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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 May 2000 Issue No. 482 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 May 2000 Issue No. 482
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Features Heritage Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Premeditated mass murder
By Naom Chomsky*
For an understanding of NATO's resort to war, the most important period is the months leading up to the decision to wage war on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). And of course, what NATO knew about that period is a matter of critical significance for any serious attempt to evaluate the decision to bomb Yugoslavia without Security Council authorisation. Fortunately, that is the period for which we have the most detailed direct evidence: namely, from the reports of the KVM monitors and other international observers. Unfortunately, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) inquiry passes over these months quickly, presenting little evidence and concentrating rather on the period after monitors were withdrawn. A selection of KVM reports is, however, available, along with others by NATO and independent international observers. These merit close scrutiny.
The relevant period begins in December, with the breakdown of the cease-fire that had permitted the return of many people displaced by the fighting. Throughout these months, the monitors report that "humanitarian agencies in general have unhindered access to all areas of Kosovo," with occasional harassment from Serb security forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) paramilitaries, so the information may be presumed to be fairly comprehensive.
The "most serious incidents" reported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in December are clashes along the FRY-Albanian border, and "what appear to be the first deliberate attacks on public places in urban areas." The UN Inter-Agency Update (24 December) identifies these as an attempt by armed Albanians to cross into Kosovo from Albania, leaving at least 36 armed men dead, and the killing of six Serbian teenagers by masked men spraying gunfire in a café in the largely Serbian city of Pec. The next incident is the abduction and murder of the deputy mayor of Kosovo Polie, attributed by NATO to the KLA. Then follows a report of "abductions attributed to the KLA."
The UN secretary-general's report (24 December) reviews the same evidence, citing the figure of 282 civilians and police abducted by the KLA as of 7 December (FRY figures). The general picture is that after the October cease-fire, "Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to re-establish their control over many villages in Kosovo, as well as over some areas near urban centres and highways ... leading to statements [by Serbian authorities] that if the [KVM] cannot control these units the government would."
The UN Inter-Agency Update on 11 January is similar. It reports fighting between Serb security forces and the KLA. In addition, in "the most serious incident since the declaration of the cease-fire in October 1998, the period under review has witnessed an increase in the number of murders (allegedly perpetrated by the KLA), which have prompted vigorous retaliatory action by government security forces."
"Random violence" killed 21 people in the preceding 11 days. Only one example is cited: a bomb outside "a café in Pristina, injuring three Serbian youths and triggering retaliatory attacks by Serbian civilians on Albanians," the first such incident in the capital. The other major incidents cited are the KLA capture of eight soldiers, the killing of a Serbian civilian and the reported killing of three Serbian police. NATO's review of the period is similar, with further details: Yugoslav army shelling of civilian and KLA facilities with "at least 15 Kosovo Albanians" killed, KLA killing of a Serb judge, police and civilians.
Then comes the Racak massacre of 15 January, after which the reports return pretty much to what preceded. The OSCE monthly report of 20 February describes the situation as "volatile."
Serb-KLA "direct military engagement ... dropped significantly," but KLA attacks on police and sporadic exchange of gunfire" continued, "including at times the use of heavy weapons by the VJ." The "main feature of the last part of the reporting period has been an alarming increase in urban terrorism with a series of indiscriminate bombing or raking gunfire attacks against civilians in public places in towns throughout Kosovo." These are "non-attributable," either "criminally or politically motivated."
Then follows a review of police-KLA confrontations, KLA abduction of "five elderly Serb civilians" and the refusal of the KLA and Yugoslav army to comply with Security Council resolutions. Five civilians were killed as "urban violence increased significantly," including three killed by a bomb outside an Albanian grocery store. "More reports were received of the KLA 'policing' the Albanian community and administering punishments to those charged as collaborators with the Serbs," as well as murder and abduction of alleged Albanian collaborators and Serb police. The "cycle of confrontation can be generally described" as KLA attacks on Serb police and civilians, "a disproportionate response by the FRY authorities" and "renewed KLA activity elsewhere."
In his monthly report of 17 March, the UN secretary-general reports that clashes between Serb security forces and the KLA "continued at a relatively lower level," but civilians "are increasingly becoming the main target of violent acts," including killings, executions, mistreatment and abductions. The UNHCR "registered more than 65 violent deaths" of Albanian and Serb civilians (and several Roma) from 20 January to 17 March. These are reported to be isolated killings by gunmen and grenade attacks on cafés and shops. Victims included alleged Albanian collaborators and "civilians known for open-mindedness and flexibility in community relations." Abductions continued, the victims almost all Serbs, mostly civilians.
The OSCE report of 20 March gave a similar picture, reporting "unprovoked attacks by the KLA against the police" and an increase in casualties among Serb security forces, along with "military operations affecting the civilian population," "indiscriminate urban terrorist attacks targeting civilians," "non-attributable murders," mostly Albanians, and abduction of Albanian civilians, allegedly by a "centrally-controlled" KLA "security force." Specific incidents are then reported.
The last NATO report (16 January-22 March) cites several dozen incidents, about half initiated by KLA-UCK, half by Serb security forces, in addition to half a dozen responses by Serb security forces and engagements with the KLA, including "aggressive Serb attacks on villages suspected of harbouring UCK forces or command centres." Casualties reported are mostly military, at the levels of the preceding months.
As a standard of comparison, one might consider the regular murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli military operations in Lebanon when Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon in violation of Security Council orders, or their local mercenaries, are attacked by the Lebanese resistance. Through the 1990s, as before, these have far exceeded anything attributed to the FRY security forces within what NATO insists is their territory.
