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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 May 2000 Issue No. 480 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 May 2000 Issue No. 480
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Negotiating a necessary peace
By Abdel-Azim Hammad *
It is commonly held that the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon will turn the strategic tables between Israel and Syria entirely in Israel's favour, and will be of no advantage to the Syrians whatsoever. If this is indeed the case, why has no other Israeli government in the past 20 years dared take that course, although successive Israeli cabinets have considered the move quite seriously on several occasions, particularly under Binyamin Netanyahu?
By posing this question I intend to demonstrate that, until recently, Israel had considerable interests at stake in linking its withdrawal from southern Lebanon to a comprehensive agreement with both the Lebanese and the Syrians, and that it was in deference to these interests that Israeli decision-makers deferred the decision to undertake a unilateral withdrawal every time the subject arose. Moreover, Netanyahu's insistence that Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon could take place only within the framework of a peace agreement with Lebanon at least, rendered these interests distinct from Israeli interests in withdrawing from the Golan, which Netanyahu knew was an indispensable condition for any peace agreement with Syria.
What, then, are these interests? Why is it that the current Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, can ignore them now? Alternatively, how does he intend to protect them, and what are the chances that his plans for doing so will succeed? Finally, in the event that Israel withdraws unilaterally from southern Lebanon, will Syria have lost the last of its remaining bargaining chips with which to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the Golan?
Leaving aside such subsidiary ideological concerns as creating a Maronite entity in Lebanon strategically allied to Israel or diverting a portion of the waters of the Litani to northern Israel, I will focus on Israel's immediate interest of guaranteeing the security of its borders with Lebanon. After all, this issue was the primary motive for the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 and for creating the "security zone" from which Israel has decided to withdraw now.
It is important to note that Hizbullah did not mount the military operations against northern Israel that triggered the Israeli invasions and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon. The Lebanese armed resistance under Hizbullah only came into being after the Israeli occupation. Rather, those operations were the work of the Palestinians, many of whom still reside in refugee camps in Lebanon and who are still armed and organised. However, the later addition of the Lebanese resistance brought Lebanese freedom fighters to the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the first time in the history of this struggle.
Hizbullah is a fundamentalist organisation whose ideology transcends the nation-state to assume a vaster pan-Islamic dimension. It is quite possible that, even after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hizbullah will ally itself with the Palestinians, a prospect that seems even more likely in light of the strong indications that the Israeli withdrawal will not constitute a complete withdrawal in the true sense of the word. This is to say that, while the "flesh and blood" of the Israeli forces may indeed evacuate Lebanon, the Israeli proxies, in the form of the militias of the South Lebanese Army (SLA) will remain, and their supplies, training and offensive and defensive planning will remain under Israeli command. In addition, Lebanese airspace and territorial waters will remain subject to Israeli reconnaissance and patrols.
Thus, Barak's decision to stage a unilateral withdrawal is, at best, a calculated risk mitigated by the toll on the lives of Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and the pressure of Israeli public opinion. However, it will not resolve the problem of the security of northern Israel. Why, then, would Barak go ahead with this risk?
Above all, it is a fulfilment of the pledge he took upon himself during the last Israeli elections, a pledge he wagered would give him an edge over his primary rival and, now, predecessor, Netanyahu. And so it did. This commitment, however, was made within a more comprehensive context, which was to reach a conclusive peace agreement with Syria within a year of his election at most.
Yet, in order to make good on his electoral pledge, Barak had to prepare the ground to ensure the success of the wager. This entailed promoting an international climate through an intensive propaganda campaign so as to furnish the moral and legal foundations for preempting armed attacks against northern Israel from southern Lebanon. This campaign's overall success is apparent in the overt international support for his declaration that Israel would retaliate relentlessly against civilian targets, especially infrastructural targets, in Lebanon in the event of any armed operation -- however minor -- mounted against Israel from Lebanese territory. In addition, Israeli sources have leaked information to the effect that Barak had notified the Syrians via intermediaries that Israel would hold them responsible for any anti-Israeli military activity emanating from Lebanon and would, if the need arose, follow Turkey's example in dealing with the insurgents of the Kurdistan Labour Party based in Syria, which would be to launch a massive retaliatory assault against Syria directly, or at least against Syrian forces in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, there remains a problem with this strategy from the Israeli perspective. On one hand, it reaffirms the interdependency of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks in the peace process and, on the other, it is based on the erroneous premise that Syria is the only operative player in Lebanon.
