 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Between the old guard and public opinion
By Wahid Abdel-Meguid *
Can the new Syrian president look forward to a time of stability, or will he be compelled to confront internal opposition? This is the question upon which Syria's future, but also the region's image in the coming period, depend. Many regional issues are related to the results of Syrian-Israeli negotiations and whether the conflict will end. Although the cliché that there can be no war without Egypt and no peace without Syria is an exaggeration, it contains a measure of truth.
The resumption of the negotiations, and their ultimate outcome, will depend on Syria's domestic situation. Will Bashar Al-Assad and his supporters within the regime be able to control the situation? This question assumes the presence of two contending factions within the Syrian regime. On the whole, this is a correct assumption. The balance of power and its impact on domestic conditions, however, are more important.
Following the death of his elder son Basil and the resulting confusion concerning power, the late president made serious efforts for many years to prepare the domestic front for Bashar's accession. It was clear that such preparations required time. They were not yet complete when Assad died last Saturday. Still, he had made major progress toward ensuring the loyalty of the main security bodies to the new president, with some doubts concerning military intelligence, the head of which, Ali Duba, was dismissed by the late president.
The effectiveness of the security forces became apparent when the parliament was convened immediately after the president's death to amend Article 83 of the Syrian Constitution, regarding the age requirements of the president.
In an emergency session, the article was modified to change the minimum age. Thus, the security forces' complete loyalty to Bashar has been assured.
Doubts linked to military intelligence pertained to several factors, the most significant of which was the escape of the former military chief of staff, Hekmat Al-Shehabi, from Beirut to the United States some days earlier, despite military intelligence's influence in Lebanon. Al-Shehabi had been singled out in the Syrian media's examination of an anti-corruption campaign launched against former prime minister Mahmoud Al-Zoghbi, who committed suicide after being accused of corruption.
It was thought that Al-Shehabi, who was nominated to succeed Assad before Bashar was selected for grooming, would also be pursued. His flight to Washington therefore raised doubts about the military intelligence's loyalty, and the position of its leader in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan. Perhaps, too, Bashar Al-Assad's supporters preferred to get rid of Al-Shehabi in this way rather than risk the trial of one of the most important figures in the old guard. It is within these circles that reservations against Bashar's assumption of power were expressed.
The second sign of ambivalence on the part of military intelligence was the recent situation in Lebanon. On one level, there were increasing demands that Syrian troops withdraw in the wake of the Israeli forces. On the second, some Lebanese forces, traditional allies of Syria, showed solidarity with Al-Shehabi when he was accused of corruption. Most significantly, the Druze leader Walid Junblat spoke out against the campaign, while some of his assistants implied that it had been engineered from Bashar Al-Assad's office.
It is not clear whether the revolt against Syria in Lebanon is due to deliberate negligence on the part of military intelligence, or to its decreasing ability to control the situation.
On the whole, however, the performance of the security forces during the hours following the president's death affirm their loyalty to his son, as well as their success in overcoming the first obstacle, namely the constitutional text related to the president's minimum age.
The haste with which the modification was effected may indicate confusion rather than confidence. This would point to a desire to settle matters before those who are reluctant to see Bashar take over are able to organise themselves. It also suggests a desire to seize the moment when emotions hold sway, making it easy for public opinion to accept exceptional procedures.
Had Bashar Al-Assad's supporters felt confident, they would not have been so keen on effecting the modification in a way that could damage the incumbent's image. It is likely, therefore, that the domestic situation took precedence over considerations of form.
This, in turn, means that some opposition was expected. The opposition is concentrated in the military old guard, the Baath Party and traditional leaders of the Sunni majority.
The domestic situation will also depend on the Alawi old guard and its ability to pose a challenge after the dismissal of its most significant leaders, including Hekmat Al-Shehabi and Ali Duba.
Sunni leaders are naturally concerned that the Alawis, a minority not exceeding 15 per cent of the population, will retain power. The Sunnis, however, will not make their reservations public unless the Alawi old guard does so first.
It is not yet clear if the old guard will accept being pushed aside after many of its members have played such important roles in supporting and preserving the Hafez Al-Assad regime. Nor is it clear whether the anti-corruption campaign terrorised the old guard into keeping quiet or motivated it to face its leaders' reservations.
Since the 1949 coup, Syria has used anti-corruption measures as a tool in the struggle for power. The leaders of the coup, in fact, were the first to use the anti-corruption slogan for political reasons.
This tool, therefore, may or may not be useful to Bashar Al-Assad. It will be in his interest to use it in tandem with other measures that establish a new political legitimacy capable of mobilising real public acceptance. There are indicators that Bashar Al-Assad enjoys some popularity among the new generations, which look forward to change and believe the incoming president's interest in technology shows a willingness to modernise.
Bashar could build on this base of acceptance if he links his interest in technology with economic and political reform to end Syria's isolation from the process of global transformation. He can implement gradual changes that are sure to gain him real popularity. He seems qualified for this task, if we are to take his interests in recent years as an indicator. Once he has consolidated his own position, he can eliminate any power the old guard may enjoy. It is important, however, that he refuse to be led by a new guard that is only interested in replacing the old guard and inheriting its privileges. The path is therefore clear before the new Syrian president. It is governed by a very simple formula: eliminate the old guard by ending Syria's isolation, launch political reform and continue the economic reform the late president initiated.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the annual Arab Strategic Report issued by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
