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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 May 2000 Issue No. 481 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 May 2000 Issue No. 481
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Books Features Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Taming the trigger-happy
By Fawzi Hammad*
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 with 52 state parties, now has 187 signatories. Only four countries remain outside the NPT: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. While Cuba has no nuclear weapons programme, India and Pakistan have been self-declared nuclear states since May 1998. Israel still maintains the attitude of ambiguity it adopted at the beginning of its nuclear programme. On the other hand, all the Arab states are parties to the NPT. Their security is thus threatened by Israel, with no protection from the NPT. This is a unique position, unparalleled anywhere in the world.
The sixth NPT review conference is convening in New York from 24 April to 19 May. It is therefore timely to shed some light on the review process and the main related issues with emphasis on the situation in the Middle East.
Four NPT review conferences were held in Geneva, in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 in accordance with Article 8-3. The fifth conference, held in New York in 1995 in accordance with Article 10-2, had the dual task of reviewing the Treaty and deciding upon its extension. At this conference, which is a significant landmark in the history of the NPT, 174 state parties adopted on 11 May 1995 (exactly five years ago) without vote a decision to extend the NPT indefinitely as a part of a "politically binding package of three decisions and a Resolution on the Middle East (RME)." The three decisions are: 1) strengthening the review process; 2) principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; 3) the indefinite extension of the NPT.
The RME was proposed by the three depository states (the US, Russia and the UK) and accepted without vote. It called for universal adherence to the NPT and regional efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery systems.
The resolution was passed because 14 Arab states, led by Egypt, made it clear that any agreement on the extension would depend on commitments included in the RME. This resolution supported the 1991 Mubarak initiative for establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ).
It is now widely accepted, as stated by Rebecca Johnson, that the indefinite extension of the NPT without a vote would have been impossible without the package and the RME. This was the price accepted by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), led by the US, for the great victory achieved. They foiled a strong effort led by some Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to extend the NPT for rolling 25-year or renewable periods, and avoided a divided vote on the extension decision, which could have damaged the NPT. Further, the role of the NNWS in the Treaty implied in Article 10-2 has ended. The only leverage they had is lost.
After adopting the package, the 1995 conference was unable to agree on a final declaration on the review and implementation of the NPT, due to conflicts on nuclear disarmament. This has been a main feature of most of the review meetings. The second (1980) and fourth (1990) review conferences also failed to issue final declarations due to a lack of agreement between NWS and NNWS regarding nuclear disarmament. The NWS also refused to commit themselves to a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The 1985 conference, too, witnessed disagreements over disarmament, but the president, Egypt's Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, was able to issue a declaration by synthesising the different views in a single paragraph. This declaration called upon the parties concerned to establish a weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The on-going meeting in New York is also facing similar problems, and may not have a final declaration.
The second decision, on principles and objectives, is at the heart of the 1995 package. There is great resistance to the idea of modifying or amending them, since a lack of consensus might weaken the validity of the package and cast doubts on the validity of the extension decision. There is also a general agreement that the principles and objectives remain a valid basis for the review process.
These principles emphasise the universality of the NPT, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons-free zones, security assurances, safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The universality principle calls upon all states that have not yet signed the NPT to do so at the earliest possible date, particularly those states operating nuclear facilities that are not safeguarded. Israel is implied here, of course. Universality was emphasised as an urgent priority.
The development of nuclear weapons-free zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East, is another principle; priority is placed on establishing zones free of all weapons of mass destruction. The separate RME also emphasises this principle for the Middle East, and points to Israel without mentioning it by name.
Considerable differences also arose between the US and Egypt on the RME. The Arab states pushed for this resolution because they wanted the US to put pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear capabilities, apply the IAEA safeguard system to its nuclear facilities and accede to the NPT. Nothing has materialised, despite the urgency and priority stated in the decision.
On nuclear disarmament, a programme of action was established, including the conclusion of a CTBT by 1996, negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Fisban) and the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament.
Considerable progress was made on a CTBT at first. A CTBT was in fact concluded and opened for signature in 1996 -- a significant achievement. Of the 44 states designated to sign and ratify the CTBT, only 26 have actually signed. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not yet done so. The most serious blow came from the US Senate, which voted against ratification in October 1999. India has announced it will not sign; thus, progress is suspended.
Negotiation on a Fisban treaty, on the other hand, did not even get off the ground due to the diverging policies adopted by various states.
Given the present political circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that India, Israel or Pakistan will relinquish their nuclear capabilities and adhere to the NPT as NNWS. Further, many believe that most NWS do not want to honour the package of decisions and the RME after obtaining an indefinite extension without vote. This was the only leverage the NNWS had in the NPT, as mentioned earlier, and was given away without guarantees of implementation.
Further, some NWS are reinforcing their nuclear options, and that this process could provoke a new arms race. The gap between the positions of the NWS and the NNWS is widening again on NPT universality, disarmament and the Middle East. Indeed, very little progress -- if any -- has taken place.
The NPT, the most universal treaty in history, could unravel if a few countries continue to rely on nuclear weapons, which could lead to further proliferation, and if the 1995 package is not respected and implemented in a reasonable time frame.
The NNWS should be highly organised if they are to prevent this from happening. The new agenda coalition, formed to revitalise the international drive to eliminate nuclear weapons, was launched in 1998 by Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. This leadership is emerging to coordinate the activities of NNWS, work to implement the package of decisions and RME achieved in 1995, and to realise a nuclear weapon-free world.
We support the idea of convening a world nuclear disarmament conference under UN auspices, to address these issues. We also propose that a NNWS meeting similar to that convened in August 1968 be held to settle differences and develop a unified stand behind the 1995 package and its implementation.
* The writer is former president of the Atomic Energy Authority.