Within Kosovo, no significant changes are reported from the breakdown of the cease-fire in December until the 22 March decision to bomb. Even apart from the (apparently isolated) Racak massacre, there can be no doubt that the FRY authorities and security forces were responsible for serious crimes. But the reported record also lends no credibility to the claim that these were the reason for the bombing; in the case of comparable or much worse atrocities during the same period, the US and its allies either did not react, or -- more significantly -- maintained and even increased their support for the atrocities. Examples are all too easy to enumerate; East Timor in the same months, to mention only the most obvious one.
The vast expulsions from Kosovo began immediately after the 24 March bombing campaign. On 27 March, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 4,000 had fled Kosovo, and on 1 April, the flow was high enough for UNHCR to begin to provide daily figures. Its Humanitarian Evacuation Programme began on 5 April. From the last week of March to the end of the war in June, "forces of the FRY and Serbia forcibly expelled some 863,000 Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo," the OSCE reports, and hundreds of thousands of others were internally displaced, while unknown numbers of Serbs, Gypsies and others fled as well.
The US and UK had been planning the bombing campaign for many months and could hardly have failed to anticipate these consequences. In early March, Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema warned Clinton of the huge refugee flow that would follow the bombing; Clinton's National Security Adviser Sandy Berger responded that in that case "NATO will keep bombing," with still more horrific results. US intelligence also warned that there would be "a virtual explosion of refugees" and a campaign of ethnic cleansing, reiterating earlier predictions of European monitors.
As the bombing campaign began, US-NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark informed the press that it was "entirely predictable" that Serb terror would intensify as a result. Shortly after, Clark explained again that, "The military authorities fully anticipated the vicious approach that Milosevic would adopt, as well as the terrible efficiency with which he would carry it out."
Elaborating a few weeks later, he observed that the NATO operation planned by "the political leadership ... was not designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not designed as a means of waging war against the Serb and MUP [internal police] forces in Kosovo. Not in any way. There was never any intent to do that. That was not the idea." General Clark stated further that plans for -- Operation Horseshoe -- "have never been shared with me," referring to the alleged Serb plan to expel the population that was publicised by NATO after the shocking Serb reaction to the bombing had become evident.
The agency that bears primary responsibility for the care of refugees is UNHCR. "At the war's end, British Prime Minister Tony Blair privately took the agency to task for what he considered its problematic performance." Evidently, the performance of UNHCR would have been less problematic had the agency not been defunded by the great powers. For this reason, the UNHCR had to cut staff by over 15 per cent in 1998. In October, while the bombing plans were being formulated, the UNHCR announced that it would have to eliminate a fifth of its remaining staff by January 1999 because of the budgetary crisis created by the "enlightened states."
In summary, the KVM monitors were removed and a bombing campaign initiated with the expectation, quickly fulfilled, that the consequence would be a sharp escalation of ethnic cleansing and other atrocities, after the organisation responsible for the care of refugees was defunded. Under the doctrine of retrospective justification, the heinous crimes that ensued are now held to be, perhaps, "enough to justify" the NATO bombing campaign.
The person who commits a crime bears the primary responsibility for it; those who incite him, anticipating the consequences, bear secondary responsibility, which only mounts if they act to increase the suffering of the victims. The only possible argument for action to incite the crimes is that they would have been even more severe had the action not been undertaken. That claim, one of the most remarkable in the history of support for state violence, requires substantial evidence. In the present case, one will seek evidence in vain -- even recognition that it is required.
Suppose, nevertheless, that we take the argument seriously. It plainly loses force to the extent that the subsequent crimes are great. If no Kosovo Albanians had suffered as a result of the NATO bombing campaign, the decision to bomb might be justified on the grounds that crimes against them were deterred. The force of the argument diminishes as the scale of the crimes increases. It is, therefore, rather curious that supporters of the bombing seek to portray the worst possible picture of the crimes for which they share responsibility; the opposite should be the case. The odd stance presumably reflects the success in instilling the doctrine that the crimes incited by the NATO bombing provide retrospective justification for it.
This is by no means the only impressive feat of doctrinal management. Another is the debate over NATO's alleged "double standards," revealed by its "looking away" from other humanitarian crises, or "doing too little" to prevent them. Participants in the debate must be agreeing that NATO was guided by humanitarian principles in Kosovo -- precisely the question at issue. That aside, the Clinton administration did not "look away" or "do too little" in the face of atrocities in East Timor, or Colombia, or many other places. Rather, along with its allies, it chose to escalate the atrocities, often vigorously and decisively.
Perhaps the case of Turkey -- within NATO and under European jurisdiction -- is the most relevant in the present connection. Its ethnic cleansing operations and other crimes, enormous in scale, were carried out with a huge flow of military aid from the Clinton administration, increasing as atrocities mounted. They have also virtually disappeared from history. There was no mention of them at the 50th-anniversary meeting of NATO in April 1999, held under the shadow of ethnic cleansing -- a crime that cannot be tolerated, participants and commentators declaimed, near the borders of NATO; only within its borders, where the crimes are to be expedited. With rare exceptions, the press has kept to occasional apologetics, though the participation of Turkish forces in the Kosovo campaign was highly praised. More recent debate over the problems of "humanitarian intervention" evades the crucial US role in the Turkish atrocities, or ignores the topic altogether.
* This is the second of a four-part series
