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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Doubling beneath the weight
By Ibrahim Nafie
Egyptian-US relations are a model for the bilateral relations between a major regional power and the world's remaining superpower. The relationship, which arose in a completely different regional and international climate than that of today has, from the outset, been founded upon the mutual appreciation of each party's respective weight and sphere of influence. It continued to develop within this framework as a result of the early recognition that there is a broad base for mutual consensus which should be expanded. At the same time both parties acknowledge the necessity of a certain leeway for differences, due to the particular interests and roles of each party, differences that should be respected and not allowed to encroach upon the potential for expanding the consensual base.
Even before the upheavals of the late 1980s that dramatically altered the face of the global order, it was clear that Egypt had made a balanced assessment of the ability of the US to help broker a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as of the contribution of US aid towards supporting Egypt's economic development and alleviating the burdens of economic deregulation and structural readjustment. Conversely, the US clearly demonstrated its appreciation for Egypt's regional leverage and for its pivotal role in determining regional stability. The US has also recognised Egypt's pioneering role in forging the path to a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the development of a vision of its regional environment that holds that the issues at the heart of this conflict can only be resolved around the negotiating table.
In the same context, Egypt has repeatedly reaffirmed that the continued development and strengthening of its relationship with Washington is directly proportional to the extent with which the latter observes the particular nature of Egypt's regional role and the depth of its attachment to the Arab world, factors which, for many reasons, inherently preclude US intervention in Egyptian domestic affairs and policy concerns. The more stringently Washington adheres to these considerations the greater is the potential for lifting Egyptian-US relations to a level approximating a strategic partnership between a major regional power and the world's leading superpower.
The progress of Egyptian-US relations has, indeed, demonstrated Washington's capacity in general to observe the particularity of Egypt's regional role and national considerations. This does not refute the fact that there have been occasional infractions at some difficult junctures in the course of our bilateral relations. However, these have been rare, and for the most part Washington has proven itself committed to those principles that are essential to sustaining the strength and vitality of these relations.
Nevertheless, US policy on issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process remain a primary complicating factor in Egyptian-US relations. US policy derives from the particular nature of its position towards Israel which, in turn, has generated many problems for US policy in the region and severely jeopardised its interests in the Middle East.
It is no exaggeration to say that all criticism directed against US policy in the region can be traced primarily to America's exclusive pro-Israeli bias. It is this partiality that has opened the US to the many charges of double standards that have caused repeated blips in its relations with several Arab countries. It has become abundantly clear that this position is severely encumbering US strategy in the Middle East. It has further become obvious that the only way the US can overcome this obstacle is to adopt a policy more consistent with its principles and interests.
With regard to US policy towards the Middle East peace process, which constitutes the crux of the problem in Egypt's -- indeed in Arab -- relations with Washington it must be acknowledged that the Arabs, as represented by those parties which participated in the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, and specifically those involved in the direct bilateral negotiations and the regional multilateral negotiations, have done their utmost towards the goal of reaching a comprehensive, historic peace settlement. We could have reached agreements on all tracks and then activated the multilateral negotiations, whose focus is to create networks of cooperative links in various domains, had successive Israeli governments demonstrated the same wish. But, rather than implementing the agreements they signed, they have done nothing but elude their commitments and incessantly demand the renegotiation of issues that have been settled by agreements concluded under the sponsorship, and supported by the guarantees, of the US.
Israel's record of machinations and manoeuverings is such as to lead to the inescapable conclusion that they are an intrinsic characteristic of Israel's policy towards the negotiating process. This record reached its peak under former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who ultimately lost the confidence of Egypt and then the confidence of all other nations in the region and the world, including Israel's strategic ally, the US. As a result of his underhandedness, Netanyahu's period of rule was fraught with such tensions that the peace process ground to a halt. Cairo had given Netanyahu every opportunity and sufficient time to implement the agreements signed by Israel under Rabin and to resume negotiations with Syria at the point left off at Rabin's assassination. Sadly, Netanyahu's response was such incessant procrastination and deceit as to generate a climate almost bleaker than before the peace process began.
The arrival of Ehud Barak, who waged his electoral campaign on the promises to resume the peace process, to implement the provisions of the agreements his predecessors had signed with the Palestinians and to resume negotiations on the Syrian track at the point they had been abandoned, ushered in a wave of optimism in the region. Just as Cairo had given Netanyahu a grace period in which to implement Israel's contractual commitments, so it did with Barak, who chose the Egyptian capital as the first stop on his first foreign tour following the formation of his government last June. And, even when Barak issued certain unfavorable statements during this tour, Cairo opted to withhold judgment in order to give Barak a chance to prove himself in practice.
Unfortunately, Barak's actions on the ground have revealed him as no more than a cruder version of Netanyahu. If Netanyahu had signed the Wye River memorandum then refused to implement it, Barak signed the Sharm Al-Sheikh accord, attempted to weasel out of it and then sought to bypass it entirely by asking to commence the final status negotiations before implementing the provisions which belong to the transitional phase. In addition, Barak continued and, in fact, hastened the pace of, his predecessor's policies of land confiscation and constructing Jewish settlements. Indeed, the sole difference in this between Barak and Netanyahu is that the latter pursued these policies with considerable baring of teeth and muscle flexing, whereas Barak pushes ahead with land confiscation and settlement construction while continuing to grace the Arabs with smiles and promises to continue the peace process.
