 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 April 2000 Issue No. 476 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 April 2000 Issue No. 476
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Summit Features Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Al-Assad's limits
By Abdel-Azim HammadThe Brookings Institute for Foreign Policy Studies in the United States has long been considered an authority on the Middle East peace process. Since the 1970s, this institute has issued several studies on the major obstacles preventing the conclusion of a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Israel. Many of the Brookings Institute's experts have also served as top advisers to US presidents on Middle East affairs.
The institute organised a panel discussion to examine Syria's motives for trying to end the conflict with Israel and to shed light on Israel's calculated stances in the negotiations.
On the discussion panel were Martha Kessler, an analyst for the CIA, Helena Cobban, an expert on Syrian politics who recently published a book on the country's politics, and Hisham Milhim, a US-based political commentator. The discussion was chaired by Richard Hesse, vice-chairman of the Brookings Institute and Shebly Talhami, a political science professor who is the Anwar El-Sadat chair for peace and development at the University of Maryland.
Panel participants almost unanimously agreed that concluding a peace agreement with Israel was a top priority for Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad. However, Kessler, warned against the belief that this would make Al-Assad a more flexible negotiator or more willing to compromise. Last month's Geneva summit between President Clinton and Al-Assad proved this.
Kessler believes that the Syrian president is now convinced that peace with Israel would serve his country's domestic and external interests.
On the domestic front, the succession to the Syrian presidency is a major issue that will impact on both the local and international levels. The declining health of the 70-year-old president has been a question of constant speculation in the international media, which has been filled with quotes from experts and diplomats who fear that if Al-Assad were to die before a settlement with Israel was achieved, such an event might cause domestic upheaval and regional instability.
If Al-Assad, as is it often reported, wishes to appoint his son, Bashar, as his successor, peace with Israel would be a prerequisite, according to many analysts.
Yet, the same analysts suggest that Syrian public opinion would not tolerate a humiliating compromise that would tarnish the image of the ailing president.
Talhami and Cobban agree that an honourable peace settlement with Israel signed by the senior Al-Assad, would render his son attractive as the man to lead Syria in the coming stage of development, economic liberalisation, raising the standard of living and enhancing regional stability.
Talhami contends that President Al-Assad's decision to appoint Bashar as the commander of the Republican Guard meant that the son had been handed the entire Lebanese file. For many years, relations with Lebanon were the responsibility of Al-Assad's current deputy and former foreign minister, Abdel-Halim Khaddam. Talhami asserts that all recent changes in high-level positions in the security and intelligence services were conceived to support President Al-Assad's plan to designate his son as his successor.
External factors which helped Al-Assad decide to seriously pursue peace with Israel were summarised by Kessler. Firstly, the collapse of the former Soviet Union foiled for good Al-Assad's plans for attaining strategic parity with Israel. Secondly, Al-Assad's deep-rooted feeling that despite Syria's importance, it continues to be surrounded by more powerful states such as Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Thus, according to Kessler, Al-Assad feels that Syria's situation will be precarious unless it participates in forging a regional security system. Thirdly, with the exception of Iraq, which is living under abnormal conditions, all states in the region are pursuing ambitious development programmes. The current state of "no war, no peace" with Israel not only hinders Syria's development plans, but may leave the country far behind others in the region. Fourthly, in light of recent improvements in relations and growing confidence between the United States and Syria, President Al-Assad is seeking to persuade Washington that its interests in the Middle East are best served by the establishment of an even-handed peace in the region.
From its bitter experience of nearly a decade of on-again-off-again talks with Israel, Syria learned that given the instability of Israel's internal political situation, which has prevented any progressive advance in the peace process, Syria should make the most of the present Labour government's declared desire to strike a deal.
Despite all these external factors which might have convinced Al-Assad that the time has come to conclude a peace deal with Israel, participants in the Brookings Institute panel discussion said that Syria still faces a number of dangers.
The Israeli strategy in negotiations assumes that the more its side procrastinates and refuses to relent, the more conciliatory and compromising the Syrians would be in substantive matters. This strategy might explain the laggard attitude of the Israeli side which seems to be waiting for concessions to be made. The Geneva summit may have shattered these expectations.
However, Martha Kessler and Helena Cobban believe that while Al-Assad may show flexibility in procedural matters, he will not budge on certain points. They predict he will not compromise on a withdrawal by Israel from all Syrian territory occupied during the 1967 war, nor will he give in on a continued role for his country in Lebanon. Experts pointed out that Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon would not necessarily mean an immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops positioned in Lebanon. Al-Assad will also not accept Israel's regional hegemony and the establishment of security arrangements along his border with Israel that might double the threats to Syrian security.
In concluding remarks, commentator Talhami said that Al-Assad was ready to pay the price in blood and tears to prevent Israeli hegemony over the region and to maintain Syrian influence in Lebanon.
It is widely believed in the Arab world that had the US administration showed more understanding of Syria's concerns, the summit in Geneva might not have failed to reach agreement on the resumption of talks with Israel.