Clearly, Barak's strategy for ensuring the security of Israel's northern border following withdrawal involves intimidating Syria into keeping the armed Palestinian elements in Lebanon in check, particularly those opposed to Arafat, since Arafat himself has declared that he will not permit Palestinian resistance forces to sabotage the negotiations between the PA and Israel. It will also fall upon Syria to prevent the Lebanese resistance from engaging in further actions against Israel. These tasks, in turn, will oblige Syria to assist the Lebanese government by using its arms, intelligence and influence to extend the influence of the Lebanese government and its armed forces in the south. If, indeed, Syria is willing to perform these tasks, what price will Israel pay in return? Obviously, the bill would come to a peace agreement with Syria on the basis of the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, for could Damascus be expected to safeguard Israel's security for free?
Nevertheless, there still remains the difficulty of equating Syrian influence on the Kurdish rebel forces actually based in Syria with Syrian influence in Lebanon. Lebanon is a complex configuration of forces, not all of which are entirely dependent upon Syria and some of which are, in fact, hostile to Syria. Hizbullah, for example, owes its primary allegiance to Iran, while the forces loyal to Michel Aoun, the former temporary president of Lebanon exiled by Syria, are keen to engage in any stratagems necessary to bring about a confrontation between Israel and Syria in Lebanon. The Palestinian refugees, too, are not all either pro-Syria or pro-Arafat; indeed, many are prepared to act in accordance with the dictates of their own conscience and beliefs. As a result of these diverse forces, at the first act of provocation, Barak may well find himself forced to back down on his threat to emulate the Turkish example against Syria. Quite to the contrary, the more advantageous alternative, once again, would be to reach a peace agreement with Syria, preparatory to an agreement with Lebanon, and then to prevail upon Syria, again of course at a cost, to help Lebanon to defuse all those "mines."
Despite the general pessimism that surrounds the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, some observers, particularly in Lebanon, predict a major breakthrough on this track before the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon scheduled for 7 July. If we take the available information about what really happened in the Geneva summit between Hafez Al-Assad and Bill Clinton at face value, then it would appear that there is a proposal on the table to resolve the differences between the Syrians and Israelis over the borders to which Israel should withdraw. This would be to convert the approximately 100m-wide stretch of land between the 4 June 1967 borders, to which Syria insists Israel should withdraw, and the French Mandate borders of 1923, to which Israel maintains it should withdraw, into a nature reserve.
It is also possible to conceive of more than one scenario for resolving the problem of sovereignty over this area. One alternative is simply to defer the resolution of the issue of sovereignty for a period sufficient to build confidence between the two sides. A second is to refer the issue to international arbitration in the manner in which the question of sovereignty over Taba was resolved between Egypt and Israel. A third possibility is to place it under UN supervision, a status that could only be repealed by a Security Council resolution, on the condition that the area revert to Syrian sovereignty and that Israeli is furnished guarantees, also under UN auspices, that it will have access to the waters of Lake Tiberius.
The available information on the Assad-Clinton summit also suggests that the question of security arrangements is no longer a significant impediment to a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. The Israelis and the Americans have talked about making a generous offer to the Syrians. And we already know, as the head of the Israeli negotiating team with Syria under Shimon Peres confessed, that the Israelis had been deliberately excessive in their security demands on Syria.
It appears, therefore, that there are still surprises in store on the Syrian track. First, an agreement with Syria is the only way Israel can guarantee its security interests in Lebanon. Second, such an agreement is essential to reaching a comprehensive peace; and third, it will eliminate the Syrian obstacle to Israel's relations with the rest of the Arab world -- especially the countries of the Gulf.
* The writer is assistant chief editor at Al-Ahram.
