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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 March 2000 Issue No. 472 
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Published in Cairo by Al-Ahram established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 March 2000 Issue No. 472
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| Published in Cairo by Al-Ahram established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Books Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Al-Ahram:
A Diwan of contemporary life (328)
illustration: Makram Henein
Egypt's long-standing ties with Turkey, established after the Ottoman conquest in 1517, started shaking in the early 19th century with Mohamed Ali's military ventures in the Levant. They were further weakened by the 1882 British occupation of Egypt. The rupture was completed under the terms of the 1923 Lausanne treaty which stipulated that Turkey was renouncing all the "rights and privileges" it had in Egypt and Sudan. The treaty was the culmination of intensive international diplomatic jockeying as well as heated political exchanges inside Egypt. Dr Yunan Labib Rizk* pores over Al-Ahram editions of the time to put together the story of the break
Egypt and Ottomans part ways
At 3.45pm on Tuesday, 24 July 1923, in Lausanne and before an audience of 450 people, the representatives of the allied powers and Turkey signed the treaty that took the name of that Swiss city. When the signing ceremony was completed, "church bells chimed and the cathedral blazed with light," as Al-Ahram reported. The pealing bells in that European city tolled the end of the bond that had linked Egypt to Istanbul since the Ottoman invasion of 1517.
Hassan Hassib
George Domani
Salama Mekha'il
Mustafa El-Shorbagi
It is true that by the 20th century, Ottoman hegemony over Egypt had no more than a shadow of its former power. The foundations of this suzerainty were severely shaken in the 1830s when Mohamed Ali took arms against Ottoman forces in the campaign known as the wars of the Levant. The campaign ultimately ended with the firman of 1841, conferring upon Mohamed Ali the right of hereditary succession and granting a number of other concessions to semi-autonomous Egyptian rule. Following the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Ottoman suzerainty became purely nominal, with bows made to Istanbul through the formalities of the decree from the Supreme Porte confirming the accession of the heir designate to the throne and the payment of the annual tribute to the Golden Gate. With the outbreak of World War I and the declaration of the British protectorate over Egypt, Cairo's relations with Turkey were further weakened. But it would not be until nine years later that the ties were fully severed with the Turkish signature on the treaty of Lausanne.
On the front page of its 4 August 1922 edition, under the headline, "The Lausanne Treaty as it was published in London today", Al-Ahram brought the Arabic translation of the treaty to its readers. The three articles which concerned Egypt were heralded by the subheading, "Egypt's standing in this treaty with regard to the question of debts and international disputes over them." The first, article 17, referred to the allied declaration of war against Turkey in 1914 and stated, "Turkey has renounced all its rights and privileges in Egypt and Sudan as of 5 November 1914." Article 18 read, "Turkey is freed from all commitments and restrictions pertaining to the Ottoman loans that had been underwritten by the Egyptian tribute, which is to say the loans of 1852, 1891 and 1894. The annual payments which Egypt had paid towards these loans have now become a portion of the Egyptian national debt payments and are free of all restrictions that apply to the Ottoman public debt." Finally, article 19 stated, "Any matter that arises over the recognition of the status of Egypt shall be settled by agreement, the negotiations over which shall be determined in the manner designated by the Great Powers concerned."
But the Lausanne Treaty was not Turkey's first recognition of the end of its four-century-long bond with Egypt. Three years previously, Istanbul had renounced all its rights in Egypt in the Treaty of Sèvres, article 101 of which stated, "Turkey has renounced all its rights and privileges in Egypt, said renouncement being considered effective as of 5 November 1914. Turkey declares that, by virtue of the action undertaken by the allied nations, it recognised the protectorate declared over Egypt by Great Britain on 18 December 1914." The Treaty of Sèvres, however, never took effect primarily because Greece occupied extensive portions of Turkish territory, which Istanbul considered a continuation of the war.
