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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 May 2000 Issue No. 482 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 May 2000 Issue No. 482
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Features Heritage Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Reaching the limit
By Graham UsherWhile Palestinian masked youths were dodging Israeli army bullets throughout the West Bank amid the strongest protests in years marking the 52 anniversary of the Nakba, or Israel's creation on 15 May, news came that the Israeli cabinet had finally approved the transfer of Abu Dis and its sister Azzariyyah and Sawahara villages to "full" Palestinian Authority "control". It was "a step in the right direction -- but only one step," commented one PA official. But it was a step too far for the right and religious parties in Ehud Barak's government, six of whose ministers voted against the decision.
Among them were four from the Sephardi Orthodox Shas movement, a constituency Prime Minister Ehud Barak has long seen as vital to the "grand coalition" he seeks for an agreement with the Palestinians. On Monday night, nine of their members also voted against the transfer in the Knesset with eight others "absenting" themselves from the count. It was enough to give Barak a slim 56-48 majority in favour of the decision. But it appears that the five-member National Religious Party is now on its way out of the coalition, outraged by Barak's "free gift" of Abu Dis to Arafat.
Given these ruptures -- and after already eight months of delay -- why did Barak choose 15 May of all days to approve the transfer? One reason is his need to demonstrate to President Bill Clinton (whom he meets in Washington next Saturday) that he has the will and the ability to make the "difficult decisions" required for even a partial agreement with the Palestinians. This is especially so given the fact that the "gift" the PA received was anything but "free".
According to US security officials quoted in the Israeli media on 14 May, 10 days ago PA security forces arrested Mohamed Deif in Gaza. Deif is the leader of Islamist Hamas movement's military wing, and has long been sought by the PA and Israel for his alleged role in a string of suicide and military actions inside Israel since 1994. On news of the capture, Israeli security sources expressed "satisfaction" with the PA's increasingly effective "counter-terrorism". PA officials denied the arrest of Deif, but conceded that one of his top aides was held in a Gaza prison.
A Palestinian policeman (l) fights with Israeli soldiers during clashes in Gaza
(photo: Reuters)It is not difficult to fathom the logic of Arafat's latest move against an increasingly disabled Hamas. Barak may have little time for the notion of "land for peace", but he and every other Israeli does have an interest in the notion of land for their own security. Arafat has long accepted this trade-off but on condition that he actually gets land, and certainly more than the 40 per cent of disconnected plots in the West Bank and 80 per cent of Gaza he currently controls.
But there are other trade-offs Arafat may not be able to make, and the strength of the Palestinian protests on 15 May demonstrated why. Far more than Barak, it is likely to be the Palestinian leader who will be under pressure from the US not only to bring the protests in the occupied territories to heel, but also to evince "flexibility" on those aspirations that brought his people out onto the streets. For these are not about the transfer of Abu Dis to PA control but rather for Jerusalem, the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and the freedom from jail of all Palestinian prisoners, including those with "Jewish blood on their hands". And on these core issues of Palestinian nationalism Arafat may find that his "coalition" is no less fragile than Barak's.
While the occupied territories were ablaze, chief PLO negotiator for the final status talks, Yasser Abed Rabbo, tendered his resignation. He did so in protest at the existence of "more than one channel" for the negotiations and out of the fear that these may be "a ploy invented by Israel -- in collaboration with outside parties-- to create loopholes in the Palestinian position" on Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders and statehood.
Abed Rabbo is a loyalist; his letter "voiced confidence and support to the wise leadership of President Arafat". And that is why Arafat had probably announced on Tuesday his rejection of his aide's resignation. But Abed Rabbo knows the current exasperated, distrustful mood of his people, and the message his resignation sends is every bit as resonant as the thousands of Israeli Jews who demonstrated against the government in Zion Square in West Jerusalem on 15 May. They were warning Barak that he "cannot divide" Jerusalem. Abed Rabbo -- and those other Palestinians who fought and died in the name of Jerusalem -- is warning Arafat that he cannot accept Abu Dis as a substitute for it.
