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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 June 2000 Issue No. 484 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 June 2000 Issue No. 484
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Features Heritage Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Just passing through
By Abdel-Wahab Badrakhan *As is customary, the gap between the people and government was quite apparent. Arab public opinion rejoiced at the news of the Lebanese victory, all the more jubilantly because such good news is scarce. Governments, however, were more reserved; the silence, indeed, was almost audible. This official reticence reflects some fear of the event. Perhaps the problem was acknowledging those responsible for the victory, because those leading the celebrations are "Islamists." Then again, the silence could have been due to the fact that this victory exposes the impotence prevailing throughout the rest of the Arab world. Whatever the reasons, the victory is a major accomplishment with significant repercussions on both Arab and Israeli fronts.
As a first step, the silly debate concerning the "identity" of the victors must stop. We should acknowledge the event as a real victory, and consequently a responsibility, not as a free bonus, because its cost is counted in the lives of thousands of martyrs and wounded, and hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, not to mention a psychological and social damage that is impossible to estimate. The Arabs should not be fighting about who scored the first blow against Israel. They are still feeling the pain of utter defeat. They are trying to contain its impact peacefully, in a manner that still does not seem credible. At the end of the day, the lessons learned about our enemy, ourselves and our abilities, as well as what the enemy learns from his failures and successes, are the important aspects of any victory.
The Lebanese victory will affect the peace process as a whole, if only by encouraging people to carry on the struggle until they have obtained their rights. This event will undoubtedly leave its mark on US efforts to achieve complete Arab-Israeli peace, as well as the Israeli understanding of this peace. We must not deceive each other. Israel would not have withdrawn from south Lebanon if it had seen a way of continuing the occupation.
This is the first victory ever of its kind. Israel was not defeated in the military sense. The south Lebanese war did not provide the circumstances for a military battle in which Israel could use its sophisticated weapons to destroy the opponent and occupy more land. It was a daily war of attrition that made Israel's presence as an occupying force a losing political wager. There was no way it could justify the occupation. Israel also suffered human losses it could not force public opinion to accept. Therefore, it decided to withdraw. And because this was the first decision of its kind taken by the Israeli government, it took the form of defeat due to Israel's habit of arrogantly advertising its invincibility.
Because the withdrawal/defeat took place during the "peace process" era, in which Israel achieved many gains because the military balance is tilted in its favour, Lebanon proved that its military prowess is not always useful. Had Israel been fighting the Lebanese army, the war would have been settled in its favour long ago. The resistance, however, was another matter.
Moreover, for the first time Israel found itself facing a resistance that it could not deal with as it had done with the Palestinian resistance, or even with the Lebanese resistance following the invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982. The confrontation was rendered more difficult because Israeli soldiers were facing Hizbullah fighters who do not fear death and do not hesitate before suicide operations when necessary. In recent years, Hizbullah has not given priority to such operations, however, preferring to invest its energy in major operations characterised by courage and accuracy. The South Lebanon Army, Israel's proxy, was infiltrated. Lebanese and Syrian intelligence cooperated with Hizbullah to make the job easier. Little by little, the Israelis realised that they were exposed.
The Israeli occupation of south Lebanon no longer had a function after the end of the civil war in 1990 and the re-establishment of the Lebanese state after a forced 15-year absence. It could no longer be justified, in fact, after the PLO left Beirut in 1982. Even Palestinians in the camps were incapable of establishing an effective structure for armed resistance across the border. The return of the Lebanese state, supported by Syria, or under exaggerated Syrian control, represented a new and decisive factor for the Lebanese resistance, particularly since Hizbullah had become stronger and had made resisting the occupation a fundamental part of its task. The tripartite equation was thus complete: Syria plans and provides weapons, the Lebanese state provides the legitimate political cover and the resistance operates and executes. Of course, there was the material support Iran offered the resistance in general, and Hizbullah in particular. The "Lebanese front" proved dangerous to the "security" of Israelis, be they soldiers in occupied areas or settlers in north Israel. Even more dangerous was the front's effect on the security of the peace process itself.
