Al-Ahram Weekly
23 - 29 March 2000
Issue No. 474
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Issues navigation Current Issue Previous Issue Back Issues

 
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Caviar, carpets and compromise

By Azadeh Moaveni

As domestic politics heat up in both Iran and the United States, an end to two decades of mutual hostility may be in sight. Against the background of a sustained battle between establishment hard-liners and reformists in Iran and preparations for presidential elections in the United States, a remarkable development in the relations between the two countries has occurred.

American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 17 March made the most significant overture to Iran by a leader in the US government since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when economic and political relations were frozen.

Albright's announcement of the decision by President Bill Clinton's administration to lift sanctions on several non-oil Iranian exports marks a profound ideological shift away from traditional US foreign policy on Iran. By admitting that repeated American interference in Iranian domestic affairs during the past century produced a legacy of ill-feeling between the two countries, Albright signalled that the US is willing to extend itself for the first time since the revolution to rehabilitate its relationship with Iran.

The breakthrough began with a remarkably mature acknowledgment by the United States of the short-sighted nature of its policy of supporting Baghdad during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Regret was expressed concerning CIA involvement in the 1953 coup that toppled a popularly-elected administration, as well as regarding Washington's uncritical support for the Shah's authoritarian rule. Albright then moved on to the most tangible dimension of the overture: the US's willingness to unfreeze billions of dollars in Iranian assets held since 1979.

"The wall of distrust" that the US secretary of state said she wants to tear down, though, may prove to be higher and have more solid foundations than anticipated.

Hard-line government officials in Tehran rejected the initiative in familiar terms: Hassan Rouhani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, said Washington was inappropriately attempting to bolster reformists in a bid to undermine the establishment. The council, though not formally charged with foreign policy-making powers, is permitted to extend its control over any matters that impact on defence and security.

The equally hard-line Revolutionary Guards, the principal security arm of Iran's government, accused the US of trying "to create a crisis in Iran."

Indeed, the Clinton administration has not been subtle about the how and why of this particular overture -- it has said that the reformist victory in last month's parliamentary elections indicates the emergence of a moderate force in Iranian politics with which the US is inclined to do business. Washington has long insisted Iran must change its policies on the Middle East peace process, terrorism and nuclear armament before renewing ties can even be contemplated. But with moderate forces gaining ground that can help reformist President Muhammad Khatami promote his cautiously open foreign policy in the face of reactionary anti-Americanism within the hard-line establishment, it seems Washington believes that the promotion of its own interests requires flexibility rather than dogmatism.

Hard-liners have been as intransigent regarding improving relations as the most right-wing of American Republicans, and have likewise long refused to countenance ties with the US unless the Clinton administration takes practical steps as evidence of its sound intentions.

By making the unfreezing of Iranian assets a symbolic cornerstone of the initiative, Albright effectively took a first step that may help reformists deprive hard-liners of their main political playing-card. Many believe the hard-line establishment, which has made anti-Americanism its virtual raison-d'être for two decades, feels too threatened by the very idea of American ties to ever move on the issue, despite their rhetorical insistence on prerequisites.

Iranian-Americans, who number one million and formed the audience for Albright's address, have prepared the Clinton administration for an inconsistent and ultimately discouraging Iranian response. Reformist politicians close to the Foreign Ministry privately confess that Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi is committed to improving ties with the US, but that the reality of conservative control over foreign policy forces him to seek change at the lowest of levels (pushing for extra telephone lines in the office of the Iranian interests section in Washington, DC, for example).

Through a neither transparent nor well-defined set of laws, foreign policy in Iran is largely in the hands of the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council. The strong American naval presence in the Persian Gulf can justify the hard-line security body's attempt to determine how or if Iran will show any flexibility toward Washington.

The Expediency Council, which adjudicates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council, is the most well-placed institution to direct the country's foreign policy planning, because it includes influential officials from many parts of the government and is formally responsible for advising the Supreme Leader. Out of all the murky institutions that inform the Iranian foreign policy machine, the Expediency Council's consensus is likely to be the most measured and have the greatest legitimacy. Thus, that Secretary of the Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei welcomed the US overture and spoke of a "new chapter" in relations should be viewed as significant, even if his welcome was lukewarm.

With oil sanctions still in place, Iranian caviar, carpets, and other sundries will not be a serious source of cash to the government. Public sentiment, measured by support for reformist politicians who have made the issue a key platform topic, largely favours renewing ties with the US as well. Observers in both countries expect a tempered response to Albright's speech, at best. However, they say they are hopeful that such a historic attitude shift in one country may nudge the same response, eventually, in the other.

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