In all events, the subsequent three-year interval brought tumultuous events in Egypt that culminated in the British Declaration of 28 February 1922 ending the British protectorate. As a result, the situation in Lausanne was dramatically different from that of three years earlier. At the time of the Sèvres Treaty, the British had been doing all in their power to keep the Egyptians from being represented at the Versailles peace conference. Indeed, the refusal of the British High Commissioner in Cairo to accede to the demand of Saad Zaghlul and two other nationalist leaders to be allowed to represent Egypt in Versailles triggered the events that led up to Zaghlul's first exile and the outbreak of the 1919 Revolution. By the time Zaghlul and his companions were released from exile and permitted to go to the peace conference, the British had succeeded in rallying the other major powers to support the legitimacy of their protectorate over Egypt, and the Egyptian delegation was essentially confronted with a fait accompli. Because of that bitter experience, the Egyptians would insist upon attending the talks in Lausanne three years later. Even if the matter at hand concerned a relationship that had, in effect, long been defunct, the nation that had only months previously emerged from under the British protectorate wing, was not about to have its affairs determined without being present and having a say.
The first reports that a conference was to be held to discuss the status of Turkey came in mid-October 1922. Even before its venue was known, Al-Ahram featured an editorial in its 16 October edition of that year which said, "Egypt has the right to sit at the peace table with the international powers because it is an independent sovereign nation. This conference will be discussing our affairs and our future. Any nation that denies our right to participate will, in effect, have declared its enmity against us, for it will have retracted its recognition of our sovereignty. To take our future in our own hands and defend it before the community of nations is far more preferable to allowing other nations to determine our affairs according to their whims."
In the same edition, Al-Ahram responds to a letter from a reader in Alexandria who asked why Egypt should attend that conference. The answer is threefold, the newspaper replies. Firstly, Turkey once had sovereignty over Egypt and was party to an international agreement concerning the neutrality of the Suez Canal. According to this treaty, the security of the canal is to be protected by an Egyptian force, and, if that is impossible, then a Turkish force should assume the responsibility. Secondly, Turkey had the power that had granted capitulatory rights in Egypt. "Now that Turkey seeks to absolve itself of these capitulations, which are still in effect, the obligations they entail will pass to the Egyptian government." Finally, the tribute Egypt paid the Ottoman government had been used to underwrite loans to the Turkish government. The money that the Egyptian treasury will no longer pay to Istanbul must now be used to settle the loans.
Al-Ahram's concern for answering its Alexandrian reader's question encouraged him to contribute a series of articles on the same subject. The articles reveal considerable erudition combined with a fervent patriotism. In one article, he poses the question, "Should we go to Lausanne?" The matter was not as straightforward as it sounded, he said. It was not merely a question of receiving an invitation to attend. Britain would only sanction the presence of an Egyptian delegation at that conference provided that there would be no departure from the Declaration of 28 February. "This declaration reserves for Britain absolute discretion in certain matters concerning its interests in Egypt that it does not want an international conference to discuss. If we agree to the British conditions, then this would be construed as a tacit acceptance of the substance of a declaration to which they had not been party. Simultaneously, if the international powers at the conference agree to keep such matters off the agenda, that, too, would be construed as a tacit acceptance of a declaration to which they are not bound."
Other contributors were more optimistic. One reader suggested that Egypt's representation at the conference was a foregone conclusion and that it was only a question of choosing the delegates. The author of this letter to Al-Ahram, signing himself "the engineer", urged the immediate appointment of the Egyptian delegation in order to give it time "to thoroughly scrutinise the Egyptian question in light of international covenants before going to the conference". This would be no small task in light of the many documents and references the delegation would have to study. In addition to the many Ottoman decrees pertaining to Egypt, they would also need to familiarise themselves with international law, the substance of international treaties, both old and new, the principles of political economy and finance, the fundamentals of road and irrigation engineering, land and naval military strategy and general political and economic history. In addition, they would have to appoint qualified interpreters. In short, "the members of the delegation should start meeting now in order to review their material, determine their objectives and formulate those strategies that will best forward Egyptian interests".