Despite repeated Israeli declarations since the Madrid conference that it was not interested in Lebanese land or in continued occupation, and although it made various suggestions for withdrawal from the "quagmire," it failed to end "the coordination of the Syrian-Lebanese tracks," as the equation was termed in the peace negotiations. Israel -- and the US -- tabled several projects for peace with Lebanon. They attempted partial withdrawal from some areas. The Netanyahu government offered to implement Resolution 425 (which dictates complete Israeli withdrawal) on the condition that security agreements be signed with the Lebanese government. Before he was elected, Barak promised to withdraw from south Lebanon, hoping that this pledge would help pacify the situation. These and other attempts failed, as did the use of force, in the form of massive destruction campaigns under Yitzhak Rabin (summer of 1993), a new offensive launched during the time of Shimon Peres (the "Grapes of Wrath" operation and the Qana massacre of April 1996), or the bombing of power stations and infrastructure under both Netanyahu (July 1999) and Barak (February 2000).
Everyone seemed convinced that a Syrian-American peace had to precede a solution to south Lebanon. The US repeatedly, but always in vain, attempted to convince Damascus that a cease-fire was necessary to a breakthrough in negotiations. Syria saw the resistance as another negotiating. It also reasoned that, in any case, and regardless of the type of peace concluded with Israel, Lebanon was the only front from which it could control the Palestinians and dissolve the resistance if Islamist trends grew too powerful. Syria also saw itself as the only party capable of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon. Syria, therefore, seemed poised to play a pivotal role in regional post-peace arrangements. All this seemed possible at the beginning of the year, at least, when Syrian-Israeli negotiations were resumed. The negotiations soon stumbled, however, then froze after two rounds at Blair House and Shepherdstown, and following a rescue attempt at the Geneva summit. Israel was not prepared to fulfil the requirements of peace with Syria and thus brought about the collapse. At that point, withdrawal from Lebanon seemed less costly.
To achieve its aims, Israel chose to comply meekly with international law, for the first time since it was implanted in the Arab world. What it could not obtain through security arrangements with the Lebanese authorities, it sought to obtain through international channels. Its forces would exist either as a buffer zone defending Israel's borders, or they would not exist at all. In this case, the Lebanese front would remain open to all possibilities. Thus, Israel would have transferred its problems to the opposite side.
The resistance has accomplished its task by forcing an Israeli withdrawal, but is no longer useful as a negotiating card unless Syria, the Lebanese state, the resistance and Iran, as allies, can rewrite its function and transform it into a reason for continued dispute. As long as the Golan remains occupied, furthermore, the resistance must continue. This logic has now come up against the new reality imposed by the Israeli withdrawal. South Lebanon is no longer suitable for such a struggle; any future escalation will mean a war, in which Israel will appear to be defending "its land."
Moreover, the need to end the Syrian military presence in Lebanon was strongly argued in American diplomatic circles and the media. Debates about this point may arise during the coming stage: whether to avoid a Syrian-Israeli war, under the pretext of "protecting Israeli security," or of strengthening Lebanon's independence and state sovereignty. Encouraging Syria to withdraw from Lebanon will be packaged as a warning against renewed conflicts. True, the call for withdrawal remains the jurisdiction of the Lebanese state, but in the current situation, it does not seem prepared for such a step. The Israeli withdrawal requires that Lebanon decide. On the international level, the Israeli withdrawal is seen as peace, without agreements or normalisation. The Lebanese state must now deal with it as peace, and thus refrain from involvement in continuing disputes until complete peace is reached.
Any external power that felt it had scored a point was soon disappointed. Lebanon, like all small countries, can serve as a passage to everyone, but no one remains. The Israeli withdrawal constitutes a new beginning. It does not mean, however, that Lebanon will find complete internal peace.
*The writer is a columnist and political analyst with Al-Hayatnewspaper.
