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Al-Ahram Weekly 30 March - 5 April 2000 Issue No. 475 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 30 March - 5 April 2000 Issue No. 475
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Great expectations dashed
By Lamis AndoniWhen American President Bill Clinton met with his Syrian counterpart Hafez Al-Assad in Geneva on Sunday, he presented the Syrian leader with "a carrot and a stick." But neither worked. The carrot did not prove sufficiently attractive and the stick was not threatening enough to extract from Damascus the concessions desired by Israel.
This is the assessment made by diplomatic insiders in Washington after the summit.
From the Syrian viewpoint, what Washington considered "a carrot" was really an Israeli attempt at extortion. According to American and Israeli press reports, the carrot was an American proposal that Israel withdraw from the Golan Heights to a modified pre-1967 War border that would guarantee its control over Lake Tiberias which supplies Israel with approximately 40 per cent of its water.
Neither American officials nor the media here took into account that what Washington demanded from Syria was, in essence, that it compromise its rights and needs. After the announcement that the summit failed to guarantee the resumption of peace talks between Israel and Syria, the Israeli and US media blamed "the intransigent Al-Assad" for failing to "understand Israeli concerns."
The prevailing view in the United States is that Syria should have accepted the proposed Israeli "concession" or else risk the repercussions of a shifting regional political map. While it is not yet clear whether Clinton explicitly waved the stick in Al-Assad's face during their three-hour meeting, American pundits, particularly staunch supporters of Israel, have been emphasising the possibility of negative consequences for Syria with great clarity.
The implied American threat was based on three main assumptions:
Firstly, that a shift in Iran's foreign policy toward rebuilding ties with the United States, which the latter hopes for, would weaken Syria and undercut its regional position and capacity to bargain with America. Secondly, Al-Assad needs American support and an agreement with Israel to guarantee a smooth succession of power to his son Bashar, especially in view of reported resentment toward such ambitions within the ranks of the ruling Ba'ath Party, the army and even the Alawite sect to which the Syrian leader belongs. Thirdly, Israel's "promised threat" of a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon by July would -- from the Israeli point of view -- strip Damascus of an important negotiating chip.
Well-informed, but unabashedly pro-Israeli columnist Thomas Friedman even argued in his New York Times column last week that Clinton should not give Al-Assad more than three minutes to comply with Israeli-American terms. But the perception of Syria's weakening position, widely promoted in the American media, does not explain Clinton's eagerness for the resumption of Israeli-Syrian talks.
In addition to Clinton's obvious desire to reach a breakthrough before the end of his presidency next January, the United States has serious reasons to be concerned about the continued stalemate. American officials have repeatedly expressed fears that a continuation of tensions in south Lebanon, especially in the absence of an Israeli-Syrian agreement, could lead to a large-scale confrontation that might trigger unrest beyond Lebanon, especially in Palestine. Washington has been particularly alarmed by the outpouring of popular support in the Arab world, along with the more reserved but still significant official support, for Lebanon and Hizbullah's right to resist Israel. Although the Arab League meeting in Beirut on 11 March fell far short of making a commitment for concrete action, the apparent revival of pan-Arab solidarity, even if only on the rhetorical level, went against US efforts since the Gulf War to discourage an anti-Israeli Arab consensus.
President Hosni Mubarak's historic visit to Beirut was yet another sign that unless a Syrian-Israeli treaty is concluded, the sands of the region could erode all of the efforts made towards integrating Israel into the region.
American National Security Adviser Sandy Berger conceded on the eve of the Geneva summit that the United States was seriously concerned about the rising tension and anger in the Arab world. "Time is not the friend of peace in the Middle East," Berger told reporters following Clinton's announcement of his plans to meet with Al-Assad. "Any sense of urgency comes from their clocks and not our clocks."
According to US analysts, Israel's threat to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon without an agreement with Syria could be a recipe for regional instability. Meanwhile, Al-Assad's reportedly fragile health makes it more urgent for Israel and the United States to try to reach an agreement before Syria is plunged into the unknown. Bashar, if he succeeds his father, will neither have the experience of the senior Al-Assad, nor is he expected to have sufficient power to ensure that a deal will be struck. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak needs such an agreement with Syria before the end of his term to pre-empt further losses in south Lebanon and to secure Israel's northern border. As one Israeli commentator put it, a deal with Syria would open the door to Europe and the rest of the world "once Israelis can travel to Europe by car through Syria."
More significantly, many Israelis and Americans are convinced, or at least they claim to be, that an agreement with Syria would lead to normalisation of ties between Israel and the Arab world. Although such an analysis underestimates the centrality of the Palestinian question in the conflict, an agreement with Syria might increase the pressure on Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to come to terms with Israel.
In spite of all of the threatening noises in the American media, mostly based on official briefings that preceded the Geneva meeting, the United States is equally eager, if not more so than Al-Assad, to clinch an agreement.
By venturing outside of Damascus -- something he rarely does -- to meet Clinton in Geneva the frail 69-year-old Syrian leader may have overestimated American eagerness to win an agreement. However, the wily leader cannot afford to bequeath to his son a deal that leaves Israel with control over an invaluable water reservoir and the right to having an armed presence in the Golan Heights. According to informed US sources, Clinton did not convey any major Israeli concessions to Al-Assad with regard to Syria's insistence on maintaining a military presence at an early warning station in the Golan Heights. Syria said it was ready to accept that the station have American and French officers, but not Israeli ones.
Furthermore, while signs of an Iranian-American rapprochement might threaten to undermine Syria's position, a Syrian-Israeli treaty is crucial to help the United States step up its pressure on Tehran to drop its opposition to Tel Aviv and the peace process. Thus, while Al-Assad's apparent expectations of a significant American proposal proved to be wrong, so were Israeli and American calculations. The question now is: who will hold out longest in trying to get most of their demands?
