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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2000 Issue No. 486
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters 'Peace' postponed!
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Until President Assad's death on 10 June, most political observers believed that an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could be worked out before the end of the incumbent US president's term next January, and that Clinton stood a good chance of going down in history as the architect of peace in the Middle East.
This optimistic scenario was based less on objective reality, which still remains very far from peace (the Syrian track has still not been reactivated, and as far as the Palestinian track is concerned, the most intractable issues have been left to the final stage talks) than on a subjective factor, which is Clinton's tireless efforts to achieve a breakthrough on this foreign policy front and thus secure a prominent place for himself in history books, perhaps even a Nobel prize, despite his many failures and scandals.
However, this subjective factor comes up against two constraints: the first is that the window of opportunity is open to Clinton for only a few weeks before events outstrip him and attention shifts to the election of the new president; the second is that if Bashar Al-Assad wants to come to an agreement, he will have to make a significant departure from his father's line, which is hardly conceivable in the very close future.
What Bashar will probably focus on as soon as he takes office is how to consolidate his power in the face of challenges from other 'centres of power' that are likely to emerge. It is a development that cannot be discounted, especially if we consider the recent spate of corruption trials in which top-level officials were implicated and which, it is said, were launched at Bashar's instigation. Syria's prime minister for 13 years, Mahmoud Al-Zoghbi, committed suicide after being charged with corruption while the former chief of Syria's intelligence agency, Hekmat Al-Shehabi, left Syria accompanied to the airport by two top Syrian dignitaries only days before he too was charged. Such events do not bode well for a smooth transition of power.
This explains the speed with which the Constitution was amended, only hours after Hafez Al-Assad's death, and the minimum age for presidential candidates reduced from 40 to 34, so that his son Bashar could be eligible for office. The decision was passed unanimously at what is arguably the shortest parliamentary session ever, which wound up its business in a record 15 minutes. Such developments signal that the near future promises other surprises, and that working out a peace settlement with Israel will certainly not be the top item on the Syrian leadership's agenda in the immediate future.
The unprecedented step of presidential power passing from father to son is sure to provoke heated debate in the Arab world. Without going into how legitimate it is for a republic to apply the rules of succession of a monarchy, or whether this phenomenon can become generalised to other Arab countries, I would like to focus here on what is specific to Syria in this respect.
For close to a decade before his death, Hafez Al-Assad was systematically manoeuvring to ensure that the reins of power would pass to one of his sons. His original choice was his first-born, Basil, but after he was killed in a car accident, Assad began grooming his second son Bashar to take over. While this leaves the late Syrian president open to charges of dynastic ambitions, this would be an overly simplistic reading of the situation. To place matters in their proper perspective, we must not lose sight of the fact that Assad's most enduring political legacy is his refusal to back down from his determination to restore all the territory Syria lost in 1967. It is understandable that he would want his legacy to survive his death by ensuring that whoever succeeded him would not be tempted to abandon his principled stand or soften the uncompromising line he has always adopted towards Israel, and it is in this that we can find an 'objective' explanation for his insistence on naming a son of his to succeed him. For who could be better trusted not to squander his legacy than his own son?
Everything had been prepared to consecrate Bashar's status as vice-president and heir apparent in an extraordinary congress of the ruling Baath Party that was to have been held on 17 June. But one week before the scheduled session, Hafez Al-Assad was dead. His death left a power vacuum that the Syrian regime rushed to fill by calling a special session of parliament to amend the Constitution and tailor it to fit Bashar's specifications, to ensure a smooth transition of power.
Hafez Al-Assad had prepared for the succession exactly as Barak had prepared for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. But in both cases the preparations were not enough to preclude surprises. When Israel's proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army, realised that Israel was planning to withdraw without making any provision for their safety, they fled in disarray. Some sought refuge in Israel, others surrendered to the Lebanese army or even to Hizbullah guerrillas. This was an eventuality that had not figured in Barak's calculations, and he found himself forced to withdraw three weeks ahead of schedule, leaving a power vacuum in southern Lebanon that was immediately filled by Hizbullah. With no buffer separating Hizbullah fighters from the settlers in northern Israel, Israel's self-proclaimed security zone was suddenly transformed into what is perhaps its least secure border. If it were not for Hizbullah's admirable self-restraint, the Lebanese front could have exploded into violence with disastrous consequences for the entire region.
Hafez Al-Assad's death is another example of the best-laid plans being defeated by unforeseen events, in other words, by the surprise element. His passing too led to a vacuum of power and created an ambivalent situation that carries within it the potential for unrest on the domestic front. In terms of foreign policy as well, the situation is highly charged. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is to Syria's advantage in that it paves the way for a similar withdrawal from the Golan. After all, Israel justifies its occupation of Syrian territory, as it did its occupation of Lebanese territory, in terms of its security requirements (including, possibly water security), not in terms of ideological considerations, as neither Syria nor Lebanon are part of the biblical land of Israel to which the Jewish state lays claim.
But the withdrawal from Lebanon has also produced negative side effects, particularly as relates to Syria's image on the world stage. International public opinion finds it hard to understand Syria's insistence on de-linking its presence in Lebanon from the Israeli occupation. Syria's argument is that it was called in by the Lebanese government to protect Lebanon from sectarian strife, unlike Israel which entered Lebanon as an occupation force.
Positive and negative factors combined have created a number of unusual paradigms, such as Farouk Al-Sharaa's statement, which was not confirmed by the Lebanese government, that Lebanon will not sign a treaty with Israel as long as Syria does not. Then there is the Shebaa issue. Syria has not laid claim to the Shebaa Farms, in order not to adopt a stand identical to that of Israel. At the same time, however, it has not confirmed that they are Lebanese, declaring only that it will back the Lebanese government's position in this respect. Al-Sharaa has said that regardless of whether the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese or Syrian, what is certain is that, as Israel itself admits, they are not Israeli, and that "the implementation of Security Council resolution should not be selective."
Such ambiguities can only be dissipated by a strong leader whose decisions are not questioned. This is an attribute that cannot be inherited but must be built up by each individual political figure out of his own experience. It is a process that takes time and, accordingly, Syria cannot at this juncture formulate policies that deviate in any way from Hafez Al-Assad's line without slipping into dangerous waters. Thus the hope that a declaration of overall peace in the region can be issued before Clinton terminates his presidency seems to have been dashed. Such a declaration will have to be postponed indefinitely, because Clinton's successor is bound to have different priorities and is unlikely to give the Middle East crisis the same degree of attention that Clinton devoted to it.
The failure to come up with such a declaration is not necessarily a bad thing. For if it is true that, when it comes to the Syrian track, the first step is the most difficult, the very opposite is true on the Palestinian track, where all the most difficult problems (Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, etc.) have been deferred to the final stage. All these issues cannot be addressed, let alone resolved, in a matter of weeks, and even if a declaration claiming otherwise is issued before next January, it will be nothing more than cosmetics without substance. The problem is that whoever questions the validity of such a "peace" will be accused of being anti-peace and of encouraging subversive activities. This will only make the prospects of a genuine and just peace in the region more remote than ever.