It is highly unlikely that readers, optimists and pessimists alike, who contributed to the discussion on the Egyptian representation in the Lausanne conference were aware of the secret communications that were taking place at the time between the Egyptian and British governments. On 3 November 1922, the chargé d'affaires for the High Commissioner in Cairo dispatched a memorandum to his superiors in London in which he maintained that it would be difficult to refuse the Egyptian government's request to attend the conference. Firstly, he argued, Egypt was now an independent sovereign nation and could no longer be treated as though it were part of the British Empire. Secondly, it was important at this stage to demonstrate the goodwill of the British government so as to better facilitate negotiations between Cairo and London on the four British "reservations" in the Declaration of 28 February. However, he added a few caveats. He said it was important that the British government learn in advance the position the Egyptian delegates will take in the conference. The questions of the Suez Canal and Sudan in particular would be major sticking points in the negotiations between the two governments and it would be advisable to come to an agreement over these issues with the Egyptian delegation before going to the conference. Finally, he proposed that Italy and France join Britain in extending the invitation to Egypt to go to Lausanne so as to allay the suspicions the Egyptians might have were London, alone, to extend that invitation.
Over the next four weeks, intensive talks took place between British High Commissioner Lord Allenby and Egyptian Prime Minister Abdel-Khaleq Tharwat on the stance Egypt would take at the conference. Cairo hoped to introduce modifications into some articles of the Treaty of Sèvres concerning Egypt. Although the two sides agreed to certain modifications, the Egyptian prime minister held out against others for fear that his approval of those modifications would expose him to criticism by his political adversaries. In particular he feared that King Fouad, with whom his relations had deteriorated sharply in the preceding months, would seize the opportunity to dismiss the cabinet.
During the same period, other channels of communication were busy. London was parleying with Paris and Rome over the method of inviting Egypt to the conference. Abdel-Khaleq Tharwat dispatched one of the members of the Egyptian royal house, Prince Seifallah Yusri Pasha, known to be on good terms with the rulers in Turkey, to Istanbul in order to learn the Turkish government's position on Egypt's participation in the conference. The Egyptian prince reported back that Turkey hoped that the Egyptians would send a delegation representing popular nationalist sentiment, especially one consisting of members of the National Party with which Istanbul was on friendly terms.
Initially talks with Paris and Rome were positive. Both governments signaled to Britain that they had no objections to Egypt representing itself at the conference. However, December 1922 brought developments that the Egyptian Prime Minister would find very disappointing. On 24 December, the French government informed London that some error had occurred when it initially approved Egypt's representation and that now it would have to suspend that approval.
Egyptian delegation to The Lausanne conference on its return home
The British government was mute to the French retraction, perhaps because of recent difficulties in Egypt, which led to the collapse of the Tharwat government the previous month. Perhaps this silence, and the consequent delay in the approval of the invitation to Egypt led Al-Ahram to declare in a headline, "So, Britain is not inclined to our participation in the conference." The newspaper went on to comment, "The government of Egypt has demanded, as it has every right to demand, that it attend the peace conference. Britain's response to this demand was negative. However, the Egyptian government pressed its demand and, in turn, it was asked to delineate the position it would take at the conference. It complied with this request. However, Egypt has yet to receive a clear approval for its participation from the governments concerned."
When it appeared that Egyptians would despair of official sanction to attend the Lausanne conference, Al-Ahram published an editorial entitled, "Either we go to Lausanne officially or we protest against the international powers' failure to invite us!" The article, which was directed to the Egyptian government, ushered in a second phase of the Egyptian campaign, one in which popular opinion was to play a more dynamic role.
The public debate over who would represent Egypt started even before the British began to renege on their commitment to promote an official Egyptian delegation and before the French retracted their support for such a delegation. The newspapers of the nationalist Wafd Party and the National Party opposed the notion of an official delegation on the grounds that the existing government did not have the confidence of the Egyptian people. "Each party, whether pro-Zaghlul or pro-Adli Yakan, wants to have their own representatives present at the conference," remarked Al-Ahram. Its comment was well-founded. Already at the end of October, the National Party had announced that a number of its leaders who were in Europe at the time intended to go to Ankara to negotiate with the Turkish government over their representation at the conference. Indeed, according to foreign wire reports, several National Party leaders, after having come to an agreement with the Turks, travelled from Rome to Lausanne on 27 October in order to defend the Egyptian cause at the conference. Moreover, two weeks later another delegation, consisting of "Zaghlulists" as Al-Ahram dubbed its members, joined their fellow countrymen in the Swiss city. The Egyptian representatives included George Domani, Salama Mekha'il, Hassan Hassib and Mustafa El-Shorbagi.