Negotiations on the Syrian track, after much delay, were finally resumed in Shepherdstown. The talks, which dealt with issues on both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, were close to reaching a historical settlement until Israel started to leak false and misleading information, the net effect of which was to forestall the convening of the third round of these negotiations. Then, even as Barak, after much equivocation, declared that he accepted the pledge of withdrawal which Rabin had "deposited" with the US president, he left the Knesset to pass, on the first reading, a draft referendum over the withdrawal from the Golan which served only complicated the situation. The fact is that, had he wanted, he could have prevented the passage of that referendum had he responded to the financial requests of the religious Shas Party, which is a member of the ruling coalition. The bill passed in the Knesset by a majority of 60 -- among whom were 10 Shas Party members -- to 53 votes. Had the Shas Party members voted against the bill, it would have failed to pass the first reading. Although it is true that the bill will still have to go through a second reading, the point here is that Barak's conduct with regard to this referendum represents yet another instance of the underhandedness that threatens to freeze the current phase of the peace process and, perhaps, to derail subsequent phases.
A more flagrant example of Barak's duplicity is the recent savage Israeli bombardment of civilian areas and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. This assault constitutes a blatant -- and unilateral -- departure from the April understanding, which bans strikes against civilian targets and which confirms the legitimate right of the Lebanese resistance to wage military operations against the occupying forces on its territory. Clearly, when Israel found itself incapable of curbing the enormous toll on its armed forces in Lebanon, it decided to renege on its commitment under the understanding, launching a massive offensive against Lebanese power stations and expanding the scope of its attacks to include schools and residential neighborhoods. How curious it is that it is Israel that flagrantly violated the agreement banning strikes against civilian targets while the Lebanese resistance has strictly abided by this principle, yet we find Israeli officials scrambling feverishly to issue threats and ultimatums against Lebanon that violate the most basic rules and conventions that govern the behaviour of civilised nations. One cannot help but to be struck by the irony of the image of Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy standing before the Knesset, threatening to set Lebanon on fire and to avenge "child for child, blood for blood and soul for soul" when the Lebanese resistance has never harmed a civilian, let alone a child, in Israel. It is Israel that is guilty of murdering innocent children in Lebanon, not the reverse. The Lebanese resistance has restricted its operations to Israeli military forces and installations inside occupied southern Lebanese territory.
Apparently, the Barak government is in the grips of a megalomania that has blinded it to the facts. So far from reality are their statements that one is given to a diagnosis of dementia, for such madness is certainly not characteristic of rational statesmanship.
Another manifestation of this disorder occurred during President Mubarak's recent visit to Lebanon. This visit was fundamentally an extension of the Arab dimension of Egypt's foreign policy and of its role in the peace process and, as such, was intended to convey a message to numerous parties, among which was Israel. To Israel and the world, Mubarak was saying that the Israeli assault against Lebanon constituted an unacceptable departure from the principles of the peace process and that such muscle flexing against a small Arab country could not be tolerated or allowed to be repeated. But rather than contemplate the implied message of Mubarak's visit, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy cried out hysterically that this visit fueled hatred of Israel in the region, as though Israel itself was not responsible for fueling such hatred through its brutal assaults against innocent civilians and through its endless machinations to elude all its pledges and commitments.
The US is fully aware of the realities of Israel's conduct. But in its absolute pro-Israeli bias it is inevitable that its foreign policy should be tainted with double standards. We thus find that Washington, which mobilised its forces to the defence of the human rights of civilians in Bosnia and then Kosovo, is the same Washington that so blithely turns a blind eye to the murder and terrorism perpetrated by the state of Israel. It is little wonder, therefore, that US statements in the wake of the recent Israeli aggression against Lebanon should trigger such outrage in Arab public opinion. This outrage not only expressed itself in Lebanon, where American University students staged a mass demonstration demanding the departure of the US ambassador, but such outpourings of popular anger also manifested themselves in numerous other universities, as well as in the streets of many cities throughout the Arab world.
In a similar vein, Washington's remarks on President Mubarak's visit to Lebanon were, in effect, a knee-jerk reiteration of the Israeli position. Such tacit collusion with the systematic terrorism perpetrated by Israel is not only detrimental to the peace process, it also jeopardises US interests in the region, wreaks havoc with its relations with Arab nations and severely tarnishes the model for bilateral relations it has with Egypt.
If Washington had considered President Mubarak's visit to Lebanon from a purely American perspective, it would have commended it as an important contribution in support of regional stability and the peace process. Unfortunately, the demands of the "strategic burden of Israel" forced Washington, through its State Department statements, to adopt a line more in keeping with the Israeli viewpoint than with the principles of US foreign policy, in general, and with its vital interests in the Middle East, in particular.
Nothing could be more harmful to America's growing interests in this region than its reflexive tendency to put Israeli before US interests in the formulation of its Middle East policy. Moreover, its ever-readiness to adopt the Israeli line and to defend policies and actions that conflict with its own declared policies and actions has come to undermine US foreign policy aims in other parts of the world, for the simple reason that it has become so easy to point to the inconsistencies between the principles it declares and how it behaves towards Israel.
As successive Israeli governments came and went, the US supported their occupation of territory by force of arms, their acts of terrorism and genocide, their bombardments of civilian targets, their flagrant flouting of the principles of the UN charter, their determined weaseling out of agreements the US itself had brokered. This blatant discrepancy between the stances it takes on behalf of Israel and its declared principles has become the Achilles heel of US foreign policy. Only by bringing its positions on the various issues entailed in the Middle East conflict and the peace process into line with its principles will the US be able to rid itself of the charge of double standards. This, in turn, will open vast horizons for its relations with the countries of the Middle East and pave the way for the smoother pursuit of its foreign policy objectives in general.
