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Al-Ahram Weekly 25 - 31 May 2000 Issue No. 483 |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Open hostilities, hidden agendas
By Gamal Nkrumah *
The Ethiopian army scored a runaway success with its Eritrean campaign, so it seems. Ten-nil to Ethiopia, one might say. Ethiopian forces have advanced deep into Eritrean territory and Eritrean forces are being deployed in and around the capital, as well as in strategic military locations and Red Sea ports, which have come under intensive artillary and air strikes by Ethiopian forces. On Monday, the Ethiopians were reported to be heading toward Mandefera, 96 kilometres south of the Eritrean capital Asmara.
The lightning speed with which the Ethiopian army overran Eritrean military positions took everyone, including the Eritreans, by surprise. The entire southwestern fifth of Eritrea now appears to be under Ethiopian control. The Ethiopians stormed the main Eritrean army training centre at Sena, near the Eritrean-Sudanese border. After their spectacular triumph on the western front, the Ethiopians are moving east toward the disputed Zalambessa region.
But the Ethiopians are hardly on firmer ground. The current hostilities are by far the biggest expeditionary force against Eritreans since the Ethiopian army hastily evacuated Eritrea almost a decade ago. Ethiopia's punitive campaign, cruelly timed, coincides with the seventh anniversary of Eritrean independence from Ethiopia. Needless to say, preparations for celebrations marking the anniversary on Wednesday were muted and described as a "show of defiance."
Ethiopia's show of air power is intended to give the message that the Ethiopian army can more than adequately deal with anything the Eritreans can throw at it. Both sides have each spent an estimated $1 million a day on the war effort since the outbreak of hostilities in 1998, but Ethiopia's money seeems to have been wiser spent. Ethiopia's policy of purchasing relatively sophisticated weaponry seems to have paid off, while Eritrea has paid dearly for investing in small arms, more suited to guerrilla warfare -- a policy leftover from the days of the national liberation war against successive Ethiopian regimes.
Ethiopia has bought relatively sophisticated communications equipment from France and has spent $150 million on eight Russian Sukhoi 27 fighters, which has significantly altered the course of battle. The fighter jets proved critical in butressing Ethiopia's air power and Ethiopian air forces made ample use of them in the intense air bombardments that cleared the way for the ground troops to move into position. Eritrea likewise spent $150 million to purchase Russian-made MiG 29 interceptors, but these have yet to prove their worth in battle. Eritrea also purchased attack helicopters from Italy, but again these have not been put to the test.
Ethiopia and Eritrea are buying death machines they can ill afford, even the dreaded BM21 multi-barrelled rocket launchers, better known as "Stalin's Organs." Last week, the United Nations Security Council imposed a 12-month arms embargo on the two warring neighbours but it is unlikely to have any immediate or short-term effect. Russia, which reluctantly agreed to the embargo, and Bulgaria have supplied both sides with arms and ammunition; and in any case, the Horn of Africa countries -- Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia -- are awash with weapons.
The Eritreans say that tens of thousands of Ethiopian troops were butchered as they were ordered into human wave attacks against Eritrean positions and also claim to have shot down an SU-27 warplane, an MI-24 helicopter gunship and scores of tanks. Claims and counter-claims abound, but by refusing international arbitration for delineating common borders neither government has strengthened its moral case.
Charactarised by a stubborn defensiveness, official statements tend to downplay the underlying dynamics and impetus for war. There is absolutely no need for such lack of candour. The real causes of the war, which one suspects is the rivalry for regional hegemony, is never presented at peace talks and negotiating tables. Thus, under cover of a verbal feint, the actual motives behind the war get swept under the carpet. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, we have seen it at Ouagadougou and again more recently in Algiers. The protagonists couched in the empty sloganeering of diplomatic language used all the old tricks to try and trip up their opponents. Mediators, watching the meaningless verbal fusillades, gave up in exasperation.
But what is the purpose of this show of military prowess? Eritreans fear that the real cause of the escalation in violence is aimed at toppling the Eritrean government. Yemane Ghebreab, political advisor to Eritrean president Isaias Aferwerki, told Al-Ahram Weekly that Ethiopia has set up a "provisional Eritrean government" in exile in Mekele, capital of Ethiopia's Tigray region. "Addis Ababa installed Abdallah Idriss as puppet head of the Eritrean government-in-waiting," Ghebreab said, but the Eritreans warn of dire consequences.
"We have fought a long and bitter war of national liberation and the Eritrean people will never accept the imposition of a governmnet subservient to the Ethiopian regime," Ghebreab added.
Indeed, Eritreans are demonstrating around the world, and angry words were backed up with generous deeds -- Eritreans abroad raised over $150 million toward the war effort. Eritrea also raised funds from treasury bonds. In comparison, Ethiopians abroad, who far outnumber Eritreans overseas could only come up with $750,000. The figures speak for themselves.
Eritrea boasts of killing and injuring 25,000 Ethiopian troops. Ethiopia scoffs at the figure, pointing out that it has routed the Eritrean army in Bademe, Om Hajer, Barentu and Teseney. Ethiopian forces last Wednesday announced that they captured the Eritrean town of Barentu in the lush region of Gosh Barka. There are still the territories of Zalambessa, Boda-Bure, Alitena and Irob, which the Ethiopians say are occupied by the Eritreans. The latest Ethiopian offensives suggest that Addis Ababa is directing operations against the Eritrean forces in these disputed areas.
One of the abiding failings of the Horn of Africa conflicts is that there are too many hidden agendas that invariably impact other secondary and tertiary wars. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are fighting wars by proxy in Somalia. The Ethiopians invaded Somalia several times in recent years, ostensibly to chase members of the militant Islamist group Al-Itihad Al-Islami. And forces of two secessionist Ethiopian movements -- the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have their rear bases deep in Somali territory.
Ethiopia supports Puntland -- a virtually autonomous political entity in the northeastern tip of Somalia -- but at one time Addis Ababa was the chief ally of Somaliland, another unilaterally independent Somali state in the northwestern part of the country. Since both Puntland and Somaliland are embroiled in a territorial dispute, the Ethiopians have had a hard time reining in the two rival breakaway states.
Eritrea has chosen to back Hussein Aidid, arguably Ethiopia's bitterest Somali foe and the favourite Somali warlord of several key Arab states. Ethiopians at one point backed General Omar Haji Mohamed -- better known as "Masaleh" -- leader of the Somali National Front, which has the upper hand in the Gedo region of Somalia. Ethiopian troops even briefly occupied the Gedo region of Somalia in 1997. Masalah, however, later ditched the Ethiopians in favour of Aidid.
The Ethiopians then backed yet another dark horse -- General Mohamed Siyad Hersi, popularly known as "Morgan", who holds sway in the southern Somali port of Kismayo. But it is the Rahenweyne Resistance Army (RRA) that has emerged as Ethiopia's most reliable ally in war-torn Somalia. The Ethiopian-trained RRA captured the strategically-situated central city of Baidoa from the forces of Aidid.
Peace in the Horn of Africa cannot be truncated; the parties concerned must show that they are negotiating in good faith. A resolution of the current crisis entails a far more frank and comprehensive discussion on the numerous conflicts going on in the Horn of Africa, within Ethiopia and, of course, in Somalia.
Early this week, Eritrean Ambassador to Egypt Mohamed Omar delivered an official request from President Aferwerki to President Mubarak for Egypt to use its political weight to mediate the current crisis in the Horn of Africa.
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