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Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 March 2000 Issue No. 471 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 2 - 8 March 2000 Issue No. 471
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Interview Features Focus Heritage Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Dreaming of independence
By Salah Hemeid
The creation of an independent state has been the ultimate goal of the geographically dispersed Kurdish nation for generations. Last month's local elections in the areas controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq's northern Kurdish region raised the question of whether such a development could be considered a small step toward the achievement of this goal.
According to the PUK, led by Jalal Talabani, the municipal elections were meant to encourage popular participation in the administration of the area. No similar election was held in the area under the control of the PUK's rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani.
The elections were not the first in Kurdistan since Baghdad relinquished its control over the enclave following the Gulf War. In 1992 the two parties organised elections for a regional council, which they participated in along with a few smaller parties, until a power struggle sabotaged the experiment.
In the interval between the two elections, and despite the continuing conflict between the two Kurdish parties, the region's organisational structure has been transformed dramatically, and a nation-building spirit has prevailed among the people, giving Iraq's Kurdish region the appearance of being on the threshold of independence.
When the Gulf War ended, the Shi'ites and Kurdish uprisings that followed in Iraq heightened expectations among many Iraqi Kurds that independence was at hand, although this was not the purported aim of the revolt. After they took control of Iraq's northern region, Kurdish hopes for an independent state were raised once again.
But now, nine years after Iraqi Kurds began to take a degree of control over their affairs, Iraq's own uncertainty complicates the issues concerning the establishment of a Kurdish state. The Kurdish national movements in northern Iraq have never suggested seceding from Iraq, opting instead for a kind of autonomous or federal status as an appendage of that state. But many Kurds believe that their de facto independence might one day be transformed into a de jure reality.
As things stand now, some 3.5 million Iraqi Kurds are living free from Baghdad's influence and control. The KDP and PUK administrations function as real governments of independent entities, although they do not enjoy official foreign recognition and UN membership. Border posts which link the enclave to neighbouring Iran, Syria and Turkey are guarded by the Peshmergas, Kurdish fighters who raise the yellow and green Kurdish flag, while millions of dollars worth of customs levies come into the coffers of the local governments.
The two administrations run virtually every aspect of political, economic, cultural and social life in the three provinces under their control. Indeed, the two political parties also enjoy sound foreign relations not only with their neighbours but also with major powers like the United States, Britain and France and some Arab countries.
But the new Kurdish order seems too precarious to survive for long. It needs a more reliable, stable partner in the south, rather than the isolated and unstable Iraq of today. Like their brethren in Turkey and Iran, Iraqi Kurds' ambitions are severely constrained by geopolitical and even international strategic factors, which do not favour Kurdish independence. Both Islamic Iran and nationalist Turkey, home to sizable Kurdish populations, strongly resist the notion of Kurdish autonomy and have made it clear they will seek to block any attempts by Iraqi Kurds to secede from Iraq. The United States, which wields considerable influence over the two Kurdish parties, is also not expected to back an independent state in Iraqi Kurdistan, at least for the time being. The Americans want to avoid antagonising Turkey, their strategic regional ally already under pressure to reform itself in preparation for European Union membership. Similarly, the Arab world, including those countries which chastise the Iraqi regime, is not expected to turn a blind eye if Iraq is threatened with fragmentation.
In Baghdad, Iraqis in both the establishment and the opposition will have to deal with the Kurdish issue once Iraq is reintegrated into the international community. Any solution will depend largely on the balance of power between the Kurdish movement and the government in Baghdad. While a powerful government will resist any solution that could trigger the partition of the state, it will be ready to negotiate local autonomy, but probably not the federal system that the Kurdish groups advocate. Even major opposition groups have said that any resolution should be put forward in a public referendum and not be decided by the government or political parties alone.
Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed nine years of self-rule and would find it difficult to water down their expectations and accept Baghdad's direct rule once again.
If an end to Iraq's domestic crisis also entails wider participation of Kurds in the country's decision-making (premised on the principle of the indivisibility of the Iraqi state) progress on Kurdish concerns is more of a possibility. Should a final settlement between the Palestinians and Israel be achieved, the region will have to focus on the daunting task of solving its minority problems. To this end, a vast change in the attitudes of all parties will be required, as well as far-sighted national leadership.
