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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Arabs without a safety net
By Dina Ezzat"The disagreement between the Palestinians and Syrians with regards to the peace process is very profound," commented one senior Arab diplomatic source. "It is one of the most difficult problems currently standing in the way of inter-Arab coordination." He added that to judge by the political attitudes evident in and around the Beirut meeting, this problem is unlikely to be overcome in the near future.
The Syrians admit that there is a serious problem on this front. However, they say that the problem is "between the Syrians and Arafat, not the Syrians and Palestinians," to quote one Syrian diplomat. He added, "We have no problem with the Palestinians. We recognise that they have every right to negotiate a peace deal with Israel. What we totally disagree with Arafat's way of conducting negotiations by making continuous concessions in a unilateral fashion."
Indeed, many Syrian diplomats claim that every time Arafat sits down with the Israelis, he ends up giving away some new concession. "Look at the course of the negotiations from the beginning of the Oslo talks up to the recent Sharm Al-Sheikh II meeting hosted by Egypt on the eve of this Beirut meeting, and you will see how many Palestinian rights Arafat has given up," the source said. He added, "Every time we disagreed with Arafat on these concessions, he would say that he was acting on basis of 'the Independent Palestinian decision.' So then, let him continue independently."
It is because of these concessions that Damascus refuses to coordinate with Arafat over the peace process. "There is no point in coordinating with Arafat. Arafat does not want to coordinate. He wants to make his own deals. Then, if something goes wrong, he wants to come to us and ask for our support, before he goes into the next round of unilateral decision-making -- or rather concession-making," the Syrian diplomat opined. He added, "Did Arafat tell anybody about Oslo? Do the Egyptians, who keep hosting his meetings with the Israelis and Americans, know exactly what he is up to? How can we in Syria be sure he would stick to any agreement we might reach with him?"
That is why the Syrians cannot respond positively to Egypt's attempts to bring the Syrians and Arafat together, since Egypt cannot guarantee that Arafat will abide by any agreement he may make with them. Yet, they admit, "It is Syria's Arab duty to support Arafat as he stands with his back to the wall before the Israelis."
Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa has meanwhile been preaching the need to establish an "Arab safety net," whereby all the Arabs would support any decision taken by any Arab party in negotiations with Israel.
"Arafat once had the entire Arab world to back him up. When he went alone to Oslo, Arafat abandoned the Arab world. Now Arafat is like an avalanche: if we get too close, we will end up being carried down with him. His way is doomed. We owe it to our people not to take that path," said the Syrian diplomat.
The Lebanese are of the same mind on Arafat. Indeed, they are even more upset with Arafat than the Syrians. "We have a time bomb -- the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon," explained one Lebanese diplomatic source. "Arafat seems to be negotiating a deal that fails to take the return of those Palestinians into consideration -- all of them. This means he expects us to keep them, which we cannot do -- not at any price." The source added, "The composition of the Lebanese population is already a very delicate matter, due to the many factions we have. If we were to inflate one faction, this would be enough to cause civil instability."
The Syrians and Lebanese, however, do not see eye-to-eye on every aspect of the peace process. It is true that neither is very enthusiastic about a recent unilateral Israeli decision to pull its occupying troops out of South Lebanon. But each has a very different reason for its stance.
The Lebanese insist that what the Israelis are talking about is not withdrawal, but only a redeployment -- and one, moreover, that is accompanied by the threat of retaliation in case attacks should be launched by Hizbullah against northern Israel. This, they argue, is not enough to satisfy the relevant clause in Security Council Resolution 425, which speaks of an "immediate and unconditional withdrawal."
The Syrians also want more. They say that the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon should be conducted according to a "425-plus" formula -- the "plus" in this case being a Syrian-Israeli settlement.
Syria has troops in South Lebanon. It also has influence over the south Lebanon resistance movement of Hizbullah. If Israel were to pull its troops out, Syria would be under pressure to withdraw its own troops from Lebanon. Moreover, Syria needs time to encourage Hizbullah to undertake its transformation from a resistance movement into a political party. If Syria was to take these steps before reaching a settlement with Israel, Tel Aviv would have no reason not to drive as hard a bargain as it could with Damascus. "This is the rationale beyond the entwining of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks," commented one Lebanese source. "It is a decision for which we sometimes pay too high a price."
