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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 May 2000 Issue No. 481 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 May 2000 Issue No. 481
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Books Features Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Sezer consensus ends Turkish wrangling
By Gareth JenkinsLast Friday, in a third round of voting, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the president of the Constitutional Court, received the support of 330 of the 550 members of parliament, comfortably clear of the simple majority of 276 needed. His nearest rival, Nevzat Yalcintas of the Islamist Virtue Party (FP), received just 113 votes.
Sezer, a 59 year-old career lawyer, was chosen as a candidate by the government in late April after Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit failed to persuade his coalition partners to amend the constitution to allow the incumbent President Suleyman Demirel to remain in office. The failure of the constitutional amendment triggered a desperate backroom battle as each of the three parties, and even different wings within parties, tried to put forward their own presidential candidates.
Ecevit proposed Sezer as a compromise candidate in a desperate attempt to prevent the disintegration of the government. So far, the gamble appears to have paid off. Sezer received the support not only of his coalition partners but also of many members of the two opposition parties in parliament, the FP and the centre-right True Path Party (DYP).
The Turkish press has enthusiastically hailed the consensus as an indication that the country's traditionally quarrelsome politicians are finally reaching maturity. But the real reason appears to be that no one knows enough about Sezer to be able to object to him.
Until he was named as a candidate by Ecevit, Sezer appears to have had no political ambitions. A reserved father of three grown-up children from the provincial town of Afyon, Sezer had pursued a modest lifestyle and remained out of the public eye. The only exception was in April 1999 when, at the anniversary of the foundation of the Constitutional Court, he delivered a speech in which he called for greater democratization.
The speech has been cited by both foreign critics of Turkey's human rights records and the FP as proof that Sezer will be a reformist president. "Sezer talks just like us," declared FP Chairman Recai Kutan.
But, although there is no reason to question Sezer's commitment to democracy, doubts remain as to his definition of democracy. Sezer's career took off in 1983 when he was hand-picked by Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta which had staged the 1980 coup, for membership of the Supreme Court of Appeals. In January 1998, when he was a member rather than president of the Constitutional Court, he voted for the closure of the FP's predecessor, the Welfare Party.
Significantly, both privately and publicly, Turkey's powerful military raised no objection to Sezer's candidacy. Nor do they appear to have any grounds for concern. Last Friday, in his first speech as president elect, Sezer stressed his commitment to what he described as the inviolable principles of secularism and territorial integrity, which suggest that he is unlikely to tolerate expressions of an Islamic or Kurdish identity.
There are also questions as to whether Sezer could push through reforms, even if he wanted to. In theory, the Turkish presidency is essentially a ceremonial office. The only real political power comes from the requirement that all legislation be signed by the president before it comes into force. But the president is also chairman of the National Security Council, which, although theoretically merely an advisory body, effectively sets the parameters for government policy. Yet all of Sezer's predecessors have either been former prime ministers, who have retained a considerable political following, or retired generals backed by the military. In practical terms, Sezer has no such means of exercising political leverage.
More significantly, Sezer has also called for a reduction in the presidency's existing powers, such as the right to veto legislation by withholding his signature. "The powers given to the president exceed the boundaries of parliamentary democracy," he said.
Such statements and the relative ease with which Sezer was elected, will have done much to reassure Ecevit, who took a major gamble in choosing a non-political figure as a candidate. But there are also signs that Ecevit's methods, particularly when trying to browbeat his coalition partners into extending Demirel's term in office, may have fatally damaged the government. On Saturday State Minister Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik from the Motherland Party (ANAP), the junior partner in the tripartite government, resigned in protest at the dictatorial methods used by Ecevit. It is also an open secret that ANAP Chairman Mesut Yilmaz had been hoping to be elected president himself. The frustration of his ambitions will only heighten tension and distrust inside the coalition at a time when Ecevit's continuing frail health has already raised questions about the longevity of the government.
