President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials, confirming Egypt's full support for Syria.
Contrary to claims that these official statements were intended solely for "public consumption", Egypt's position with regard to Lebanon and Syria was made perfectly clear. In his meeting with the editors-in-chief of Lebanese newspapers in Beirut, President Mubarak cautioned against Israeli attempts to drive a wedge between Syria and Lebanon. He said that as soon as Syria and Israel reach an agreement on Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, it will be time for the Lebanese to resolve all their problems with Israel. These problems, he stressed, were the most straightforward in the entire Arab-Israeli conflict, but, as he and Lebanese President Emil Lahoud emphasised in a joint statement, it is vital that Syria and Lebanon closely coordinate their negotiating tracks.
As these statements indicate, Egypt is fully aware that, given the link between the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, Syria is the last regional Arab party to negotiate with Israel. The Arabs, therefore, have only two alternatives. Either they can support Syria in its attempt to reach an agreement with Israel capable of serving as a platform for resolving all the other outstanding differences between the Arabs and Israel, or they can abandon Syria to confront Israeli tactics on its own. In the latter case, if Israel succeeds in delinking the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, whatever Israeli-Syrian agreement results will bring an end to the regional negotiating process (to differentiate it from the Palestinian track) without having secured a commitment from Israel to resolve many other serious disputes with the Arabs.
One major area of contention is Israel's strategic superiority. It is the only country in the region to possess nuclear weaponry and delivery systems, and, as is well known, the US has vouchsafed its quantitative and qualitative superiority over all the Arab countries combined. Egypt has suggested a peaceful alternative to this gross distortion in the regional balance of power, which it brought before the armaments reductions committee of the Middle East multilateral negotiations. The Egyptian proposal, inspired by former US President Bush's initiative of 1991, advocates the creation of a collective regional security order that aims to reduce the levels of traditional armaments in the region preparatory to creating a zone free of all weapons of mass production. This regional security order would be brought into effect following the conclusion of a comprehensive and lasting peace in the region.
It is important to remember that, at the time of the Camp David negotiations, the Israeli demand that Egypt give its bilateral agreement with Israel priority over its joint Arab defence agreement delayed the peace accord for over a year. It is not unlikely that the same situation will arise again on the Israeli-Syrian track. It is difficult to imagine that Syria would make such a concession to Israel, which already enjoys overwhelming military superiority, unless Israel becomes part of a regional security order of the sort that Egypt proposes.
Because of the vital importance of the regional security imbalance, it is not in Egypt's and Syria's national interests, nor in the interests of the Arab world as a whole, for Cairo and Damascus to compete at this crucial phase. Such rivalry would only weaken all Arab parties, and the Syrians in particular. It would debilitate the Syrian negotiating position further were Lebanon to negotiate independently. But this would not serve Lebanese interests in the long run either. First, Lebanese territory would remain an arena for the cold war between Israel and Syria were the former to reach an independent agreement with Lebanon, especially since it is difficult to imagine that Syria would relinquish its role in Lebanon in light of all it has invested in that country over the past 20 years. Secondly, it would be folly for Lebanon to reach an agreement with Israel independently of Syria as long as Israeli military superiority remains unchecked by a collective regional security order. Today, it is palpably clear that the well-being of the Lebanese people is prey to the unbridled whims of the trigger-happy Israeli military establishment, a fact Lebanon will never succeed in dispelling unless a lasting and comprehensive peace is reached. The continued presence of 460,000 Palestinian refugees, whose status remains another unsettled point with Israel and among whom Syria has many allies, should serve as a constant reminder of the potential volatility of the situation in Lebanon outside the framework of a comprehensive peace.
In short, the mutual dependency of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks is essential to promoting the Arab demand for political and security arrangements on the lines of EU defence arrangements to offset Israel's strategic superiority. That Syria sees eye to eye with Egypt on this was evident in Damascus's immediate response to Mubarak's initiative to mediate between Damascus and Ankara. If anything, that experience demonstrates how the Syrian and Egyptian roles in the region complement one another, not the contrary. The Arab conception of regional security also includes Turkey, so as to obviate a bilateral defence alliance between Turkey and Israel. If Egypt and Syria are working together towards that end, their complementary roles also serve a more immediate objective. In the event that it proves impossible to bring Israel on board a collective regional security order, it will still be possible for Cairo and Damascus together to constitute a deterrent against any Israeli military moves designed to obtain political concessions from either of the two countries even after peace agreements are signed.
No less important, however, is the potential that joint Egyptian and Syrian action has for promoting regional economic cooperation. As the political commentator George Samaan wrote recently, without the joint leadership of Egypt and Syria, the Arab Fertile Crescent project for regional development will turn into the Fertile Star project (in reference the star of David). Abandoning Syria to Israeli-Turkish designs for regional cooperation in the Levant will only give Israel and Turkey economic as well as military hegemony over the region. That, of course, would not be in the national interests of Egypt, and, indeed, would gravely jeopardise its regional role, particularly if the "Fertile Star" project has access to Gulf petroleum resources and consumer markets.
While Israel has long demanded access to Gulf oil, Turkey's policy of exchanging water for oil is a new factor in its plans to shape regional cooperation. Syrian and Egyptian cooperation, therefore, can contribute to marginalising Israel's and Turkey's influence, in both the Levant and the Gulf.
Because of all these considerations, President Mubarak, during his visit to Lebanon, was more explicit in his support for Syria than on any previous occasion. Not only did he warn against Israeli attempts to drive a wedge between Syria and Lebanon and emphasise the importance of simultaneity on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks; he declared unequivocally on two occasions that armed resistance to Israeli occupation of South Lebanon is a right guaranteed under international law. In view of the fact that the Lebanese armed resistance is the strongest card Syria and Lebanon have in their negotiations with Israel, President Mubarak's visit to Lebanon was clearly directed against Israel and cannot be construed in any other light. Indeed, if anything, it bolstered Syria's role in supporting Lebanese resistance, and simultaneously sent a message to other Arab governments to lend their support to the Syrian and Lebanese negotiators.
