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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 16 - 22 March 2000 Issue No. 473
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Imaging tomorrow (4):
Creativity -- on Heikal's terms
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
On 2 March 2000, Al-Ahram Weekly published an extensive interview with Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in which the veteran writer and political analyst articulated his vision of Egypt's role in the future of the Middle East at the turn of the new century. Heikal's stature on the Arab political stage and his well-known stand on the issue of peace with Israel -- he was one of the most prominent critics of the Camp David accords -- make him a particularly valid interlocutor in any debate over the future of the region.
The interview proceeded from the assumption that a number of recent developments, notably the breakdown of negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli track, the Israeli raid on civilian targets in Beirut and President Mubarak's solidarity visit to Lebanon, have ushered in a new phase in Arab-Israeli -- and particularly, Egyptian-Israeli -- relations. In reply to the question on what this new phase will mean for Egypt's status and role in the region, Heikal addresses the issue of regional leadership, which he describes as "a function of the recognition of others." Noting that Egypt's leadership of the region has been much discussed over the last few years, he points out that a leadership role is "not something one can claim while shying away from the responsibilities associated with it... If, however, you respond to the call that your responsibility in your region implies, and if the region welcomes this response, then it is the region that has laid on you the mantle of leadership."
But not the region as a whole, obviously. Israel's position on the question of Egyptian leadership is clear. According to Heikal, it "has always wanted to sideline Egypt, and had partially succeeded. The imposition of an Israeli peace on the region implies, of necessity, that Egypt will eventually be totally isolated... [It will] be totally ignored, because all the focus will be on the Fertile Crescent region and, through it, on the Gulf. Egypt will find itself confined to Africa, made unwelcome by the North African group and forced to look south, towards the Sudan." This will allow Israel, which looks to the Levant and the Gulf as its "vital space," to freely pursue its interests in those regions.
We are before a very real conflict of interests here which, in Heikal's opinion, will give rise to what he calls an "ongoing, long-term conflict," but one of a very special sort: "The notion of conflict is loaded with a sense of armed confrontation, which is not at all what I am talking about. When you look at relations between two neighbouring countries, there is a fact that cannot be wished away -- these relations will be characterised either by shared interests, close ties and a kind of natural contiguity, or by conflict -- what we might call, for want of a better word, contradiction. This is especially true when two neighbours exist within a region in which both enjoy special status."
In the case of Egypt and Israel, Heikal contends that "conflict exists of necessity, irrespective of our wishes." He believes the contradiction between them would exist "even if we disregard the usurpation of Palestine and the dispossession of the Palestinians. For the fact remains that Israel was put there so as to isolate me from an area to which I belong, an area which I claim is a natural extension of my existence -- in Asia -- just as that area views me as its natural extension in Africa. A wall has been put up between Egypt and the Arab East.
"For many years to come, Egypt will be obliged to manage a conflict, or fundamental contradiction, with Israel; one that has not ended, and will not end, in genuine peace, at least in our time. As such, you are faced with a new question: how to manage a long-term, low-grade and strictly controlled conflict, and ensure that it does not spin out of control."
He goes on to suggest that being a party to an ongoing contradiction can create a beneficial tension: "Live with it and maintain it at a certain level of tension. This need not be a bad thing. On the contrary, I believe that certain kinds of tension can be creative".
Although Heikal does not explain what he means by creative tensions, I believe the notion carries within it the key to overcoming the present impasse and should serve as the basis on which any settlement must be established. I share his belief in the existence of a fundamental contradiction between the strategic imperatives of Egypt and Israel. I also agree that although this contradiction stands in the way of achieving genuine peace, it is unlikely to provoke an all-out war between the two parties. Still, it is not to be compared to the no-war no-peace situation that prevailed between '67 and '73, a situation Heikal describes as a "state of suspended animation." The fundamental contradiction between Egypt and Israel will go on shaping events in the region for a long time to come, even if Clinton's concerted efforts to wrap up a deal in the few months left in his presidency are successful, and we see official peace agreements signed in the near future.
Actually, the question of Egypt's future role in the region is the subject of intense speculation. In its issue dated 22-23 January 2000, the International Herald Tribune carried an article, reproduced from the New York Times, by Thomas L Friedman, under the title "Egypt ponders its role in a reshaped Middle East." In the article, Friedman quotes me as seeing "a natural rivalry emerging between Egypt and Israel". I identified three distinct phases in Egyptian-Israeli relations: a first phase marked by hostility and war, a second phase of partnership, when the two countries worked together to persuade the other Arabs that their reconciliation was the right way to go, and, the third and current phase, which is moving beyond partnership into rivalry over who will set the guidelines for the region.
An extreme example of the creative ideas that can be contemplated in imagining the future of the Middle East is the possibility of the de-Zionisation of Israel. Heikal does not altogether dismiss the possibility, which would provide a new basis for Israel's relations with the Arab world, but wonders what would "remain of Israel if it is de-Zionised?" He sees this question as the fundamental contradiction at the heart of Israel's existence, "for if you remove its Zionist basis, you remove the foundations of the state."
Another imaginative idea that Heikal touches on but does not elaborate is the role of the Fertile Crescent in any plans for the future of the region. His reference to the vital space which the Fertile Crescent represents for Israel is not limited to its geopolitical importance but extends to its economic importance. In the context of peace -- assuming Israel reaches a settlement with Syria and signs a final agreement with the Palestinian Authority -- we could well see a kind of "Middle East Benelux" emerging between Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and a Palestinian entity.
Such a development would place Egypt in a critical situation. If it can be said that since Egypt signed the Camp David Accords and its Peace Treaty with Israel, it enjoyed the special status of "matchmaker" in the ensuing developments of the peace process, a Middle East Benelux will dispense with the need for any matchmaking efforts and Egypt will be isolated without a regional role whatsoever. Heikal was keen to underscore that Egypt's role as leader in the Arab world is completely at odds with that of matchmaker in the peace process. As he rightly points out, the two functions are mutually exclusive.
According to Heikal, the peace process has reached its final stage -- the make-or-break point at which Israel has to present its final offer. He believes the coming challenge for Egypt is to provide "careful and imaginative coverage for the halt in the peace process". But given that neither the de-Zionisation of Israel nor an integrated Fertile Crescent that would include Israel are likely developments in the foreseeable future, it is on other scenarios that we must concentrate our attention if we are seriously thinking of "living creatively with contradiction" in our dealings with Israel over an indefinite period in future.
The main thrust of the peace process in the last few years has been to stay one step ahead of disaster by concocting scenarios to conceal the fact that the Madrid process has ground to a virtual standstill and that a just, equitable and comprehensive peace is not on the agenda in any foreseeable future, in short, to sustain the myth that it is still a viable proposition and hence prevent the region from plunging into war or complete chaos.
It is only by exposing this subterfuge that we can come forward with an alternative scenario for genuine peace. This entails some creative thinking on our part, as well as a concerted effort to redress the balance of power between the negotiating parties so that they can come to enjoy a degree of parity. This in turn entails overcoming the acute -- and certainly not creative -- tensions now souring inter-Arab relations. If there is no way of overcoming the fundamental contradiction with Israel, surely this does not apply to inter-Arab contradictions. The meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Beirut last week could be a step in the right direction. It remains to be seen whether this initiative will be the first of many collective Arab actions, or whether it was nothing more than a one-off reaction to what every single Arab considered an unacceptable provocation.
