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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 March 2000 Issue No. 472 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 9 - 15 March 2000 Issue No. 472
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Focus Books Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons People's priorities, policy's preference
By Gamil Mattar
One of the wildest interpretations I have heard of the first visit by an Egyptian president to Lebanon in 41 years held that it was intended to offset Syrian influence in that country; this was supposed to explain why President Mubarak was so warmly received by officials and the people alike.
One purpose of President Mubarak's recent visit to Beirut was to confirm Egypt's foreign policy priorities. These priorities have always resided in the Levant, extending from the north of the Saudi Arabian peninsula to the borders of Turkey. One of the fixed foreign policy targets of countries opposed to Egypt has always been to marginalise Egyptian influence in that area.
In recent months, events have suggested that Egypt has decided to reorient its diplomatic, if not strategic, priorities westward, toward North and sub-Saharan Africa. It became an observer in the Maghreb Union preparatory to becoming a full member. It has participated in attempts to lay the foundations for a North African-EU partnership, and it has turned southward, toward the countries of the Nile Basin. These foreign policy moves have led some to imagine that Africa will soon become Egypt's front yard, and that it will not be long before Egypt sees the world through an African, rather than an Arab or even multi-faceted prism.
These conjectures, classified under the optimistic heading of "the post-settlement phase", surfaced in the commentaries that accompanied the resumption of direct talks between Syria and Israel in Sheperdstown. They also coincided with developments that sparked the concern of Egyptian foreign policy experts. Suddenly, in the Arab East some began to talk of "a new Fertile Crescent". Equally suddenly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began hinting to Iran that it might be prepared to overcome its sensitivities about the occupied Emirates islands and move toward close relations once more. It is no secret that Egypt has been dragging its feet over a reconciliation, or at least a mutual understanding, with Iran, partly because of the question of Iran's occupation of these strategic islands. In fact, one commentator wrote that the GCC's overtures to Iran should free Egypt of that obstacle to a more rapid rapprochement.
Egyptian foreign policy has always been the subject of strong conflicting trends. Those who advocate the primacy of an African orientation, on one hand, and a Mediterranean-European orientation, on the other, have continuously vied with proponents of the traditional Arab-Islamic orientation. Several voices have called for isolationism, as though that option were still possible in this age, and especially for Egypt. Recently, too, a new trend has received greater impetus than one would have expected, spearheaded by those who are convinced that the best option for Egypt is to cooperate with Israel in establishing a regional structure for peaceful coexistence.
All these trends of opinion support their views with a range of arguments and evidence. Many, often correctly, point to the fact that the Arab countries are neither serious nor prepared enough to cooperate effectively toward the revival of the Arab order. Sadly, they have ample proof for their contention. Summits, if they are held at all, produce nothing, and the participants fail to honour their agreements. For Egypt, to preoccupy itself with Arab concerns dissipates meagre resources for little in return. Many argue, too, and again often correctly, that American influence is so pervasive that no truly autonomous Arab order is possible. Moreover, the forces of economic and cultural globalisation are so overwhelming that even if the Arabs could combine their forces they would be unable to withstand, or at least alleviate, the powerful changes globalisation is bringing in its wake.
Apparently, however, appeals that Egypt and the Arabs should turn their attention to issues other than the Palestinians and Israel have not had a particularly significant impact within decision-making circles. Perhaps the government has come to the conclusion that the vast stretch of Arab North Africa is incapable of satisfying, alone, Egypt's desire for an effective external role. Perhaps, too, it has realised that Sudan, which has begun to resolve its domestic troubles and its problems with Egypt, does not offer sufficient incentive to give it and sub-Saharan Africa precedence over the Levant and the questions of the Palestinians and Israel. Indeed, events in Africa confirm that circumstances in this continent are more critical and complicated than they are in the Arab world and that the returns from southern investment will not be greater than those from an eastern orientation.
At any rate, according priority to any of the other options -- North Africa, Sudan and sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean basin and Europe -- is purely theoretical. Reordering Egyptian foreign policy priorities may suit certain vested interests, but it is not an option for foreign policy-makers. The other alternatives may acquire greater weight in proportion to our various concerns, but they stand little chance of shifting the fundamental direction of Egyptian foreign policy.
Thus, Mubarak's visit to Beirut did not represent a "return" to the primary orientation of our policy, but an affirmation thereof. This visit, however, did not signal that our other foreign policy concerns had become less important. I was struck by the intensity of reactions to the president's visit. Within the historical context, these reactions indicate a phenomenon in the Arab world that remains strong.
Those of my generation remember the Arab reaction to the Wafd government's position on the alliance created to counter the consequences of the military defeat, and specifically the wrath of the Arab armies. We also remember the reaction on the Arab street to Egypt's stance vis-à-vis the Baghdad pact, a reaction that was far more widespread and explosive than Egyptian policy-makers had bargained for. That was the first experience Egypt's post-revolutionary rulers had of Arab public opinion, and was directly responsible for the unique relationship that developed between the two. Since then, Arab public opinion has been an important component in the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy. Indeed, on several occasions it formed the immediate stimulus for an Egyptian foreign policy decision. Moreover, on the exceptional occasions when Egyptian foreign policy departed from this framework, it did so only after very careful calculations.
The relation between foreign policy and Arab public opinion dates back to the time of the monarchy. Perhaps the Arab reaction to Egypt's position on the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria projects marked the beginning of a period of excesses on both sides. One vivid example occurred when the secretary-general of the Arab League, Abdel-Rahman Azzam, addressed the Arab peoples directly, exhorting them to pressure their governments into taking steps toward joint Arab action.
In the '50s, when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, popular reaction in the Arab world gave a powerful incentive to the government and people of Egypt to hold out until the end of the crisis. This dynamic gained momentum during the '50s and '60s. Arab public opinion, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, was the driving force behind the union between Egypt and Syria, and later behind Egypt's actions, starting in the spring of 1967, to alleviate Israeli pressure on Syria. In 1967, every escalation in rhetoric and brinkmanship was received with widespread acclaim, until the situation erupted in war.
Three months after the 1967 War, in a meeting with Lebanese journalists, President Abdel-Nasser in effect reproached Arab public opinion and Arab opinion shapers for catering to the irresponsible tendency to goad governments into precipitous action. In the wake of the disaster, his reproach hit the mark. But it was too late. In fact, that dynamic, set in motion many years earlier, had become a primary influence on the formation of Egyptian policy, on one hand, and the constitution and behaviour of Arab public opinion, on the other. What both sides failed to take into account was that ultimately the decision-maker is a human being, who, like people everywhere, is moved by praise and is prone to let emotion have a preponderant impact on his actions. Arab public opinion can be both a powerful motivator and an inhibitor. Both extremes have been brought to bear on Egypt in the past 50 years.
I followed the Egyptian and Arab press reports closely at the time of Mubarak's visit to Lebanon. I listened to press statements and watched Arab popular reaction. History does not repeat itself, yet I could not help noticing that the Arab region seems to have recovered something of its former cohesion, although I will not go so far as to use the term solidarity. I observed rising expectations among the shapers of public opinion and in public opinion itself. There seems to be an incentive to stop the endless flow of concessions in the Arab-Israeli struggle. The Lebanese resistance has received a potent restorative. In addition, the Arabs have decided to hold the next session of the Arab League council in Beirut and, in their talks with the US about oil and gas, they are less docile than usual.
Egypt has shouldered a heavy burden, which will grow weightier as the anger of Israel and the US rises. But Egypt can sustain it -- of that, I am convinced.