Egyptian opinion was divided over the idea of two delegations instead of one at the conference. While one body of opinion thought two delegations demonstrated a show of strength, another felt that it betrayed division and weakness. Al-Ahram, in an editorial on 4 November, sided with the first view. Under the headline, "Europe Bound," it wrote, "It was our fervent hope and that of all sincere patriots that the two delegations could travel together as one body. However, the National Party delegation felt that it had to act quickly in order to lay the groundwork in Switzerland before the conference convened. It nevertheless has pledged to embrace every other Egyptian delegation that travels to Europe as long as they are united by a single aim and course of action, which is to promote the Egyptian cause before that international conference."
Britain was naturally disconcerted by the presence of the two nationalist parties in Lausanne. The National Party was too cozy with the Turks while the Wafd Party had powerful connections in France and Italy. The two influences combined could easily spell trouble for the British stance at the conference.
The Morning Post correspondent in Cairo voiced these anxieties in a lengthy dispatch to London, in which he reported that the two delegations had gone to Lausanne "to execute an extremist agenda". He went on to say that from his discussions with "moderates" in Cairo, he had learned that they, too, had shared the same apprehensions regarding the collaboration of the two parties, "which comprise the worst political elements in Egypt, and this threatens to undermine hopes of a speedy settlement to the Egyptian question".
Al-Ahram, however, proved that such fears were groundless, as each party sought only to further its own interests. The National Party saw in Lausanne the opportunity to regain some of the ground it had lost among the Egyptian public following the 1919 Revolution. Moreover, it stood a good chance of succeeding, since it had certain advantages over the Wafd. Many National Party members had been living in various parts of Europe throughout the war and would constitute a solid backbone for their delegation. The same could not be said of the Wafd. At the same time, the National Party had closer relations with Turkey than any other political grouping.
The Wafd, however, were determined that no other political grouping would elbow them out of their leadership of the Egyptian nationalist movement. Saad Zaghlul might be in exile at the moment, but they still had the people behind them. In fact, the exile of this popular national leader was a major reason why the Egyptian public rallied behind the Wafd Party. Wafd leaders drove the point home through their customary method of holding rallies throughout the country and dispatching telegrams to officials at home and abroad asserting that this was the party, founded by Saad Zaghlul, that represented the Egyptian people. Then, when the Wafdist delegation departed for Europe, it was in the midst of great fanfare that began with a rally outside the House of the Nation, as Zaghlul's home was popularly referred to, and proceeded to Alexandria with prearranged popular receptions at every train stop along the way.
In fact, in deference to public opinion, the Wafdist and National Part delegations met in Rome and concluded what they called "a holy union" in accordance with which they would abide by the principles of the National Charter, which they had drawn up. When they arrived in Lausanne, the delegations formed a subcommittee, as was agreed to in the "holy union", to draw up the memoranda they would present to the conference in their combined capacity as "the only delegation empowered to represent the Egyptian people". The result of the subcommittee's efforts was a 19-page memorandum which presented a historical overview of Egyptian-British relations as a background to the affirmation of Egypt's right to full independence and sovereignty. It concluded with three demands: firstly, "the recognition of the full and absolute independence of the Nile Valley, inclusive of Egypt and Sudan," secondly, "the evacuation of British forces from the Nile Valley," and, thirdly, "that the neutrality of the Suez Canal be established in practice and that the preservation of this neutrality be assigned to Egypt".
Unfortunately, it did not take long before discord erupted over contacts by the National Party with Turkey over Wafdist objections. This friction enabled Britain to impose its conditions for terminating the ancient relationship between Egypt and Turkey.
* The author is a professor of history
and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
