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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters After the last days are done
By Gamil Mattar *
President Hafez Al-Assad has passed away at a time when we are required to think about the shape the region will take in peacetime or, more precisely, in the post-settlement phase. From now on, people will tend to link two concepts that do not necessarily coincide: "the post-settlement phase" and "the post-Assad phase."
I do not find this tendency odd -- not because there is no direct connection between peace and Assad, for there certainly is. Rather, it is because Syria is once more the focal point in the Middle East for competing regional and international leaderships and spheres of influence. Syria occupied that position from the 1940s until the day when Egypt decided to reduce its regional role in a manner that would permit it to conclude a separate peace with Israel. Egypt's partial withdrawal from the regional arena left a vacuum that could well have exposed Syria to the ambitions of its neighbours had Assad not acted so quickly to fill the void with his personal dynamism and the latent potential of Syria itself. As a result, Syria was transformed: once the playing field for regional and international power ploys, it became a power in its own right, extending its influence beyond its borders and implementing quasi-expansionist policies.
In the 1940s, all Arab governments had their eyes on Syria. Indeed, Syria aroused greater concern in Arab capitals than the events then taking place in Palestine. Baghdad, Amman, Riyadh and Cairo were obsessed with their contest over Syria, while in Syria itself the interplay of various political trends was largely motivated by this inter-Arab tug of war. One movement alone, the Syrian Nationalist Movement, rebelled against this situation and, through its appeal for Greater Syria, sought to transform Syria into a full-fledged contestant.
The Arab ruling houses at the time saw Syria as a great strategic prize for those who could bring it into an alliance or under their control. They also knew, however, that the loss of Syria would be devastating to the entire Arab cause. They were taunted by the prospect of Syria falling under the control of non-Arabs or of an arrogant clique that would turn it against the Arabs and either seek regional domination or adopt a policy of isolation. Nor were political and military leaders in the Arabian Peninsula or in Egypt ignorant of the fact that all the territories separating Syria from them were of strategic value as passageways to be secured or obstacles to be fortified. Still, control over these areas was never a goal in and of itself. The ultimate goal -- for Arabs and non-Arabs -- was always, from the age of the Mamelukes to the present, Syria. The British in the heyday of their empire were thoroughly aware of this fact, which is why they occupied Palestine, the corridor to the heart of the Levant, and the Jordanian desert, the barrier to the same destination.
The conflict over Syria was the first issue of discord among the Arabs during the founding of the Arab League, although the dispute lasted long after the establishment of this institution. At a time when war with Israel was imminent, the Arabs were embroiled in their rivalry over Syria and were making projections about "the region after the British and French evacuation." Today, once again, the Arabs, along with many others, are scrambling over Syria as they discuss "the region after peace is concluded." Then and now, when the Arab ruling elites talked about "the region after..." what they were really referring to was the future of Greater Syria and the fight to shape that future.
The contenders in the struggle over Syria have changed; there can be no doubt about that. In the 1940s, they were Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Egypt. These countries continue to fight over Syria, even if they pretend not to. On closer inspection of their numerous policies and military and political alliances, we find that these same parties are readying themselves for a renewed scramble over Syria. Their preparations suggest that the contest promises to be more heated than it was 50 years ago, a conjecture that bears itself out when we examine the foreign policies and alliances of Turkey, Iran and Israel. Indeed, I would wager that the Palestinian Authority will also join the fray.
I cannot pretend to know what goes on in the minds of Egyptian foreign policy-makers, but I see signs of apprehension in Cairo. It is not just Israel's continued possession of a nuclear arsenal, along with the delivery systems that can target any country in the region for destruction, that accounts for this anxiety. I believe that when Amr Moussa declared in Palmyra recently that the Syrian question was nonnegotiable and could not be dealt with in isolation, he was expressing the real and more important reason for Egyptian anxiety. Apprehension in Egypt dates back to the sudden tensions between Syria and Turkey two years ago. The pressure continued to rise as negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli track were bogged down by successive complications, the most recent instance of which was the crisis in Geneva concocted to embarrass Assad and mar Syria's international reputation. Compounding Cairo's trepidation were the attempts to exacerbate the crisis in Lebanon; the developing military alliance between Turkey and Israel, with Jordanian participation; Iran's remarkably rapid "peaceful" reintegration; and Israel's growing military interest in Kurdistan, that vital geographical juncture between northeastern Syria, northwest Iraq and southeastern Turkey, from where it is possible to strike directly into the Iranian heartland. Last but not least, there was Iraq's singular attempt to influence the situation in Syria when Baghdad announced that Saddam Hussein was to be the secretary-general of the Socialist Arab Baath Party, a position that had remained vacant since the death of Michel Aflaq.
While all these developments do not necessarily point to the growing likelihood of a renewed scramble over Syria, Syria is nevertheless at their centre, or at least closely associated with them. This alone is a source of anxiety for Cairo and Riyadh.
After a long slumber, a renewed tug of war over Syria is looming on the horizon, but with graver and more far-reaching implications. The circumstances have changed and the contenders have multiplied. All the old Arab players have returned to the field and Turkey, Israel, Iran and the PA have joined the melee. Meanwhile, the butt of this enterprise appears stable; but this stability is borne more of violence and oppression than of popular consensus.
*The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Studies.
